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Martin Dackling, Poul Duedahl
& Bo Poulsen

Reformer og ressourcer

Reforms and Resources

Rapporter til det 29. Nordiske Historikermøde,
bind 2

AALBORG UNIVERSITETSFORLAG

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Inledning

Bidragen i denna antologi har tillkommit i anslutning till det 29. Nordiska historikermötet i Aalborg i augusti 2017. Som läsaren kommer att finna visar de sju ingående artiklarna på historieämnets stora bredd, både vad gäller ämnen, tidsepoker och tematik, och ifråga om problemformuleringar, analysnivåer och teoretiska verktyg. Den övergripande rubriken för bandet är reformer och resurser, två begrepp som antologins artiklar på olika sätt förhåller sig till. Reformer och historiska förändringar är centralt för historievetenskapen, men kan vara av mycket skilda slag: från snabba historiska förändringar, till de mer trögrörliga strukturer som Fernand Braudel åsyftade med begreppet *la longue durée*. På liknande sätt finns också en stor variation i vad som historiskt har betraktats som resurser samt hur tillgång, användning och förståelse av dessa gestaltat sig. I blickfånget för antologins artiklar står följaktligen en rad olika resurser – från människor och djur till jord och energi – som alla fogats in historiska förlopp och förändringar.

Sjuttonhundratalet brukar ibland beskrivas som epidemiernas århundrade, men det var långtifrån bara människor som blev sjuka. I sitt bidrag analyserar Johanna Widenberg bekämpningen av

boskapspest i Sverige under 1700-talet. Sjukdomar krävde många offer bland lantbruksdjuren och smittspridningen var stor, inte minst på grund av att djurbesättningar blandades på gemensamma sommarbeten. Till följd av detta började myndigheterna utarbeta olika bekämpningsmetoder. Vid sidan om enstaka exempel på medicinska ingrepp, var de främsta åtgärderna avspärrning och utslaktning i syfte att hindra spridning. Widenberg konstaterar att sjukdomsbekämpningen i Sverige i stora drag följde samma mönster som andra europeiska länder, men pekar även ut säregenheter som behovet att möta återkommande angrepp av mjältbrand och att myndigheterna tidigt tog initiativ till utslaktningar.

Djur var en viktig resurs i den agrara ekonomin, en annan var själva jorden. Hur ägande och tillgång till jord har reglerats i olika samhällen är därför en central historievetenskaplig fråga. I en komparativt anlagd studie visar Martin Dackling hur brytpunkten från en släktbaserad till en individbaserad egendomsrätt tog sig uttryck i debatterna om släktens rättigheter till jord i Sverige och Norge mellan 1810 och 1860. Trots att den politiska debatten i de två längderna hade många beröringspunkter fick de helt olika följder: släktjordslagstiftningen avvecklades i Sverige, men behölls – och är ännu gällande – i Norge. Dackling visar att en anledning bakom de skilda utfallen var olika referenspunkter i diskussionen, där den svenska debatten i högre grad berörde frågans ekonomiska sida, medan den norska mer uppfattades i en (identitets)politisk kontext.

Jordegendom kännetecknas av att den ovillkorligt är fixerad i rummet, men de flesta resurser utmärks av att de kan transporteras och handlas med. I sin artikel diskuterar Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis och Gilles Paché en central sådan handelskedja: den transatlantiska slavhandeln under tidigmodern tid. Deras intresse rör framför allt frågan hur denna välkända triangelhan-

del organiserades och deras analytiska fokus ligger på infrastruktur och logistik. Som system betraktat kan detta handelssystem analyseras som en distributionskedja, vars existens berodde på möjligheterna att samla kapital, existensen av en afrikansk bytesmarknad, behovet av arbetskraft i amerikanska kolonier samt en fungerande sjöfartsindustri. Tolkad ur ett sådant perspektiv kan den transatlantiska slavhandeln enligt författarna ses som den stora föregångaren till 1900-talets globala distributionskedjor.

Att människor hanterades som handelsvaror var specifikt för slavhandeln. Att de också i andra sammanhang betraktats som en viktig resurs framgår av Sophy Bergenheims artikel om befolkningsfrågan i Finland under 1940-talet. I ljuset av den politiska utvecklingen – särskilt erfarenheterna under vinterkriget – framträdde denna som en nationell ödesfråga. Befolkningen var totalt sett för liten för att kunna försvara sig gentemot angrepp, och befolkningstillväxten var dessutom för låg. I artikeln undersöks politiska diskussioner inom *Väestöliitto*, en expertgrupp för befolkningsfrågor bildad 1941. För att främja en ökad befolkning verkade gruppen på olika sätt för att förbättra såväl befolkningens kvantitet som kvalitet, och Bergenheim finner flera paralleller till det befolkningsprogram som Alva och Gunnar Myrdal vid samma tid introducerade i Sverige. I jämförelse med denna fick emellertid den finska debatten en betydligt mer konservativ inramning, vilket Bergenheim relaterar till landets historiska erfarenheter.

När målet i vissa historiska sammanhang varit att öka en resurs, har det i andra varit att minska beroendet av en annan. Danmark har stundtals betraktats som ett föregångsland ifråga om energibesparing och miljöhänsyn, men hur väl stämmer denna bild? Bo Poulsen undersöker i sin artikel sex statliga danska kampanjer mellan 1974 och 1995, samtliga med syfte att minska energiförbrukning. Poulsen visar att hänsyn till miljön inte spelade nå-

gon framträdande roll i kampanjerna förrän slutet av 1980-talet. Istället låg fokus på att spara pengar, både för det enskilda hushållet och för den danska staten. I kampanjmaterialet framhävdes energibesparing närmaste som en patriotisk handling. Först mot 1980-talets slut förändrades anslaget och energibesparingen rättfärdigades i högre grad av miljöhänsyn, vilket enligt Poulsen kan förstås mot bakgrund av FN:s tilltagande arbete för hållbar utveckling och Tjernobylkatastrofen 1986.

Som påtalats kan resurser vara av mycket olika slag. I Christian Widholms undersökning av kulturarvsentreprenörer står snarast immateriella resurser i centrum. Utgångspunkten i artikeln är frågan hur historia används och ges mening. Diskussioner om kulturarv aktiveras inte sällan i samband med stora samhällsomvandlingar, som ett sätt att fokusera på värdet av den egna identiteten. Med tre exempel från Stockholms skärgård framgår hur ett specifikt maritimt kulturarv lyfts fram och används av olika entreprenörer inom turistnäringen. Widholm påpekar särskilt hur de minnen som aktiverats kan relateras till erfarenheter i de (manliga) entreprenörernas barndom. Referenserna till barndomen fungerar därmed som ett slags emotionellt register med stort inflytande över hur kulturarvet lyfts fram.

Samhällets fördelning av resurser kan analyseras i skilda tidsutsnitt, men också över längre tid. I sitt bidrag anlägger Jørgen Elsøe Jensen ett långt tidsperspektiv och analyserar i ett flertusenårigt perspektiv övergången mellan två civilisationsformer och därmed förbundna födostrategier. Den äldre, klassiska, civilisationsformen kan spåras mycket långt tillbaka i tid, och utmärks av en stark hierarkisk ordning där en elit med tvång försåg sig med nödvändiga resurser på övriga bekostad. Den yngre, främst utvecklad i väst, utmärks enligt Jensen istället av en marknadsutveckling av resurser och ett ömsesidigt beroende, vilket gagnade en demokratisk

och egalitär utveckling. Han knyter denna övergång till järnplogens införande i nordvästra Europa under framför allt 1100-talet, vilket också fick stor betydelse för järnbrytning och järntillverkning i Norden.

Martin Dackling
Poul Duedahl
Bo Poulsen

Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike

Johanna Widenberg

Epizootiernas århundrade …

Det artonde seklet har ofta beskrivits som epidemiernas århundrade. Smittkoppor, dysenteri och andra farsoter härjade svårt bland människorna i Europa.[1] Under samma tid härjade också många djursjukdomar i Europa. Aldrig tidigare hade så många lantbruksdjur dött i så många svårartade infektionssjukdomar. Situationen inom djurhälsan påminde stort om den som rådde inom humanhälsan. Seklet kan därför med rätta beskrivas även som epizootiernas århundrade.[2]

Hur viktiga de stora lantbruksdjuren var i 1700-talets agrara ekonomi kan inte nog understrykas. Svin, får, getter, nötkreatur och hästar verkade som mat-, gödsel- och råvaruproducenter, och de senare även som dragdjur. När kreaturen dog i stora skaror fick det många samhälleliga konsekvenser. Jordbruket i de europeiska länderna påverkades, och därmed livsmedelsförsörjningen. Andra samhällssektorer där djuren och råvarorna hade en central roll berördes också: handel och hantverk, uppbördssystem och militärväsende.[3]

… och människornas kamp för att rädda djuren

Denna artikel handlar om den statliga epizootibekämpning som uppstod och utvecklades i det svenska riket, alltså Sverige och Finland, under 1700-talet. Tidigare hade det funnits regelverk och rutiner för att bekämpa sjukdomsutbrott hos människor, såväl i det svenska riket som i de andra europeiska staterna.[4] Men till följd av farsoternas härjningar bland de stora lantbruksdjuren i 1700-talets Europa utformades alltså system för att motverka även djursjukdomar.

Den svenska epizootibekämpningen växte fram i mötet med de två sjukdomar som gav upphov till störst förluster i den svenska och finska nötkreaturstocken under perioden: boskapspest och mjältbrand. Sjukdomarna härjade våldsamt i det svenska riket och epizootibekämpningen blev med tiden ganska omfattande, sett till organisation och verksamhet. De sjukdomsbekämpande insatserna kom att engagera en stor del av den dåtida statsförvaltningen.

I denna artikel skildras den statligt organiserade kampen mot boskapspest och mjältbrand närmare. Frågan om vilka bekämpningsåtgärder som den svenska statsmakten och dess representanter förespråkade och genomförde för att hindra smittspridningen kommer att besvaras, liksom frågan om varför olika åtgärder valdes i vissa situationer och varför de i praktiken kom att genomföras på vissa sätt.[5] Framställningen kommer att lägga vikt vid internationella jämförelser. Förhoppningen är att kunna tydliggöra särdragen i den svenska epizootibekämpningen, men också att visa på likheter med andra länder.

Nya perspektiv på veterinärmedicinhistorien

Artikeln utgår från den forskning som presenteras i min kommande monografi *Den stora kreatursdöden. Kampen mot boskapspest*

och mjältbrand i 1700-talets svenska rike. Den är för närvarande under publicering och förväntas utkomma år 2017. Studien grundar sig på ett stort empiriskt underlag. Alla de handlingar i det svenska riket som under perioden 1710–1780 tillkom i korrespondensen kring boskapssjukan mellan statsledningen, landshövdingarna och medicinalverken (Collegium Medicum och Sundhetskommissionen) har inventerats och analyserats. Därtill har kungliga förordningar studerats, liksom medicinska skrifter, tidskrifter och lantbrukslitteratur. Studien är den första i sitt slag som tar ett helhetsgrepp om den svenska epizootibekämpningens utveckling. Det regelverk som statsledningen utformade på området är förvisso beskrivet i tidigare veterinärmedicinhistorisk forskning. Några enskilda landshövdingars och medicinares insatser i bekämpningsarbetet har också varit föremål för studium.[6] Men hur kampen mot de stora boskapssjukdomarna organiserades i sin helhet har aldrig tidigare skildrats i forskningen.

Den veterinärmedicinhistoriska forskningen har genomgått stora förändringar under de senaste decennierna. En yngre forskargeneration, bestående av historiker, sociologer och andra forskare med rötter inom humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, har så smått börjat dominera forskningsfältet. Den yngre forskargenerationen har riktat skarp kritik mot den äldre forskargenerationen, vilken i huvudsak bestått av veterinärer. Nya teoretiska perspektiv har formulerats och etablerade sanningar inom forskningsläget har utsatts för prövning. Omvälvningen inom veterinärmedicinhistoria har sin motsvarighet inom humanmedicinhistoria, och har också samröre med den omsvängning inom humanvetenskaperna som brukar omtalas i termer av *the cultural turn*. De nya perspektiven som lanserats i den internationella forskningen har bidragit till att ge en delvis annorlunda bild av epizootibekämpningens innebörd och utformning under äldre tid, än den som tidigare var given.[7]

Den tidigare bilden av epizootibekämpningen, som presenterades av den äldre forskargenerationen under loppet av 1900-talet, har av den yngre forskargenerationen kritiserats för att vara både anakronistisk och elitistisk. Forskningen har kritiserats för att den styrts av veterinärkårens intressen och genomsyrats av sökandet efter den moderna epizootibekämpningens ”rötter”. Den har följaktligen kritiserats för att den oreflekterat utgått från moderna begrepp och förhållanden i sin skildring av äldre tiders sjukdomsbekämpning, och för att den lagt alltför stor vikt vid statsledningens och statstjänstemännens idéer i kampen mot djursjukdomarna.[8]

Många teoretiska perspektiv har alltså lanserats av den yngre forskargenerationen i polemik mot tidigare forskning, i syfte att ge en mer rättvis bild av den statligt organiserade epizootibekämpningen i Europa. Det har i grunden handlat om en strävan efter *thick description* – en utförligare skildring av den historiska kontexten. Min forskning har tagit intryck av denna rörelse. Den genomsyras följaktligen av två inom den nya forskningen ofta förfäktade perspektiv. De kallas här ”det synkrona perspektivet” och ”underifrån-perspektivet”.

Det synkrona perspektivet innebär att de sjukdomsbekämpande åtgärder som företogs i 1700-talets svenska rike skildras utifrån de föreställningar om boskapssjukdomar och sjukdomsbekämpning som fanns i 1700-talets samhälle. Utgångspunkten är att de verksamma statstjänstemännen och djurägarna agerade utifrån tidens egna synsätt när de utformade sina bekämpningsåtgärder, inte utifrån de uppfattningar vi har idag. Moderna diagnoser och nutida beskrivningar om sjukdomarnas egenskaper används i denna artikel endast för att begripliggöra de historiska reaktionerna på sjukdomarna ifråga.

Underifrån-perspektivet innebär att de sjukdomsbekämpande åtgärder som statsledningen och statstjänstemännen genomförde

inte studeras som renodlade myndighetsprojekt, utan som resultat av tillmötesgåenden, förhandlingar och kompromisser med olika representanter för 1700-talets agrarsamhälle. Utgångspunkten är att alla de människor som levde direkt eller indirekt av det som lantbruket producerade hade intresse av att stävja sjukdomarnas framfart. Däremot hade olika representanter ibland olika uppfattningar om hur bekämpningsåtgärderna bäst skulle gå till.

Boskapssjukan och de moderna diagnoserna

Boskapspest är en numera, sedan 2011, utrotad virusjukdom. Sjukdomen spreds lätt genom kontakt med smittade djur eller kontaminerade råvaror och hade mycket stor dödlighet; i Europa dog drygt 80 procent av alla smittade djur.[9] Boskapspest kunde smitta många olika klövdjur, men i Sverige drabbade den endast nötkreatur. Förutom stor smittsamhet och hög dödlighet gav sjukdomen bland annat upphov till hög feber, mun- och näsflöden och kraftiga blodblandade diarréer.[10] Sjukdomen kom ursprungligen från Asien. I början av 1700-talet började den sprida sig västerut mot Europa. De flesta länder på den europeiska kontinenten drabbades.[11] Sjukdomen spred sig dock aldrig till Finland under seklet. Sverige drabbades emellertid av åtta stora sjukdomsvågor mellan åren 1721 och 1771. De södra landskapen drabbades värst då smittspridningen från den europeiska kontinenten regelmässigt gick via Danmark. Sammanlagt orsakade sjukdomen drygt 350 000 nötkreaturs död i det svenska riket under 1700-talet.[12]

Mjältbrand orsakas av en bakterie. Sjukdomen har funnits i Europa sedan urminnes tider. Den kan smitta nästintill alla varmblodiga däggdjur, men särskilt känsliga är gräsätare som nötkreatur, hästar, får och getter. Smittspridningen kan ske på olika sätt. Smittan kan överföras mellan djur, och via redskap och födointag, men

också genom kontakt med kontaminerad jord. Det ibland mycket långsamma smittspridningsförloppet via jordsmitta är ett särdrag för mjältbrand. Mjältbrandsbakterier bildar nämligen sporer i kontakt med luft. Dessa sporer är motståndskraftiga och kan överleva i jord och mark under flera decennier. Betesdjur som vistas på nedsmittade marker kan således angripas av mjältbrandsbakterier som legat vilande under mycket lång tid. Sjukdomen kännetecknas av hög dödlighet. Nästintill hundra procent av alla smittade nötkreatur dör. Sjukdomsförloppet hos nötkreatur och andra gräsätare är oftast mycket hastigt och ger – om symptom överhuvudtaget hinner utvecklas – upphov till feber, mun- och näsflöden och bölder. Sjukdomen påverkar också ofta de inre organen kraftigt, inte minst mjälten, där av sjukdomsnamnet. Mjältbrand kan även smitta människor. Smittade människor drabbas av blåsvarta hudutslag och ibland allmäninfektioner med feber. Dödligheten är dock inte lika stor för människor som för betesdjur.[13]

Mjältbrand gav upphov till många stora sjukdomsutbrott i det svenska riket under 1700-talet. Sjukdomen var väl spridd i både Sverige och Finland. Vissa byar och socknar drabbades återkommande, andra mer sporadiskt. De flesta smittspridningsförlopp uppstod i och med jordsmitta på betesmarken och fortsatte sedan med kontaktsmitta mellan djuren i den närmaste omgivningen. Ibland utvecklade emellertid mjältbranden mycket långvariga och komplicerade smittspridningsförlopp, och spred sig då precis som boskapspesten från djur till djur över väldigt stora områden. Särskilt svårt härjade sjukdomen i Finland under seklet, och just under 1760-talet även i Mellansverige.[14]

Boskapspest och mjältbrand gick ofta under samma namn i 1700-talets svenska rike. Sjukdomarna benämndes boskapssjuka, kreaturssjuka, fäsjuka och ibland också boskapspest, kreaturspest och fänadspest.[15] Några statstjänstemän och medicinare menade

också att sjukdomarna i grunden utgjorde en och samma farsot.[16] De flesta medicinare betraktade dock sjukdomarna som två olika varianter av boskapssjuka, och menade att det fanns många egenskaper och symptom som skiljde varianterna åt.[17] Oftast tolkades skillnaderna mellan sjukdomarna som uttryck för geografiska variationer, enligt det topografiska tankesätt som präglade seklets medicinvetenskap. Boskapspesten, som ju härjade främst i Skåne, kallades följaktligen för den skånska boskapssjukan. Den ansågs vara identisk med den boskapssjuka som härjade på den europeiska kontinenten. Ibland kallades den därför också för den europeiska boskapssjukan. Mjältbranden, som ju härjade värst i Finland, men även i Norrland och andra delar av Sverige, omtalades vanligtvis som den finska boskapssjukan. Den mjältbrand som drabbade Mellansverige under 1760-talet, hölls vanligtvis för en egen sjukdomsvariant, och kallades följaktligen för boskapssjukan i Svealand.[18]

Olika smittspridning, olika smittbekämpning

Vad som utmärkte de olika sjukdomsvarianterna och hur de följaktligen bäst skulle bekämpas var en ständigt pågående debatt i 1700-talets svenska rike. Vissa egenskaper och särdrag var mycket omdiskuterade men i frågan om sjukdomsvarianternas olika smittspridningsförlopp rådde i princip konsensus. Såväl medicinare som statstjänstemän och djurägare lade märke till att de huvudsakliga smittkällorna vanligtvis skiljde sig åt mellan de olika sjukdomsvarianterna. De var således överens om att boskapssjukan i Skåne (boskapspesten) spreds via direkt eller indirekt kontakt mellan djur.[19] De bekämpningsåtgärder som riktades mot denna sjukdomsvariant utformades således med kontaktsmitta i åtanke. Resonemangen i detta hänseende återknöt till den under 1700-ta-

let alltjämt rådande antika sjukdomsläran, och smittan omtalades följaktligen som *contagion*.[20]

Samtida betraktare lade också märke till att boskapssjukan i Finland, Norrland och Svealand (mjältbranden) uppstod återkommande på särskilda platser och betesmarker. [21] De bekämpningsåtgärder som riktades mot dessa landsdelar utformades således med någon form av miljöberoende smitta i åtanke. Även här gick resonemangen tillbaka på antika läror och smittspridningssättet omnämndes vanligtvis i termer av *miasma*. Begreppet betecknade enligt tidens rådande föreställningsvärld oren sjukdomsalstrande luft. Sådan luft kunde uppstå i blöta och smutsiga miljöer, som gyttjiga vattendrag och sumpiga våtmarker.[22] Den finska och mellansvenska boskapssjukan ansågs dessutom kunna spridas via kontaktsmitta. Bekämpningen kom sålunda att präglas även av denna insikt.

De kungliga förordningarna

Det fanns två grundläggande kungliga förordningar rörande boskapssjuka, till vilka alla andra instruktioner hänförde sig: förordningen från den 13 januari 1722 och förordningen från den 23 mars 1750.

Underlaget till förordningen från 1722 författades av landshövdingen i Kristianstad, Samuel von Hylthén, som en följd av boskapspestens framfart bland nötkreaturen i Skåne.[23] Några särskilda sjukdomsvarianter eller djurslag nämndes emellertid inte i texten. Förordningen gällde smittsamma sjukdomar hos alla stora lantbruksdjur, i allmänhet. Men i praktiken utformades förordningstexten med boskapspesten för ögonen. Förordningen rymde nio paragrafer. Den första paragrafen förbjöd användningen av kreatursfoder från smittade orter. Den andra paragrafen förbjöd

transporter av djur från smittade till obesmittade orter; bestämmelsen påverkade således oxhandel i riket. Den tredje paragrafen förbjöd lösa hundar på orter där boskapssjuka härjade. Den fjärde paragrafen stadgade att allt samröre mellan smittade och obesmittade orter skulle upphöra. Bestämmelsen innebar exempelvis att smittade och obesmittade gårdar, byar och socknar som delade betesmarker med varandra inte fick släppa samman sina djur. Den femte paragrafen föreskrev nedgrävning av smittade och avlidna djur och sanering av fähus, bås och redskap. Den sjätte, sjunde, åttonde och nionde paragrafen preciserade vidare instruktioner för hur djurägare, länsmän och andra lokala statstjänstemän skulle agera och samverka vid smitta.[24]

Den kungliga förordningen från 1750 rymde tolv paragrafer. Förbud och föreskrifter var ungefär desamma som i den första förordningen, men bestämmelserna beskrevs utförligare. Dessutom infördes en nyhet, nämligen den sjunde paragrafen om sundhetspass. Bestämmelsen utgjorde en uppmjukning av det totala förbud mot handel mellan smittade och obesmittade län som stadgats i den första förordningen. Paragrafen stadgade att djur och djurprodukter som kom från obesmittade orter i län där boskapssjuka i övrigt härjade, fick utföras från länet om länsmän eller andra statstjänare skriftligen intygade att de, liksom de orter de kom från, var friska. Intygen fick endast utfärdas efter medgivande från statsledningen.[25]

Införandet av sundhetspass i 1750 års förordning var resultatet av fleråriga förhandlingar mellan statsledningen och olika intressegrupper bland undersåtarna. Oxhandeln i det svenska riket stod för en stor del av den långväga spridningen av boskapspest i det svenska riket, det var uppenbart för alla samtida betraktare. Smittan hade vid ett flertal tillfällen följt i slaktoxarnas spår.[26] De flesta djurägare hade således intresse av att oxdrifter förhindrades

i tider av boskapssjuka. Men handeln var också oumbärlig för rikets näringar, ekonomi och välstånd. Oxhandeln led svårt av 1722 års förbud att forsla djur och djurprodukter mellan smittade och obesmittade län. Oxmarknaderna i de södra landskapen ställdes in och bönderna i Småland kunde inte sälja sina överskottsdjur. I suppliker till överheten lät de upprepade gånger under 1700-talets första hälft påminna om sitt trångmål. Oxhandlarna i Småland klagade också. De kunde inte genomföra de sedvanliga oxdrifterna mot Göteborg, Karlskrona, Stockholm och Bergslagen. Slaktarna och garvarna i Stockholm framförde också återkommande klagomål till statsledningen, ty stor brist på kött och hudar rådde i den ständigt växande huvudstaden. Stor klagan kom också från militärgarnisonen i Karlskrona, där manskapet saknade nötköttet vid utspisningen.[27]

Vid mitten av seklet såg sig statsledningen föranlåten att ingripa mot den situation som uppstått till följd av 1722 års förordning, och införa någon form av handelslättnad. Bestämmelsen om sundhetspassen i 1750 års förordning ska förstås mot den bakgrunden; den utgjorde en kompromiss mellan olika intressen. Sundhetspass förekom i andra europiska stater och hade där bidragit till att passivisera handelsförbudens mest kritiska grupper.[28] Det svenska systemet med sundhetspass var hårt reglerat, och statsledningen avsade sig inte på något sätt kontrollen över oxhandeln, men det innebar ändå en öppning i det totala förbud mot varuutbyten som tidigare gällt vid boskapssjuka.

Utöver de förordningar som handlade om hur boskapssjukan skulle hanteras inom riket, utfärdade den svenska statsledningen en rad kungörelser som förbjöd handel med sådana länder som drabbats av boskapssjuka. Det gällde förbud mot livdjurshandeln men också restriktioner i handeln med djurprodukter. I praktiken riktade sig dessa kungörelser till de länder i Europa där bo-

skapspest just härjade. Syftet var förstås att hindra smittan från att nå det svenska riket överhuvudtaget.[29]

Avspärrningar i gårdar och byar

Landshövdingar, kronofogdar och länsmän ansvarade för att åtskillnaden mellan sjuka och friska djur upprätthölls i län, socknar och byar, och för att kunna göra det företog de avspärrningar. Ofta ordnades med fysiska hinder och vakthållning med manskap. Färdvägar mellan städer och byar försågs med grindar och vaktposter. Och länsgränser och kuststräckor patrullerades.[30] Men att isolera och övervaka enskilda djurbesättningar var inte helt enkelt, då gårdarna i Sverige och Finland ofta låg i byar. Inom byarna delade gårdsinnehavarna hägnader och betesmarker med varandra. Några särskilda beteshagar fanns mycket sällan vid den här tiden. Hägnaderna var istället till för att skydda byns gemensamma åker- och ängsmarker mot såväl tama som vilda djur. Boskapen rörde sig sålunda utanför de hägnade områdena, på den gemensamma utmarken, eller på de åker- eller ängsgärden inom hägnaderna som för tillfället inte brukades.

Att isolera en enstaka gårds djurbesättning under de agrara omständigheter som rådde var således ytterst svårt. Förhållandet var särskilt komplicerat i det tättbebyggda Skåne. Här var det till och med svårt att isolera hela byar. Hägnader och betesmarker var nämligen ofta gemensamma för flera byar. Många byar låg i så kallade hägnadslag med varandra och hade fäladerna som gemensamma sommarbeten.[31] Det var ingen slump att boskapspesten härjade som värst i dessa områden; här blandades regelbundet djurbesättningar med varandra. Vintertid fanns förvisso möjlighet att upprätthålla avspärrningar runt byarna. Då stod ju djuren mest på fähus.[32] Men sommartid var det nästintill

ogörligt. Dragdjuren behövdes i jordbruket och de övriga djuren trängde bete. Djurägare och länsmän sökte hålla djuren inne i fähusen så länge som möjligt på vårvintern, men när vårbruket stod för dörren och fodertillgången började tryta tvingades de så småningom släppa ut djuren. Ständiga överläggningar pågick i frågan om hur avspärrningarna bäst kunde bibehållas under våren – och om det överhuvudtaget var möjligt. I vissa fall gav djurägare, länsmän och landshövdingar gemensamt upp inför övervakningsproblematiken och drog in alla avspärrningar, trots att dessa föranstaltades i de kungliga förordningarna. De var ibland överens om att smittspridningen i praktiken inte gick att hejda under rådande förhållanden.[33] Men i vissa fall tog landshövdingarna och länsmännen upp kampen med farsoterna och utökade avspärrningarna på vårkanten. Det skedde då ofta mot byinvånarnas vilja. Dessa prioriterade jordbruket – och rörligheten över markerna – och såg en utebliven betessäsong, en dålig skörd och ett magert foderbord som en lika stor olycka som fortsatt smittspridning.[34] I det senare fallet bad landshövdingarna ofta om handräckning från regementena. Ryttare och fotsoldater ålades att sätta upp så kallade *cordons sanitaires* runt de smittade byarna, alltså vaktkedjor för att motverka smittspridning. Den militära närvaron till trots fungerade inte alltid avspärrningarna. Styrkorna bestod ofta av lokalt manskap, med nära band till de drabbade byinvånarna. De var därför ofta eftergivna gentemot de bönder som behövde passera avspärrningarna. En del avspärrningar blev emellertid mycket omfattande och långvariga. Den största militära avspärrning som tillkom i kampen mot boskapssjukan var den som landshövding Carl Adlerfelt satte upp i Malmöhus län sommaren 1767. Den sträckte sig runt ett femtiotal byar och övervakades av 600 soldater under flera månaders tid.[35]



Landshövdingen Carl Adlerfelt lät rita en karta över den avspärrning, cordon sanitaire, som sattes upp runt Hököpinge och Eskilstorps byar utanför Malmö sommaren 1767 för att skydda omgivningen från boskapssjukan. Kartan är unik i sin genre i Sverige. Riksarkivet, Kunglig Majestäts kanslis arkiv, Landshövdingen i Malmöhus län till Kungl. Maj:t, vol 29, bilaga i brevet 30 juli 1767. Foto: Riksarkivet, Stockholm.

Tillvägagångssättet att skilja de sjuka djuren från de friska och hindra samröre mellan smittade och obesmittade orter var i grunden detsamma vid boskapspest och mjältbrand. Men vid mjält-

brand, då det var uppenbart att utbrottet orsakats av jordsmitta, avspärrades ibland också den kontaminerade betesmarken. Övervakningsproblematiken komplicerades i sådana fall ytterligare för länsmän, soldater och djurägare, när inte bara betesdjur skulle bevakas, utan även hela markområden.[36]

Boskapsmedicinen

Vanligtvis försökte man behandla och bota de sjuka djuren inom avspärrningarna genom att ge dem medicinsk behandling. Detta gällde både vid boskapspest och mjältbrand. Vid påkommen smitta vände sig landshövdingen till medicinalverken och bad om förslag på verksamma botemedel. Medicinalverken sände då ofta några medicinare till de drabbade byarna, för att bestämma sjukdomens art, dela ut läkemedel och ge behandling. Ofta engagerades provinsialläkare, fältskärer från militära förband eller medicinkunniga från universiteten.[37] Dessa kom då i kontakt med den folkliga läkekonst som fanns på landsbygden. Ibland omtalade de den som underlägsen, men i praktiken visade de stort intresse för den. På sina resor runt om i riket spred de exempelvis inte bara de lärda behandlingar som fanns mot boskapssjuka, utan nedtecknade, utprovade och praktiserade också många folkliga kurer.[38]

Ympning, eller inokulation, alltså överföring av levande smittämne för att stimulera bildande av antikroppar, diskuterades i det svenska riket under 1700-talet. Ympning var på modet i det lärda Europa. Lyckade ympningsförsök mot boskapssjuka rapporterades exempelvis från England år 1750-talet. De blev omtalade och fungerade förstås som inspiration.[39] Ympning byggde på idén om immunitet. Att boskapspesten – den skånska och europeiska boskapssjukan – gav upphov till livslång immunitet för de djur som insjuknat och tillfrisknat, var känt sedan länge i Europa. Sedan

1740-talet var fenomenet också iakttaget i det svenska riket, även av allmogen.[40] Men ympning blev aldrig en av de viktigare bekämpningsåtgärderna mot boskapssjukan i det svenska riket. Metoden debatterades livligt under några år i Collegium Medicum och ett fåtal försök utfördes, men metoden vann aldrig myndigheternas fullkomliga gillande. Detta berodde delvis på att medicinarna inte alltid gjorde åtskillnad mellan den finska eller mellansvenska boskapssjukan (mjältbranden) å den ena sidan och den skånska och europeiska boskapssjukan (boskapspesten) å den andra sidan. Många medicinare menade exempelvis att det var vanskligt att laborera med sekret från smittade djur, då många människor hade rapporterats smittade när de hanterat sina sjuka (mjältbrandssjuka) kreatur. Det mest omtalade ympningsförsöket i det svenska riket gjordes också på mjältbrandssjuka djur, men i analogi med de ympningsförsök som gjorts med boskapspest i andra europeiska länder. Medicinaren Barthold Rudolf Hast ympade ett föl med ett smittämne från ett nötkreatur i Österbotten på 1760-talet.[41] I denna landsdel härjade inte boskapspest överhuvudtaget under seklet, utan endast mjältbrand. Fölet dog och ympningsförsöket omtalades som ett misslyckande. Åtgärden var förstås dömd att misslyckas på förhand, då mjältbrand inte ger upphov till immunitet på samma sätt som boskapspest. Sammanblandningen av de båda sjukdomsvarianterna gjorde sammanfattningsvis att ympning framstod som en ytterst tveksam bekämpningsmetod för den boskapssjuka som härjade i riket.[42]

Utslaktning

Slakt av sjuka djur – *stamping out* – har i den tidigare forskningen setts som en central del av 1700-talets statliga epizootibekämpning. Utslaktning förespråkades tidigt av de europeiska auktorite-

terna på området, bland andra italienaren Giovanni Maria Lancisi och engelsmannen Thomas Bates. Utslaktning praktiserades också av såväl påvestaten som den brittiska statsledningen i början av 1700-talet, med ett relativt gott utfall.[43]

Men utslaktning föreskrevs inte som bekämpningsåtgärd i de svenska kungliga förordningarna. Den svenska statsmakten motsatte sig bestämt slakt vid boskapssjuka under 1700-talets första hälft. Statsledningen och landshövdingarna sökte till och med hindra den slakt som företogs av djurägarna själva.[44] Djurägarna runt om i det svenska riket ägnade sig nämligen regelmässigt åt så kallad preventiv utslaktning, alltså avlivning av friska djur vid pågående boskapssjuka. Det gällde både vid boskapspest och mjältbrand. De kungliga förordningarna förbjöd uttryckligen djurägarna att ta tillvara något från de *sjuka* djuren; av smittskyddsskäl skulle dessa grävas ned med hull och hår, oavsett om de självdött eller nedslaktats. Men förordningarna hindrade inte djurägarna från att ta tillvara delar från slaktade *friska* djur under pågående boskapssjuka. Här fanns således ett utrymme för handling som djurägarna ofta utnyttjade. Den preventiva slakten företogs helt enkelt för att rädda vad som räddas kunde när smittspridningen tog fart i omgivningen och de egna djurens liv var allvarligt hotade. Djuren, som dragdjur betraktade, förlorades förvisso genom nedslaktningen. Men värdefulla produkter som kött, hudar, horn, senor, inälvor och blod kunde räddas och omsättas. Djurägarna kunde på så sätt mildra sina ekonomiska förluster vid boskapssjuka. [45]

Statsmakten betraktade emellertid den preventiva slakten som ett onödigt slöseri med kreatursliv. Första delen av 1700-talet ägnade sig myndigheterna således åt att kritisera djurägarnas utslaktningar. Men vid mitten av seklet ändrades detta. Boskapspesten härjade våldsamt i södra och mellersta Sverige, trots avspärrningar och medicinska behandlingar. Ingen av de gängse bekämpningsmeto-

derna hade fungerat och statsledningen och landshövdingarna såg sig desperat omkring efter andra lösningar. I det sammanhanget började utslaktning alltmer framstå som ett möjligt alternativ. I bakgrunden fanns förstås påverkan från den internationella litteraturen och förekomsten av positiva internationella erfarenheter på området. Men stor inverkan hade med all säkerhet också de inhemska traditionerna. De svenska djurägarna var vana vid, och inställda på, slakt vid pågående boskapssjuka. Detta var något som statstjänstemännen kunde utnyttja. En rad utslaktningsföretag initierades sålunda av statsledningen och landshövdingarna i de av boskapssjuka drabbade länen. Men nu handlade det inte om att rädda ekonomiska värden, utan om att förhindra vidare smittspridning. Utslaktningarna kom därför i huvudsak att riktas mot de sjuka djuren, de som bevisligen bar på smittan. Första gången som utslaktning verkligen genomfördes av myndigheterna var år 1756 i Malmöhus län, närmare bestämt, på sätesgården Lindholmen med grannbyar. Utslaktningen lyckades i så måtto att smittspridningen avtog.[46] Myndigheterna tog intryck av detta och fick blodad tand. Omsider blev de också mer rigida i sin utslaktningsverksamhet. Under 1760-talet riktade myndigheterna åtgärderna inte bara mot de uppenbart sjuka, utan även mot de friska djuren i de sjuka djurens närhet, de som förmodligen bar på smittan men ännu inte insjuknat. En rad utslaktningar av såväl sjuka som friska djur genomfördes, exempelvis i Hallands län 1763, Kronobergs län 1763 och Malmöhus län 1767. I det sistnämnda länet utslaktades inte bara nötkreatur, utan även får, getter, svin, hundar och katter, detta för att undanröja alla potentiella smittbärare.[47]

Statsmakten och dess representanter var drivande i frågan om utslaktning som bekämpningsmetod under 1700-talets andra hälft. Det fanns som sagt en viss vana vid slakt ute i byarna, men alla djurägare var inte odelat positiva till att använda systematisk

avlivning i bekämpningsarbetet. För att statstjänstemännen skulle kunna räkna med djurägarnas stöd vid insatsen krävdes övertalning, eftergifter och förhandlingar. Den springande punkten var den ekonomiska kompensationen. Statsledningen drog sig i det längsta för att finansiera utslaktningarna med medel ur statskassan. För att lösa ersättningsfrågan – och samtidigt mildra bristen på oxkött i riket – utfärdade statsledningen det så kallade kött-undantaget den 5 februari 1751. Det innebar ett undantag från de kungliga förordningarnas bestämmelse om nedgrävning av sjuka djur med hull och hår. Det tillät alltså djurägarna att ta tillvara och omsätta de sjuka djurens kött, såvida det inte var allvarligt påverkat av sjukdomen.[48] Undantaget gällde fram till 1760-talets första hälft, och de utslaktningsföretag som företogs under denna tid finansierades huvudsakligen på detta sätt. Därtill bildade djurägarna sammanskott för att täcka sina förluster. Sammanskotten utgjorde ett slags försäkringsförbund där alla som bidrog kunde räkna med kompensation i händelse av förluster i samband med boskapssjukan. Landshövdingarna och deras underlydande organiserade sammanskotten, men djurägarna ingick dem frivilligt; de diskuterade och godkände dem på tings- och magistratsmöten.[49]

Undantaget från 1751 – rätten att ta tillvara delar av sjuka slaktade djur – drogs tillbaka vid mitten av 1760-talet när rädslan för att köttet var smittsamt ökade kraftigt. Detta hade i sin tur att göra med att medicinare runt om i det svenska riket allt oftare vittnade om att människor som hanterat sjuka djur vid slakt insjuknat och dött.[50] Det handlade förstås om mjältbrandssjuka djur, och människor som smittats av mjältbrand. Men statsledningen och medicinarna gjorde som tidigare nämnts inte alltid skillnad på de olika varianterna av boskapssjuka, och undantaget från 1751 drogs sålunda in, inte endast i de områden där människosmittan omtalades, utan i hela riket.

Diskussion – internationell utblick

I den tidigare veterinärmedicinhistoriska forskningen har man ofta framhållit att alla de bekämpningsprogram som utarbetades i de europeiska länderna under 1700-talet utgjorde olika nationellt anpassade varianter av Giovanni Maria Lancisi idéer. Denne var påvlig livläkare, och han utarbetade sina förslag om sjukdomsbekämpning när påvestatens nötkreatursbesättningar drabbades av boskapspest i början av seklet. Lancisi inflytande har alltså bedömts som stort. I den veterinärmedicinhistoriska litteraturen beskrivs han ofta som den moderna epizootibekämpningens grundläggare.[51]

I den tidigare internationella forskningen har man studerat hur epizootibekämpningen utvecklades i de länder där boskapspest drog fram under 1700-talet, exempelvis i Frankrike, England, Holland, hertigdömena Schlesvig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Strelitz och Preussen. Forskarna har påpekat att det pågick ett ständigt kunskapsutbyte länderna emellan, dels kring sjukdomsläget, dels kring bekämpningsåtgärderna. Forskarna har visat att verksamheten i de olika länderna utvecklade sig på liknande sätt under seklet och sålunda kom att innefatta avspärrningar, handelsrestriktioner, reseförbud, nedgrävning av avlidna djur med hull och hår, sanering av fähus och utslaktningar av olika slag. De grundläggande åtgärderna var inriktade på kontaktsmitta; det var otvivelaktigt boskapspestens framfart på den europeiska kontinenten som präglade regelverk och praxis.[52]

Det är tydligt att det försiggick ett erfarenhetsutbyte inom de europeiska staterna och att förhandlingar och kompromisser mellan myndigheter, medicinare, handlare och djurägare var ett genomgående drag i den europeiska epizootibekämpningens utformning i stort.[53] Särskilt tydligt framgår detta av den nyare forskning som liksom denna studie använt sig av kulturhistoriska angreppsätt och

underifrån-perspektiv. Så till exempel den tyske miljöhistorikern Dominik Hünnigers forskning som visat att sjukdomsbekämpningen i Schleswig-Holstein formerades i en ständig förhandling mellan styrande, näringsidkare och allmoge under åren 1745-1752. Påbuden anpassades efter rådande omständigheter och olika gruppers inflytande. De varierade således exempelvis mellan strikta handelsförbud och rigida karantänbestämmelser, och handelslättnader och eftergifter gentemot oxhandlare och djurägare.[54]

Det kan således konstateras, att det fanns stora likheter mellan den sjukdomsbekämpande verksamhet som fördes i många europeiska länder under 1700-talet och det bekämpningsarbetet som uträttades inom det svenska rikets gränser. På några punkter sticker emellertid den svenska erfarenheten ut.

Det är exempelvis uppenbart att den utbredda förekomsten av mjältbrand satte sin prägel på den svenska epizootibekämpningen under 1700-talet. De flesta åtgärder var inriktade på kontaktsmitta, men somliga insatser riktade sig också mot markbunden smitta, exempelvis avspärrningar av kontaminerade marker. Här spelade de många rapporterna om upprepade boskapsstörtningar på särskilda betesmarker i särskilt Finland, Norrland och Svealand stor roll. Dessutom hade rapporterna om människosmitta från samma områden betydelse för statsledningens inställning till rätten att omsätta kött från de sjuka djuren. Och inte minst fick rapporterna från mjältbrandsdrabbade orter statsledningen och medicinalverken att vackla i sin tro på immunitet och ympning. Påståendet som varit allmänt förekommande i tidigare forskning – att den svenska epizootibekämpningen formerades i mötet med boskapspesten, precis som i så många andra europeiska länder – bör således modifieras något: Den svenska epizootibekämpningen växte fram i mötet med boskapspesten *och* mjältbranden.[55]

En annan säregenhet rör de svenska utslaktningsaktionernas

utformning och finansiering. För det första företogs de myndighetsorganiserade utslaktningarna i Sverige förhållandevis tidigt. Den första utslaktningen genomfördes i Malmöhus län år 1756. Men en ännu tidigare insats planerades i Södermanlands län redan år 1750. Den genomfördes emellertid aldrig eftersom boskapssjukan där avstannade spontant.[56] Dessa utslaktningsaktioner var hur som helst relativt tidiga i en internationell jämförelse. I Storbritannien och påvestaten initierades förvisso stora utslaktningsaktioner redan i början av 1700-talet, men i många andra länder företogs sådana insatser först flera decennier senare – i exempelvis Frankrike först under 1770-talet och i Holland först under 1810-talet.[57]

För det andra finansierades de svenska utslaktningarna i hög grad med sammanskott eller med rätten att tillvarata kött från de slaktade djuren, och endast undantagsvis med statsmedel. Detta medan de flesta storskaliga utslaktningsföretag i de andra europeiska länderna i huvudsak finansierades med statsmedel. Så exempelvis i Storbritannien, Frankrike och Holland.

För det tredje riktade sig de flesta utslaktningsaktionerna i det svenska riket både mot sjuka och friska djur inom avgränsade områden. Utslaktningsföretagen i de andra europeiska länderna fokuserade i huvudsak på de märkbart sjuka djuren under 1700-talet. Några av dem riktade sig också mot de misstänkt sjuka djuren. Men de riktade sig under denna tid i regel inte alls mot de uppenbart friska djuren i de sjuka djurens närhet; åtminstone framgår inte detta klart av tidigare forskning.

För det fjärde verkar utslaktningsinsatsen 1767 i Malmöhus län utgöra ett särfall, just för att den systematiskt riktade sig mot alla djurslag inom de drabbade byarna, inte bara nötkreaturen. Men även här är den tidigare internationella forskningen på området ganska otydlig, och därför svår att jämföra med.[58]

Kanske ska den svenska statsledningens något säregna linje i ut-

slaktningsfrågan hänföras till den väl utbyggda statsapparaten? I tidigare internationell forskning har man menat att statsapparatens karaktär inverkade stort på de sjukdomsbekämpande åtgärdernas utformning.[59] Den svenska statsledningen förfogade över en effektiv tjänstemannastab för att kunna organisera utslaktningarna och väletablerade kanaler till undersåtarna för att kunna övertyga om sammanskotten – kort sagt auktoritära och byråkratiska tvångsmedel för att övertala och verkställa. Den svenska statsapparatens karaktär hade förmodligen viss betydelse. Men med all sannolikhet hade redan etablerade handlingsmönster på den svenska landsbygden större betydelse för statsledningens agerande. Detta tål att understrykas: förklaringen till att myndigheterna utformade och implementerade utslaktningsaktionerna på vissa sätt ska inte bara sökas i själva myndighetsutövningen, utan framförallt i förutsättningarna, det vill säga traditionerna, vanorna och förhållningssätten hos dem som berördes av åtgärderna.

Sammanfattning

Epizootibekämpningen i det svenska riket växte fram i mötet med två mycket smittsamma och dödliga djursjukdomar: boskapspest och mjältbrand. Boskapspestens våldsamma härjningar, främst i södra Sverige, hade störst betydelse för verksamhetens utformning. Bekämpningsarbetet styrdes i huvudsak av två kungliga förordningar rörande boskapssjuka, förordningen från 1722 respektive 1750.

Bekämpningen byggde först och främst på avspärrningar. Åtgärderna var alltså mest inriktade på att bekämpa kontaktsmitta, alltså smittoöverföring mellan djur eller mellan människor, redskap och djur. Rikets gränser, hamnar, landsvägar, länsgränser, stadsportar, bygränser och fähus övervakades noggrant. Men inom de olika avspärrningarna företogs också andra sjukdomsbekämpande

åtgärder. Djurägarna och medicinare sökte bota djuren med olika medicinska kurer och ingrepp. Några enstaka ympningsförsök företogs också. Under andra hälften av 1700-talet blev det allt vanligare med utslaktningar. Såväl friska som sjuka djur avlivades på de orter där boskapssjuka drog fram. Djurägarna kompenserades för sina förluster på olika sätt, företrädesvis genom rätten att ta tillvara på slaktköttet eller genom att bilda sammanskott, alltså ett slags försäkringsförbund.

Den svenska epizootibekämpningen påminde till stora delar om den sjukdomsbekämpning som utvecklades i de övriga europeiska staterna under 1700-talet. Detta berodde på att de samtliga utgick från allmäneuropeiska idéer om sjukdomar och smittskydd. Men den svenska verksamheten rymde också en del särdrag. Förklaringarna till att verksamheten fick en särskild utformning i 1700-talets svenska rike står att söka i den svenska statsapparatens auktoritära och byråkratiska karaktär, men framförallt i själva implementeringen av åtgärderna. Det var sålunda till stor del anpassningen till boskapssjukdomarnas egenheter och agrarsamhällets krav som gav den svenska epizootibekämpningen dess särskilda inriktning.

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52 Hans Kilian, *Die Bekämpfung der Rinderpest in Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1769-1780)* (Berlin: 1934), 1–56; John Broad,”Cattle Plague in Eighteenth-Century England”, *Agricultural History Review* 31 (1983), 104–115; Lise Wilkinson, *Animals and disease. An Introduction to the History of Comparative Medicine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 35–64; Spinage, *Cattle Plague*, 219–446; Vallat, *Les Bœufs Malades de la Peste,* 109–290; Hünniger” Policing Epizootics”, 76–91; Peter

Koolmees, "Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 1713-2002: Veterinary Science, Agricultural Policy, and Public Response", i *Healing the Herds,* red. Karen Brown och Daniel Gilfoyle, 19–41; Hünniger*, Die Viehseuche von 1744-52,* 119–210.

53 Se exempelvis John Fishers forskningsöversikt i "To Kill or not to Kill", 314–317.

54 Hünniger, *Die Vieseuche von 1744-52*, 9–18, 119–160, 213–215; Hünniger, "Policing Epizootics", 77, 79–85.

55 Wilkinson, *Animals and disease*, 35–64; Dunlop och Williams, *Veterinary Medicine*, 277–281.

56 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Södermanlands län till KM, vol. 16, breven 27 aug., 17 sept. och 15 okt. 1750.

57 Spinage, *Cattle Plague*, 115, 141–143, 243–245; Koolmees, "Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 1713-2002", 25–27. Se även Keir Waddington, "To Stamp Out 'So Terrible a Malady': Bovine Tuberculosis and Tuberculin Testing in Britain, 1890-1939", *Medical History* 48 (2004), 3.

58 Se till exempel Fisher, "To Kill or not to Kill", 314–317; Spinage *Cattle Plague*, 103–145, 241–263, 324; Koolmees "Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 1713-2002", 22–25.

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Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860

Martin Dackling

Introduktion

Runt sekelskiftet 1800 infördes på olika håll i Europa ny civillagstiftning som på ett eller annat sätt utgick från upplysningens idéer. Mest känd är Frankrikes *Code civil* (1804), men till samma kategori räknas även *Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht* (1794) och *Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* i Österrike (1811). Med utgångspunkt i upplysningsidéer introducerade dessa lagverk nya lagstiftningsprinciper med långtgående effekter, inte minst i egendomsfrågor. Grovt uttryckt banades därmed väg för en liberal fastighetsrätt, byggd på ett starkt och individualistiskt präglat äganderättsbegrepp, vilket stod i skarp kontrast med äldre tiders kollektivt präglade egendomsrätt.[1] Införandet av nya tankegångar gick inte över en natt, snarare kan spänningen mellan äldre och nyare egendomsprinciper sägas ha präglat stora delar av Europa under hela 1800-talet.[2] Detta är tydligt märkbart även i de nordiska länderna. Ännu vid ingången till 1800-talet präglades jordlagstiftningen i Sverige och Norge, från 1814 förenade i en union med separata nationella parlament, av olika former av släktjordslagar; i Sverige främst genom bestämmelserna om *arvejord* och *bördsrätt*,

i Norge med motsvarigheterna *odelsjord* och *odelsrett*. Under ett drygt halvsekel, från ca 1810 fram till ca 1860, var denna lagstiftning mycket omdebatterad på båda sidor gränsen och föremål för återkommande politiska angrepp.[3] Utgången blev emellertid helt olika: bördsrätt avskaffades medan odelsretten snarast gick stärkt ur striden. Syftet med den här artikeln är att diskutera varför debatten fick så olika resultat och hur den politiska diskussionen om släktjordlagstiftningen i Sverige och Norge kan förstås.

Historisk bakgrund

Som institutioner kan bördsrätten och odelsretten ses som variationer på samma idé: att behålla egendom inom vissa givna släktled. Under förutsättning att jorden uppfyllt vissa kriterier, vilka jag återkommer till, har bördsrätten och odelsretten gett släktingar till jordinnehavaren långtgående rättigheter. Om denne önskade avyttra jorden skulle det i första hand göras till närmaste släktingar, som så att säga hade förtur till egendomen. Såldes jorden till någon utanför släkten hade säljarens släktingar dessutom rättighet att inom en viss tid lösa tillbaka jorden. Som institutioner var vare sig bördsrätt eller odelsrett unika. Per Norseng visar att det under medeltid och tidigmodern tid går att finna liknande förköps- eller inlösningsbestämmelser i de delar av Europa som präglats av en germansk rättstradition. Företeelsen har gått under olika namn: danskans *Lovbydelse*, franskans *Retrait lignager*, och *Retraktrecht* eller *Familienvorkaufrecht* i tyskspråkiga länder. Däremot saknas motsvarande institution inom romersk rätt, och den fick därmed mycket lite inflytande i exempelvis Storbritannien.[4]

Likheterna mellan odelsretten och bördsrätten var stora, men det fanns också påtagliga skillnader. Bördsrätt omfattade enbart arvejord, varmed i princip avsågs ärvd jord, och förutsatte därmed

att egendomen passerat *minst* ett generationsskifte för att möjligheten att återbörda den till släkten skulle kunna uppstå. Arvejord fick dessutom inte testamenteras bort. Odelsretten var däremot tvungen att upparbetas genom flera på varandra följande generationsskiften, vilket successivt övergick till att uttryckas som en fixerad tidsperiod. Under medeltiden var denna tid mycket lång; enligt Magnus Lagabøters Landslov (1274) var det först i den fjärde generationen, eller efter 60 år, som egendomen blev odelsjord.[5] Under tidigmodern tid sänktes dock hävdetiden successivt och genom en förordning 1771 sattes den till blott tio år.[6] På liknande sätt var lösningsfristen för klander när jord såldes utom släkten enligt Landsloven upp till 60 år, men tidsrymden krymptes parallellt med hävdetiden. I 1771 års förordning uppgick den dock ännu till 15 år.[7] I jämförelse med denna var den svenska bördsrätten mer strikt. Preskriptionstiden var enbart ett år, förutsatt att den nye ägaren sökt lagfart (fasta) på sitt förvärv.[8] Baserat på huvuddragen i den rättsliga utvecklingen är det rimligt att anta att släktjordlagstiftningens verkningar var olika i Norge och Sverige. Eftersom all ärvd jord i Sverige var underställd bördsrätt är det troligt att lagstiftningen hade relativt stor räckvidd, samtidigt som den korta preskriptionstiden innebar att tidigare ägares släktingar var tvungna att agera snabbt. Där det svenska systemet bara räknade med två jordkategorier – arvejord och avlingejord – fanns i Norge en mellankategori av egendomar på väg att vinna odel. Denna grupp bör ha varit stor under medeltiden, då hävdetiden för att vinna odel var mycket lång. I takt med att denna successivt sänktes närmade sig dock systemen varandra och mot slutet av 1700-talet bör odelsretten snarast ha haft större betydelse än bördsrätten.

Trots att den skisserade utvecklingen pekar på en ökad betydelse för släktjordlagstiftningen över tid har den historiska forskningen framför allt analyserat dess funktion under medeltiden.

Utgångspunkten har dock ofta varit ett gemensamt nordiskt perspektiv. Den danske historikern Michael H. Gelting har diskuterat likheterna mellan danskans lovbydelse, bördsrätten och odelsretten. Hans tes är att de har ett gemensamt ursprung och inrättades först i slutet av 1200-talet.[9] Helle Vogt har i ett annat sammanhang diskuterat likheter och skillnader mellan odelsrett, lovbydelse och bördsrätt med utgångspunkt i bestämmelserna i de tidigaste lagsamlingarna.[10] Per Norseng pekar i en analys ut påfallande likheter mellan odelsretten, bördsrätten och lovbydelsen under senmedeltid och övergången till tidigmodern tid, men understryker samtidigt odelsrettens särart, bland annat i den mycket långa hävdetiden.[11] Han argumenterar för att odelsretten – trots dess plats i samtida lagar – inte hade någon större betydelse under medeltiden och knappast ens under 1500-talet.[12] Å andra sidan har arkeologer betonat odalrättens betydelse även under förhistorisk tid, mot bakgrund av bland annat analyser av runinskrifter.[13]

För medeltida förhållanden finns således en tydlig komparativ nordisk eller åtminstone skandinavisk forskning som belyst släktjordlagstiftningens ålder, utveckling och variationer. Flyttas fokus fram mot 1600-, 1700- och 1800-talen är situationen dock en annan. Det finns få studier som över huvud taget analyserat odelsrettens och bördsrättens sena historia, och bland de ansatser som ändå gjorts saknas ofta ett komparativt anslag. Ett undantag är Anna Hansen, som med exempel från jämtländska domstolsprotokoll visar hur begrepp som odelsjord levde kvar långt efter landskapet 1645 blivit svenskt territorium under svensk lag.[14] Den enda större studien av bördsrätten är Christer Winbergs studie av hur institutionen uppfattades och praktiserades under tidigmodern tid. Han understryker dess betydelse under 1500- och det tidiga 1600-talet, men skisserar även en utveckling där en äldre uppfattning om släktens kollektiva rätt till jorden successivt övergick

i en mer individualiserad äganderätt. En bakomliggande drivkraft var en förändring i synen på jorden, från en släkttillhörighet till en handelsvara.[15] Detta fick konsekvenser för bördsrätten, som Winberg menar var så gott som obsolet långt innan den 1863 utgick ur lagstiftningen.[16] Odelsrettens politiska historia har nyligen belysts av Håkon Evju, som i två artiklar analyserat hur odelsretten debatterades offentligt decennierna före och direkt efter 1814. Det fanns en tydlig kritik mot bland annat osäkerhetseffekterna för äganderförhållanden och mot att odelsretten drev fram många rättsliga konflikter. Men institutet hade också sina försvarare, som framhävde hur odelsretten gav bönderna en särskild stolthet och känsla för sin jord. Evju visar hur de norska förhållandena kontrasterades mot de danska: odelsretten framhölls som huvudorsak till att Norge inte gått i samma feodala riktning som Danmark. Samtidigt kom mycket av kritiken mot institutionen från en danskpositionerad tjänstemannaklass. Granskas argumenten framträder, hävdar Evju, två grundläggande synsätt. För kritikerna var bördsrätten en *ekonomisk* fråga och problemet definierades i äganderättsliga termer. Förespråkarna tog en *politisk* vinkling: jord hade en annan betydelse än lösören och skulle behandlas därefter.[17]

För att summera, det saknas i stor utsträckning kunskap om odelsrettens och bördsrättens senare historia. Den rättsliga utvecklingens grunddrag är kända, men knappast problematiserade. Att bördsrätten avvecklades i Sverige och odelsretten ännu är en del av norsk lagstiftning är kända fakta och framställs ibland som naturliga följder. Ändå finns påtagliga likheter vad gäller de sätt varpå diskussionen om släktjordlagstiftningen fördes i de två länderna under 1800-talet. Tre faser kan identifieras. Att odelsretten var mycket omdebatterad på 1810-talet är välkänt. I spåren av Napoleonkrigens ekonomiska konsekvenser infördes 1811 starka restriktioner, som bland annat sänkte preskriptionstiden till fem år och möjliggjorde för en ägare

att ta bort odelsegenskapen på sin egendom.[18] Med den nya författningen 1814 gjordes emellertid ett lappkast och odelsretten skrevs in i grundlagen, vars §107 föreskrev att ”Odels- og aasædes-retten maa ikke ophæves”.[19] Mindre känt är att också bördsrätten vid denna tid var under debatt, då en ledamot i bondeståndet vid 1812 års riksdag krävde dess avveckling. Under de följande decennierna inträdde ett andra skede, då frågan om släktjordlagstiftningen ingick i den omfattande översyn av civillagstiftning som initierades i båda länderna under 1810-talet.[20] För norsk del mynnade arbetet ut i Loven om Odelsretten och Åsætesretten 1821, medan arbetet för svensk del stannade vid lagutkast 1826. Därpå följde några lugna decennier, då vare sig börds- eller odelsretten förekom på den politiska dagordningen. I slutet av 1840-talet inträdde så en tredje fas, med omfattande politiska angrepp på de två institutionerna. Krav på att ta bort odelsretten från grundlagen blev föremål för Stortingets debatter 1848, 1851, 1857 och 1860, samtidigt som yrkanden om att avskaffa bördsrätten behandlades på samtliga svenska riksdagar mellan 1850 och 1863.

Trots olika utfall var således den övergripande strukturen i debatten om släktjordslagstiftningen likartad, vilket motiverar en fördjupad jämförelse av hur diskussion och argument såg ut i praktiken. Det komparativa anslaget ger dessutom möjlighet att peka på likheter och skillnader i debatterna för att därigenom fördjupa analysen. En utgångspunkt för en sådan granskning är att de sätt varpå diskussionen fördes och de motiv som tillmättes betydelse kan säga något om själva samhället under den aktuella tidsperioden. Evjus kontrastering mellan ett ekonomiskt och ett politiskt synsätt är här en viktig utgångspunkt, som också anknyter till Winbergs beskrivning av hur ett alltmer kommersiellt synsätt på jord utmanade bördsrättens principer. I det följande ligger tyngdpunkten på debattens tredje fas, när frågan blev hett omde-

batterad i parlamenten. För att kunna se hur debatten utvecklade sig fram till denna slutstrid skisseras även dess huvuddrag under de två första faser som beskrivits ovan. Undersökningen utgår i första hand från tre frågeställningar. Vilka argument fördes fram emot respektive för släktjordlagstiftningen? Stod striden i första hand mellan ett politiskt och ett ekonomiskt synsätt? Och hur stora likheter fanns mellan den svenska och den norska debatten?

Odelsretten från Eidsvoll till 1821 års Odelslov

Det ligger nära till hands att se 1814 års författning som en samtida slutpunkt för diskussionen om odelsretten; att institutionen blev skyddad i grundlagen innebar ju att det krävdes en kvalificerad majoritet i Stortinget för en avveckling. Håkon Evju visar emellertid att Eidsvollförfattningen inte betraktades som ett definitivt slut på debatten. Vid Stortingsmötet 1815–1816 bröts på nytt uppfattningarna mot varandra och odelsrettens kritiker pekade på hur den försämrade såväl jordbrukets utveckling som befolkningstillväxten.[21] Men försvaret utvecklades också, och de viktigaste tankegångarna i denna riktning stod Christian Magnus Falsen för. Denne hade spelat en avgörande roll vid mötet på Eidsvoll och var en stark anhängare av odelsretten, vilket inte minst märks i den skrift till odelsrettens försvar han publicerade 1815.[22] Falsens syfte var att beskriva ett samband mellan odelsretten och den nya fria konstitutionen och han drev sin tes genom en omfattande historisk återblick, stadigt fäst på Norges storhetsperiod under medeltiden.

Odelsretten för Falsen var inte i huvudsak en familjerätt, utan symboliserade en politisk rättighet. Oberoendet var centralt, och odelsretten gjorde innehavaren fri i förhållande till staten.[23] Falsen pekade på hur rätten att delta i samhällslivet i det gamla norska kungadömet inte var knuten till person utan till jorden och tolkade

en uppdelning i många små jordägare som en nödvändig förutsättning för nationens fortlevnad.[24] Odelsretten hade hos den norska befolkningen bevarat en förmåga till politiskt agerande, trots det långvariga styret från Köpenhamn. Men odelsretten var också en framtida garant mot uppkomsten av stora jordegendomar och – än värre – en adel, som annars skulle tillskansa sig politisk makt på de fria odelböndernas bekostnad och kasta in riket i stridigheter.[25] ”Grund-Ejendommenes lige Fordelning er Grundvolden til al borgerlig Fridhed”, fastslog Falsen.[26] Det bonderomantiserande draget hos Falsen är starkt, men resonemangets styrka ligger onekligen i att han knöt samman historia, nutid och framtid.[27] Odelsrettens betydelse kunde knappast undervärderas och dess bevarande blev för Falsen synonymt med att bevara det nya, fria Norge.

Falsens skrift renderade gensvar, men tycks inte ha fått någon avgörande politisk följd under det följande Stortinget samma år. Grundlagens §107 föreskrev att odelsretten inte fick upphävas, men de närmare bestämmelserna återstod att klargöra. Falsen lade ett eget förslag till Stortinget 1815, men hela frågan överläts till den då nyligen inrättande Lovkommittén som arbetade med en ny civillagstiftning.[28] Då kommittén inledningsvis var överhopad av arbete dröjde det till 1821 innan en ny lagstiftning kunde framläggas för Stortinget. I beredningen av förslaget konstaterades kort, med hänvisning till författningen, att ”intet Spørgsmaal være om, at Retten bør vedblive”, det var enbart formerna som nu var ifråga.[29] Hävdetiden sattes till tio år, men preskriptionstiden förblev fem år; det ansågs viktigt att ”ikke længere end nødvendig” låta en förvärvare av odelsjord sväva i ovisshet om att få behålla sin egendom eller inte.[30] Förslaget bifölls i allt väsentligt av Stortinget. Något diskussionsprotokoll för debatten finns inte, men av ett par reservationer framgår att odelsretten fortsatt var omstridd. Kritikerna anförde att den fick negativa följder både för staten och en-

skilda och i lagtinget anfördes att ”Odelsretten er stridende imod vor Grundlovs Aand, stridende imod det almindelige Retsprincip, skadelig for Familierne og skadelig for Staten”, dessutom stred den mot egendomsbegreppet, sänkte jordpriserna, hindrade egendomens förbättring och bröt ner moralen.[31] Samtidigt erkände kritikerna betydelsen i att odelsretten var införd i grundlagen, något upphävande av rätten i sig var det inte tal om.

Det är svårt att dra mer långtgående slutsatser baserat på det lilla material som återgetts, men utifrån reservationerna är det tydligt att odelsrettens motståndare använde en bred arsenal av argument för att lägga tyngd bakom in kritik. Ekonomiska argument, som effekterna på jordpriserna och jordbrukets utveckling, förekom, men politiska och familjerelaterade argument hade också sin givna plats.

Bördsrätten fram till 1826 års lagförslag

Till skillnad från odelsretten hade bördsrätten inte varit en politisk stridsfråga under 1700-talet. När frågan om dess upphävande väcktes vid 1812 års riksdag av en bonderepresentant föll den heller inte i god jord; när förslaget lästs upp i bondeståndet noterades ”ett allmänt ogillande af hwad i detta Memorial blifwit framställdt” och försök gjordes att förmå representanten att återta förslaget.[32] Det är därför rimligt att anta att bördsrätten stöddes av en klar majoritet av bönderna. Förslaget tillsändes ändå så småningom de övriga ständen, men blev inte föremål för någon mer långtgående diskussion.[33] Bland de synpunkter som fördes fram finns ändå en tydlig parallell till det mönster Håkon Evju finner i Norge. De ekonomiska argumenten låg tydligt till grund för kritikerna. Bördsrätten ansågs leda till lägre priser på jord, hindrade jordbruksutveckling och utnyttjades för att pressa pengar av den nya ägaren – det vill säga väsentligen argument av samma art som återfinns i den norska de-

batten. I likhet med den samtida norska debatten byggde försvararna i huvudsak sin argumentation på politiska grunder, men delvis med annan riktning. Någon hänvisning till konstitutionen eller historisk gemenskap gjordes inte, men bördsrättens betydelse för att upprätthålla egendomsförhållandena – som skydd för ”den mindre besutne Medborgarens egendom” – poängterades, och bördsrätten sades också vara ett uttryck för allmogens fosterlandskärlek.[34] Någon förändring av lagstiftningen kom dock inte till stånd; precis som i Norge överlämnades frågan i allmänna ordalag till beredning inom den lagkommitté som 1811 tillsatts för att göra en översyn av civillagstiftningen.

Lagkommittén utarbetade under 1810-talet utkast på civillagens rättsbalkar, men först 1826 kunde dessa presenteras som ett sammanhållet förslag. Den slutliga texten var starkt liberal, präglad av lagkommitténs ledande kraft, häradshövdingen Johan Gabriel Richert.[35] Av lagtext, motiv och kommitténs efterlämnade protokoll framgår att frågan om släktjordslagstiftningen utgjort den verkliga stötestenen i lagförslaget. Huvudförslaget, förespråkat av en majoritet inom kommittén, var att de rådande begränsningarna i rätten att disponera över arvejord skulle upphöra, men att bördsrättens däremot borde förbli.[36] I sin motivering skisserade kommittén i liberal anda en generell samhällsutveckling från ett samhälle där staten var en förening av släkter till en ordning där grunden bestod av enskilda medborgare. I det äldre släktsamhället hade jorden varit knuten till släkten och bördsrätten ingått som ”en nödvändig beståndsdel i den allmänna odalrätt, som från själfva samhällsförbundet var oskiljaktig”.[37] I det moderna samhället var dock detta en anomali; odalrätten var ett avslutat kapitel och kunde således inte längre utgöra ett motiv för bördsrätten. I dess ställe satte kommittén ”den nyare bördsrättens egentliga princip”: en förmodad kärlek till förfädernas jord.[38] Detta familjerelaterade känsloargument vävdes dock in i ett poli-

tiskt resonemang. När bönder arbetade jorden införlivades deras personlighet med denna och när jorden överförts inom släkten blev den för sin brukare som en teckning över släktens öden. Ur det lilla följde så det stora, ty ”från fädernejordens minnen utvidgas synkretsen småningom till fäderneslandets” och ”kärleken till fäders jord blir således alltid en djup grundval för kärleken till fäderneslandet”.[39] Kommittén erkände att jordbrukaren visserligen ägde ”den medborgerliga bildning” att han kunde älska fäderneslandet även utan den individuella affektionen, men manade till försiktighet: ”Fosterlandskänslan är ett band, som väfves af många trådar: ingen av dessa må afskäras obetänksamt”.[40]

Lagkommittén omdefinierade med andra ord bördsrättens motiv och la den till grund för det politiska behovet att slå ett band mellan staten och dess medborgare. Tanken på en gammal odalförfattning, där jordägandet haft central betydelse för samhällspositionen, var närmast helt liktydigt med Falsens skrift om odelsretten. I protokollen framgår dock att bördsrätten blottlade stora meningsskiljaktigheter mellan kommittéledamöterna. Juristen Anders Erik Afzelius yrkade i ett memorial på bördsrättens totala upphävande och i hans text genljöd de ekonomiska argument som tagits upp i 1812 års riksdagsdebatt – den försämrade jordbruksutvecklingen, oskicket att pressa den nye ägaren på pengar och lägre jordpriser. Han framhöll dessutom att bördsrätten hade likheter med fideikommisstanken, vilken principiellt underkänts av riksdagen några år tidigare.[41] En annan ledamot, Olof Zenius, framhöll häremot behovet att hos befolkningen upparbeta en känsla för staten och såg bördsrätten som ett verktyg för att hos jordbrukarna skapa en vördnad för den stat som skyddade dem i deras jordbesittning.[42] Richert erkände öppet bördsrättens brister, men menade att en avveckling skulle leda till ett tunnare band till fäderneslandet.[43] I motsats till Falsen hävdade han dock att den gamla

odalförfattningen var bruten: de svenska bönderna utgjorde inte längre en egendomsadel. I likhet med Falsen frammanade han dock ett framtida hot. Så länge bördsrätten bestod skulle allmogen, enligt Richert, ”säkert bibehålla Sveriges mesta jord; och så länge skall ej heller Svenska bonden förlora den rang, han äger framför de flesta, kanske alla, andra länders jordbrukare”.[44] Av naturliga skäl varnade inte Richert för uppkomsten av en adelsklass, däremot innebar hans resonemang att bördsrätten knöts till bondeklassens bibehållande vid sin jord. Det var inte en fråga om att bevara konstitutionen eller den allmänna samhällsordningen, snarare var Richerts formulering direkt riktad till bönderna som grupp.

Slutstridens upptakt

Efter att 1821 års odelslagstiftningen godkänts i Norge och 1826 års förslag till civillagstiftning lagts fram i Sverige stillades debatten och under ett par decennier var släktjordsfrågan i princip borta från den politiska dagordningen. I viss utsträckning berodde det på det utdragna arbetet med revidering av civillagsförslagen, vilket släpade efter i båda länderna.[45] Först i slutet av 1840-talet blossade frågan upp igen. Den lagberedning som övertog Lagkommitténs arbete bröt 1847 med den tidigare linjen och förespråkade istället bördsrättens fullständiga upplösning.[46] Vid den efterföljande riksdagen 1850 blev frågan politiskt aktuell då en motionär inom bondeståndet krävde bördsrättens avskaffande. Yrkandet föll, men frågan återkom vid varje följande riksdag fram till 1863. Med en märklig samtidighet dök även odelsretten upp som politiskt tvisteämne i Stortinget 1848, för att åter behandlas 1851, 1857 och 1860. Mellan ländernas debatter bör dock två skillnader noteras. Dels var sakfrågan olika formulerad – i Sverige gällde den bördsrättens avveckling, i Norge odelsrettens grundlagsskydd – dels kom yrkandena från olika håll.

I den svenska debatten kom propåerna från motionärer. Så var även fallet när odelsretten debatterades 1848 och 1851, men 1857 och 1860 var det regeringen som lade proposition om odelsrettens utmönstring ur grundlagen. I praktiken utformades dock debatterna i de två länderna i samma riktning: för eller emot en släktjordslagstiftning i börds- eller odelsrettens form.

De aktuella debatterna i Stortinget och riksdagen under dessa år spänner över flera hundra sidor och det är inte möjligt att inom ramen för denna artikel analysera allt material. Istället har debatterna ett enskilt år – 1860 – analyserats. Valet av år kan motiveras på flera sätt. Debatterna det året var mycket omfattande och ger därmed ett brett underlag att analysera. Frågan var vid det laget dessutom välkänd, varför argument och positioner bör ha varit tydliga. Händelser vid föregående session bör dessutom ha bidragit till att ge frågan tyngd. En majoritet av Stortingets ledamöter hade 1857 röstat *för* odelsrettens utmönstring ur grundlagen, men förslaget hade inte kunnat samla den kvalificerade majoritet som krävdes vid grundlagsbeslut.[47] Samma år hade riksdagen slopat de gamla restriktionerna för arvejord och dessutom avskaffat bördsrätten i städer.[48] När frågan åter kom på bordet 1860 är det därför rimligt att både kritiker och förespråkare vinnlade sig om att föra fram sina argument.

Släktjordsdebatten 1860

Släktjordsdebatterna i Stortinget och riksdagen 1860 var omfattande och involverade många talare på båda sidor. Även om de i praktiken rörde släktjordslagstiftningens vara eller inte vara, bör inledningsvis några formella skillnader mellan den svenska och den norska debatten klargöras. Den norska debatten initierades av en kunglig proposition, den gällde formellt endast att ta bort odelsretten ur grundlagen, och eftersom det var en grundlagsfråga be-

handlades den av hela Stortinget i en kammare. För svensk del initierades frågan av flera enskilda motioner, med krav på allt från restriktioner till en total avveckling av bördsrätten och den behandlades av de fyra ståndena var för sig. Den norska propositionen avstyrktes av konstitutionskommittén och föll slutligen med röstsiffrorna 47 mot 65 i Stortingets omröstning. För svensk del avstyrkte lagutskottet först alla förändringar, men när detta utlåtande återremitterades gjorde utskottet en kovändning och yrkade på bördsrättens totala upphävande. Till lagutskottets båda yrkanden fogades dessutom reservationer som gick ut på en minskning av gruppen släktingar som skulle ha rätt att väcka bördsklander (bördemannagruppen), vilket efter voteringar inom samtliga stånd fick stöd av tre stånd; enbart borgarståndet röstade för en total avveckling. Där den norska debatten var sammanhållen bestod den svenska följaktligen av åtta separata, även om debatten inom borgarståndet var mycket kortfattad vid båda tillfällena. I det följande behandlas dock den svenska debatten som *en* sammanhållen diskussion.

Att ur en flera timmar lång diskussion lyfta ut enskilda citat som ensamma kan illustrera argumentationslinjerna är metodiskt svårt och riskerar snedvrida bilden. I det följande görs därför först en kvantitativ analys av debatten för att med den som underlag därefter fokusera på centrala punkter i debatten. Avsikten har varit att identifiera *vilka argument* som användes av släktjordslagstiftningens försvarare och motståndare samt *hur vanligt förekommande* dessa var i debatten. Vid genomläsningen av debattprotokollet har argumenten identifierats och kodats, varefter den kodade texten bearbetats.[49] Argumenten har slutligen fogats samman i fyra kategorier: politiska, ekonomiska och familjerelaterade, samt argument som tagit sin utgångspunkt i lagstiftningen. Resultaten av analysen presenteras i tablå 1 och 2.

Tablå 1. *Översikt över Stortingets debatt om odelsretten 1860.*

	Argument till försvar för odelsretten (andel)	Argument-riktade mot odelsretten (andel)
A. Rättsliga argument	21	10
1. Bevarande av äldre rättsstruktur	18	
2. Rättslig koherens	1	7
3. Grundlag eller privaträtt	1	3
B. Politiska argument	42	40
1. Den allmänna opinionen	24	7
2. Säker äganderätt	0	14
3. Social struktur	7	4
4. Rationalitet, förnuftsstyre	1	9
5. Missbruk, moraliska följder	1	3
6. Samband med fosterlandskänslan	3	0
7. Övrigt	6	3
C. Ekonomiska argument	24	44
1. Effekter på jordpris och ersättningar	7	20
2. Hinder mot fri marknad	6	7
3. Misskötsel, brist på utveckling	0	11
4. Effekter på socioekonomisk struktur	11	1
5. Övrigt	0	4
D. Familjerelaterade argument	13	6
1. Emotionella band	10	1
2. Familjens sammanhållning	3	1
3. Släktbegreppet	0	3
	N = 71	N = 70

Källa: Storthingstidende: Forhandlingar i Storthinget, 1860: 81–83.

Tablå 2. *Översikt över riksdagens debatt om bördsrätten 1860.*

	Argument till försvar för bördsrätten (andel)	Argument riktade mot bördsrätten (andel)
A. Rättsliga argument	25	12
1. Bevarande av äldre rättsstruktur	6	0
2. Rättslig koherens	15	7
3. Hänvisning till rättsliga auktoriteter	4	5
B. Politiska argument	37	51
1. Den allmänna opinionen	15	12
2. Säker äganderätt	3	8
3. Social struktur	4	4
4. Rationalitet, förnuftsstyre	2	13
5. Missbruk, moraliska följder	0	5
6. Samband med fosterlandskänslan	1	2
7. Opinionen inom övriga stånd	7	5
8. Övrigt	2	1
C. Ekonomiska argument	13	35
1. Effekter på jordpris och ersättningar	3	21
2. Hinder mot fri marknad	3	4
3. Misskötsel, brist på utveckling	1	5
4. Effekter på socioekonomisk struktur	6	5
D. Familjerelaterade argument	25	2
1. Emotionella band	14	0
2. Familjens sammanhållning	8	2
3. Släktbegreppet	3	0
	N = 71	N = 98

Källor: protokoll för Ridderskapet och Adeln (13 juni och 15 september), Prästeståndet (30 maj och 18 september), Borgarståndet (6 juni och 15 september) och Bondeståndet (2 juni och 15 september), 1860.

Inledningsvis finns det starka skäl att återigen betona likheterna mellan debatterna. De enskilda argument och positioner som förekom i de två debatterna hade mycket stora likheter, men även debatternas övergripande strukturer påminde om varandra. För släktjordlagstiftningens kritiker var inte oväntat de ekonomiska argumenten viktiga, medan förespråkarna hämtade mer stöd från rättsliga argument eller med hänvisning till familjerelaterade värden. Någon påtaglig motsättning mellan ett ekonomiskt och ett politiskt synsätt är dock svår att belägga, tvärtom rörde huvuddelen av debatten i båda länderna politiska argument. Vad döljer sig då för konkreta argument bakom de fyra kategorierna?

De *rättsliga argumenten* tog naturligt sin utgångspunkt i respektive lands lagstiftning. I Stortinget byggde odelsrettens försvarare en stor del av sitt resonemang på vikten att bevara en befintlig rättsstruktur. Odelsretten var bevisligen gammal och skulle man förändra ”en 100aarig Institution, som har indforlivet sig i vor Nationalitet […] da maa man vel betænke sig”.[50] Flera talare anmärkte också på vilka effekter en avskaffad odelsrett skulle ha för Åsætesretten, med risk att gårdar på billiga villkor överfördes till en ny generation för att omgående säljas på öppna marknaden utan möjlighet för släktingar att lösa den åter.[51] I debatten blev själva det faktum att odelsretten stod med i grundlagen skäl nog för att motivera att den blev kvar där. ”Det blev antaget i Farens Stund, og i Farens Stund taler Mennesket alltid Sandhed”, som en representant uttryckte saken.[52] Att odelsretten ansetts så viktigt att den grundlagsskyddats var ett problematiskt faktum för dess motståndare. Deras resonemang utgick från att händelserna 1814 krävt enighet på ett sätt som gjorde att rationella principer satts på undantag. Agerandet på Eidsvoll var således inte fel i sig, men hade skett under extraordinära omständigheter. Nu var dock läget inte längre sådant,

och kritikerna inskärpte att odelsretten stod i strid med övriga principer i grundlagen.[53]

Värdet av att bevara äldre rättsstruktur framfördes även någon gång i den svenska debatten, men tyngdpunkten låg där istället på att skapa enhetlighet i lagstiftningen. Det var emellertid en ståndpunkt som kunde vinklas åt olika håll. Bördsrättens motståndare pekade på att restriktionerna mot att testamentera bort arvejord hade avskaffats 1857, samt att bördsrätten i städerna röstats bort samma år. Att ha olika lagstiftning på landet och i städerna var inkonsekvent, och när arvejordens ställning försvagats menade de att själva grunden ryckts bort även för bördsrätten.[54] Det var dock i huvudsak bördsrättens försvarare som använde sig av rättsliga argument. Deras utgångspunkt var att bördsrätten var ett komplement till arvsrätten och särskilt till testamentsfriheten. Om en ”onaturlig far” testamenterade bort halva sin egendom var det, mycket naturligt att hans barn kunde börda det åter, hävdade en talare i adelsståndet.[55] Mats Persson i bondeståndet såg bördsrätten som lika betydelsefull som arvsrätten; så länge den senare fanns borde även den förstnämnda äga stånd.[56] Flera talare i den svenska debatten lutade sig också på juridiska auktoriteter, särskilt den redan nämnde J.G. Richert. Eftersom denna inom lagkommittén försvarat bördsrätten, men senare i lagberedningen ställt sig bakom dess avveckling, kom hans skilda uttalanden märkligt nog att användas av *bägge* sidor i debatten.[57]

Bland *politiska argument* intog utsagor om den allmänna opinionen en särställning i båda länderna. Grunderna för detta var dock mycket olika. I den svenska debatten, särskilt inom bondeståndet, förekom ofta uppgifter om bördsrättens ställning i talarens hemort. Det är dock svårt att med ledning av detta sluta sig till den allmänna meningen. Bondeståndets Gustaf Bjerkander summerade att ”denna opinion inom alla orter är något blandad”,

och påpekade att från samma valdistrikt kunde komma representanter med helt olika bild av bördsrättens ställning i hembygden.[58] I den norska debatten fanns en annan empirisk bas. I slutet av 1840-talet genomfördes på Stortingets initiativ en landsomfattande enkät, där bland annat landets Formandskaber (motsvarande kommunstyrelser) fick ta ställning till om odelsretten skulle kvarstå i grundlagen. Totalt inkom strax över 370 svar, och en stor majoritet av dessa ställde sig positiva till att ha bestämmelserna kvar.[59] För odelsrettens försvarare var detta givetvis starka papper och det folkliga stödet var det mest använda argumentet i den norska debatten. Det hindrade emellertid inte motståndarna från att använda den folkliga opinionen som argument. De ifrågasatte värdet i enkäten och påpekade dessutom att det från alltfler håll i landet framfördes kritik mot odelsretten.[60] Tanken att en avveckling var förnuftsbaserad och en logisk följd i ett mer rationellt samhälle återkom relativt frekvent.[61] Tio år hade ändå passerat sedan enkäten om odelsretten, menade representanten Daae, en tid ”hvori Oplysningen og Udviklingen er gaaet fremad”.[62] Förnuft och känsla behövde dock inte ställas mot varandra, hävdade släktjordlagstiftningens försvarare; ”Fornuft uden Følelse er Lys uden Varme”, som Simon Lie uttryckte saken.[63]

Bland de politiska argumenten lyfte odels- och bördsrättens belackare även fram dess negativa effekter på äganderätten. Under preskriptionstiden levde en ny ägare i ovisshet om möjligheten att på sikt få behålla sin införskaffade egendom. De osäkra egendomsförhållandena satte delvis samhällsförhållandena ur spel och kunde leda till ”Ingreb i en Mands Velfærd, som intet Ondt hade gjort, uden ganske lovligt at kjøbe et Gods”.[64] I den norska debatten ifrågasattes inte denna linje, men i den svenska förekom äganderätten som ett argument för en *bibehållen* lagstiftning. En talare i bondeståndet anförde att bördsrätten var ”helig för äganderätten” och i

adelsståndet prisade greve Sparre den jordbrukande befolkningen samt varnade för att ta bort institutioner ”som skydda jordegarne i deras besittning af sin jord”.[65] Ytterst handlade saken om vem lagen borde skydda – den nye ägaren eller den gamle (och dennes släktingar).

De *ekonomiska argumenten* var i stor utsträckning liknande i de två debatterna. Motståndarna framhöll släktjordslagstiftningens effekter på jordpriser och de ekonomiska ersättningar som kunde tillkomma vid köp. Till följd av de osäkra besittningsförhållandena sades jordpriserna bli nedtryckta och lagen var därför till nackdel för säljaren. När klander mot jordstransaktioner väcktes, var det dessutom sällan i avsikt att verkligen inlösa egendomen, utan syftade snarast på att avtvinga jordägaren en ersättning för att lägga ned processen; ”Pung ud, eller jag driver Dig ud!”, som en talare i Stortinget beskrev det.[66] Flera talare påtalade att de osäkra besittningsförhållandena hämmade jordbruksutveckling och att lagstiftningen dessutom utgjorde ett marknadshinder. Även om det sällan sades rätt ut, fanns i kritiken en underliggande tankegång om värdet av en fri marknad även för jord. Ett ovanligt tydligt exempel var statsrådet Stang, som på Stortinget menade att ”Odelsretten Indflydelse ligger i, at den hindrer fri Omsætning af Jordegods og den frie Udvikling, der betinges af fri Omsætning”.[67] Att missbruk förekom erkändes även av försvararna, som dock inte alltid såg något skamligt i förfarandet. Den som köptes odelsgods fick ju därav ofta betala ett lägre pris, därför var det inte orätt att han fick betala en del till en klandrande släkting.[68] Därutöver var det flera som framhöll lagstiftningens socioekonomiska effekter, att börds- och odelsretten hindrade såväl jordkoncentration som egendomens alltför starka uppdelning.

Slutligen kan konstateras att *familjerelaterade argument* spelade en överraskande liten roll i den norska debatten, men utgjorde

en fjärdedel av argumenten bland de svenska bördsrättsvännerna. Det centrala argumentet var dock detsamma: att det var en ädel känsla att förbättra och överföra jord inom släkten.[69]

Konklusion – två bondestrategier?

Jag har i denna artikel betonat likheterna mellan den svenska och den norska släktjordsdebatten mellan 1810 och 1860. Avslutningsvis finns därför skäl att återvända till den inledande frågan – varför resulterade debatten trots likheterna i så olika beslut i början av 1860-talet? En möjlighet är att omformulera problemet till varför odelsretten höll stånd i Norge. Ett skäl var uppenbart konstitutionellt. Det var grundlagsskyddets krav på kvalificerad majoritet som gjorde att odelsretten överlevde 1857 års debatt. Analysen av debatten visar emellertid också på vilken betydelse den allmänna opinionen hade för Stortingets beslut. Det fanns en stark föreställning om att odelsretten hade starkt stöd ute i landet. En tredje möjlig förklaring är ekonomisk. Odelsretten blev i exempelvis Falsens tolkning liktydigt med en homogen och självägande bondeklass. Runt 1815 utgjorde de självägande bönderna bara 65 procent av landets jordbrukare, men denna andel steg till 85 procent runt 1860 samtidigt som böndernas inflytande i Stortinget ökade kraftigt från 1850-talets mitt.[70] Ett sätt att förklara odelsrettens ställning skulle då vara att koppla den till bondeklassens stärkta ställning. Jämförelsen med Sverige komplicerar dock en sådan tolkning. Även i den svenska debatten fanns uppgifter om ett folkligt stöd för bördsrätten, och i likhet med Norge ökade de självägande bönderna i antal under 1800-talet samtidigt som deras politiska maktställning tilltog.[71] Frågan borde då närmast vara varför Sverige avvecklade sin, i jämförelse med odelsretten, relativt modesta bördsrätt.

En möjlig väg framåt är att ta fasta på en tydlig skillnad i hur släktjordlagstiftningens sociala konsekvenser uppfattades i de två debatterna. Argumentationen rörde sig i princip över både det politiska och det ekonomiska fältet, men fick olika tyngdpunkt. I den norska debatten gick en tydlig linje från Falsens vurm för lika fördelning av egendom till 1860-talets debatt, där odelsretten anfördes som förklaring till Norges historia och rådande egendomsordning. Odelsretten sågs som en förklaring till norsk särart, det främsta skälet till att ”det skadelige Lensforhold, som overalt ellers existerede i Middelalderen” inte nådde Norge.[72] Hotet mot böndernas jordinnehav hade dock fortsatt aktualitet i debatten. Gör man jordegendom till handelsvara leder till ofrånkomligt till bondeklassens fall och uppkomsten av en penga-aristokrati, hävdade flera representanter.[73] Denna dimension av debatten var betydligt mer nedtonad i Sverige, trots att Richert fört ett liknande resonemang angående bördsrätten. I såväl adels- som bondeståndet framhölls tvärtom att bönderna inte alls var hotade; för varje år visades tydligt hur bönderna erövrade en allt större del av Sveriges jord, både genom skatteköp och förvärv av gammal frälsejord.[74] Inom bondeståndet framhölls att bördsrätten snarast började utgöra ett hinder för böndernas fortsatta expansion, ”ty de samhällets klasser, som hittills haft svårast att behålla sina fäders jord, skulle i denna rätt finna ett skydd mot allmogens större förvärfsförmåga”.[75] Bördsrätten kunde förvisso vara ett skydd för den svage, men det var en beteckning som i allt mindre utsträckning kunde sättas på de svenska bönderna och särskilt inte på deras representanter i riksdagen. För en ekonomiskt allt starkare bondeklass, som börjat markera sin höjda status med beteckningen hemmansägare, blev bördsrätten snarast en belastning.[76]

En möjlig tolkning av de skilda politiska besluten runt 1860 är således att de speglar två olika bondestrategier. Den norska slog

vakt om en traditionell bild, framhävde sin särart och höll en konservativ linje. Den svenska kan snarare betecknas som expansiv, där bönderna stärkte sin självbild på bekostnad av andra samhällsgrupper.

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74 Se exempelvis Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll 1860, 212 (Raab).
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective

Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché

Introduction

The transatlantic slave trade, although it is not the only kind of slave trade, left an indelible mark on the minds, both in terms of its length (it lasted over several centuries) and its intensity (it led to the deportation of several millions human beings). A confusion is sometimes made between slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, and it appears necessary to distinguish the two notions. Slavery is managed and maintained by large landowners, usually of aristocratic origins (even if often exiled, banished from their original land for moral, religious or succession issues), or sons of wealthy ship owners who moved to the Colonies upon order or recommendation from paternal authority. For these landowners, slavery is primarily a means to increase production, and therefore their fortune, and the slaves are vector of wealth growth, rather than the direct source of increase in wealth linked to their resale. However, the transatlantic slave trade resembles a transport trading activity, and more broadly logistics, to ensure the provision of work forces necessary to the Colonies. It is obviously understood that the transatlantic slave trade is morally blameworthy and has left

an indelible scar on the history of Humanity. Nevertheless, this should not ban an in-depth analysis of its operating mechanisms, and especially the set of operations having enabled its expansion.

The transatlantic slave trade consisted in the sufficient supplying of Europe in products from the Colonies, and in return, to provide the necessary labor to ensure the operation of plantations, based on a proven economic model.[1] This model is based on a remarkably effective logistical organization, which has yet never given rise to a detailed study. The position taken here is that it is possible to understand a certain number of historical phenomena in reference to the manner with which flows are monitored within the frame of trade. Indeed, prior research has already discussed the importance of logistical management with a historical perspective, but by first looking into military operations. One of the most emblematic cases is the Liberation, in June 1944, of the European continent occupied by the Nazis. The American strike force established, for this occasion, an impressive armada, both military and logistical (creation of artificial ports off the English coasts, as well as gigantic warehouses to store supplies, etc.).[2] The chapter opts for a different working angle by looking at how a global supply chain was structured by the set of actors to guarantee the economic success of the transatlantic slave trade. By global supply chain, we refer to the set of operations and mechanisms that unfold at the international level, and that enables to supply the clients with the products at the right time, in the right quantities and at the right place. To do so, the global supply chain relies on a set of infrastructures and physical processes, such as the transport and storage, necessary to the provision of products, from the raw material to the customer.

From a methodological point of view, this chapter draws on historical documents and in-depth studies conducted by specialists in economic history that stress the key roles played by different ac-

tors in the development of the transatlantic slave trade, but without explicit reference to the logistical process. Thus, we suggest analyzing this historical phenomenon from the perspective of the links established between the three principle areas: West Africa, the European Continent, and the Americas. We will also examine the role of the suppliers ensuring maritime logistics (shipping, auxiliary transport) and the customers (farmers in the Americas, wealthy families in Europe, and African warlords). The aim is to emphasize the roles played by key infrastructure aspects (European slave trade ports) and operations management (definition of optimal transport conditions, traceability of streams by the barbarous system of branding). Historical documents underline that transatlantic slave trade was based on codified organizational principles that were a developed and very important aspect of the slave trade enterprise. However, it is hardly ever stated that the slave trade enterprise also required and most importantly an effective global supply chain to maintain its profitability.

Founding Economic Principles of the Transatlantic Slave Trade

The slave trade was a business activity designed to meet market demand. We have decided to analyze this activity from a purely operational standpoint as a link in the trade chain between Europe and the Colonies, wherein the benefit of transporting slaves depended, in part, on the value of the "*bois d'ébène*" (ebony wood), *i.e.* slaves. The overall process was initially stimulated and regulated by mercantilist Europe. Many actors were involved, foremost being the European states and many of their factories that could, through the slave trade, find new market opportunities. Here, the theme under study is the slave *trade*, an activity requiring commercial

transportation, not *slavery* itself, a more general phenomenon requiring a different analysis, with a decidedly more philosophical view. We have adopted an analytical approach, that of logistics, in this chapter. Transatlantic slave trade involved efficiently organized and integrated supply networks, for which data from many reliable sources are available. The study of historical documents, the *Atlas of Slavery* by Marcel Dorigny and Bernard Gainot for instance[3], shows how the approach adopted by transatlantic slave trade organizers explicitly relied on a kind of flow control based on known, present day concepts in logistical management.

The strategic objective of transatlantic slave trade was to supply Europe with products from the Colonies and provide needed manpower for plantations in the New World. Key resources from each country were: (1) Europe, providing fabric (raw and finished textiles), wheat, jewelry, beads, alcohol (wine, spirits) and knives and weapons; (2) Africa, providing slaves, mostly war prisoners from tribal strife; (3) and the Americas, providing principally sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo, cotton, and tobacco. The primary goal was to trade and increase wealth. For instance, Robert L. Stein identified 500 families in Nantes, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Le Havre, and Saint-Malo who armed 2,800 ships bound for Africa.[4] The objective was the transportation of slaves to American Colonies for future sale. Once there, the goal became buying raw materials and then exporting those materials to Europe. Along the way, realizing a comfortable added value was desirable. We can speak here of downstream steering because it was the demand for labor from the Colonies that initially induced this triangular trade.

Expansion of the Sugar Industry

A reading of Table 1, taken from Hugh Thomas, shows that the

slave trade to American Colonies was primarily intended to provide labor for growing sugar.[5] Sugar cane, originally from the East Indies (Insulinde), gradually spread throughout the Pacific, reaching the South of China and India via Malaysia between the 15th and 20th centuries BC. It continued its westward progression, and roughly one thousand years later, via Europe, ended up in South America.[6] The development of slavery was a byproduct linked to the "rapid" spread of sugar to new territories. This crop requires arduous and seasonally intensive labor and naturally, farmers wanted the cheapest labor possible. For Pieter Emmer, the transatlantic slave trade would have finally had a marginal importance in terms of economic impact.[7] It was considered that the system established had first favored the spread of European values and standards, such as private property, the nuclear family or free labor. If this spread is unquestionable, the economic expansion of the New World should be remembered especially at the level of the sugar industry, as well as the coffee industry.

Table 1. *Slave Trade Destinations in the Americas*

First slave use in the Americas	**Percent (%)**
Sugar plantations	45.4
Coffee plantations	18.2
Housework	18.2
Mining	9.1
Cotton fields	4.5
Cocoa fields	2.3
Building	2.3

Source: Adapted from Thomas, *Slave trade*.

Prior to the arrival of slaves from the African continent, forced labor by Native American populations led to a genocide that the Jesuit Bartolomé de Las Casas denounced in 1514.[8] A different system, one of "*engagés*", *i.e.* European contract workers who accepted to leave their country for the Colonies, was then adopted between the second half of the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century.[9] Far from negligible, it is estimated that this represented about 300,000 contract workers who, for all intents and purposes were white slaves, and formed the basis for the Colonies' economy. The long, difficult, and disorganized recruitment of the *engagés* who were not urbanites, was costly and there was a high propensity to mutiny because internees and guards were from the same cultural, religious, and social backgrounds.

Over the course of time, risk increased and the operation's profitability became significantly burdened, especially if one considers uncertainties related to the virulent struggle between imperial powers for colonial expansion. To sustainably increase the strength of commitment among the *engagés*, increased wages and reduced years of contracted service would have been necessary. The need for an "elastic source of forced labor" was inconsistent with the prevailing European mercantilism that could not support an activity involving too great an outflow of labor, manpower being considered an asset. Despite this, in purely economic terms, continuing to move enslaved Europeans to the Americas would probably have been more profitable over the long term than organizing and funding expeditions to black Africa. The policy of using *engagés* quickly reached its limits, however, particularly due to very high mortality rates.

Thus, the staggering mortality experienced by trying to feed the slave trade became a fundamental, problematic concern. As stated by Fernand Braudel, one mustn't abuse an already needy

world (*i.e.* Europe), a preexisting, slowly matured power is required.[10] While clearly a second choice, Africans represented this slowly matured power and provided an answer to overcoming labor related difficulties. Colonial settlers made early calculations based on reasoning at three levels: (1) the captive amortization period was short (in Barbados in 1645, the purchase price of slaves was repayable in a year and a half from proceeds); (2) a slave represented available capital that could be mobilized; (3) and a slave could also provide non-monetary benefits. This reasoning was based on the premise (accepted at that time) that a major source of slave labor was available in Africa and the only element lacking was the appropriate external force to take advantage of this "natural" resource.

This idea sparked the beginning of the slave trade and resulted in one of the largest population displacements in human history. Starting in 1460 and continuing until about 1550, the slave trade was intra-African and afterwards solely intended for the Iberian Peninsula. It became transatlantic for the first time at the end of the 16th century, as a response to needs of the new Portuguese colony of Brazil. In 1672, Jacques Stuart (the future King James I of England) founded the Royal African Company. Meanwhile his cousin, Louis XV dissolved the *Compagnie Royale d'Afrique* (that had been created under Richelieu, but was deemed too inefficient in terms of triangular trade), and founded the *Compagnie du Sénégal* in 1674. Both kings intended, firstly, to break the Iberian domination on the African coasts and the Dutch transportation monopoly. Secondly, they intended to supply labor to their own North American based Colonies. When British and French actors entered the market, a model for streamlining and optimizing flow developed and continually improved over the course of the 18th century.

Meeting Needs

This is a correct, but simplistic vision of a complex reality. Today, the moral component of 17th century transatlantic slave trade involving slaves obscures the larger economic picture in the collective memory. Our modern vision of transatlantic slave trade is biased because it stresses, above all, the ocean journey, and the morally questionable use of humans as merchandise, ignoring the events occurring "on the ground" at the three "tips" of the triangle. Upstream, at the European "tip", capital, goods, men, and ships were mobilized. This created many new opportunities for manufacturing, especially textiles, leading to, for example fame and wealth in cities like Cholet in France. In Africa (the second "tip"), local chiefs took advantage of intra or inter-tribal conflicts and established their dominion over the vanquished, selling or bartering them to slave traders. The third "tip", the Colonies, benefitted from the influx of labor to expand agricultural potential, promote colonial transformation, and respond to demands for New World products in Europe.

Transatlantic slave trade was, above all, a commercial activity with a profit motive. It is therefore interesting to analyze it from this perspective, applying entrepreneurial precepts that today are called logistical processes. Transatlantic slave trade was complex, required massive organization and high capital investment, and produced unreliable and irregular profits, as historians have been able to estimate in academic studies. If expected gain was high and some shipments proved very profitable (for example, 138% profit for the ship *La Jeune-Aimée,* sailing from Nantes in 1783[11]), average overall profitability ran well below this figure. Here are two examples of less profitable outcomes:

– First, trading in Holland between 1600 and 1815 generated earnings of between 5 to 10% for 54% of all shipments (the Dutch

shareholders of the *Midelburgsche Commercie Compagnie* posted an annual average gain of 2.1% between 1730 and 1790)[12].

– Secondly, British trade was the most profitable due to the country's imperialistic experience, its well-established industry that was better able to provide products for trade and the efficiency of its banking system. As a result, the return on investment hovered between 7.1 and 7.5% between 1785 and 1807.[13]

These results should be prudently interpreted because they are averages, also keeping in mind that less risky investments existed in, for example, insurance which reported between 4 and 6% profit, or land owning with a return of 5%. Profit was in no way guaranteed. Trade activity had to, therefore, be optimized, which was not easy since, in the 18th century, a strong supply and demand phenomenon existed in specific context: English arrival on the African coast, hitherto a Dutch preserve, increased demand for slaves while supply was relatively limited. The price for slaves rose as a result, ultimately climbing six-fold between the mid-17th century and 1712.[14] In addition, in 1674, the French and Caribbean slave trade operators reduced slave purchase prices for plantation owners, stimulating sugar production, which in turn reduced sugar prices on the global market. Consumption was thus encouraged and, in response, boosted the slave trade even further.

Operational Breakdown of the Transatlantic Slave Trade

Considering transatlantic slave trade from an operational standpoint may seem surprising. Yet, if we take care to analyze the underlying exchange structures, it is indisputable that transatlantic slave trade functioned thanks to transportation management principles and, more broadly, relied upon workflow man-

agement on a vast geographical scale. It is thus possible to break down the logistical process with reference to four interrelated elements: (1) the European stage that provided the ability to raise capital, man a ship, assemble a crew and collect cargo; (2) the African stage providing an *exchange* market of products for slaves; (3) the American stage demanding slaves for sugar plantations (and marginally for coffee and tobacco production) and selling these same products for resale in Europe; and (4) the shipping and storage industry that provided transportation and storage capacities at the "tips" of the triangle on three different continents.

The European Stage

Around 200,000 to 300,000 livres tournois (a French monetary unit) had to be collected before a ship left port. In current terms, for example, in 1777, Ms. De Sabran bought a mansion in the Rue Saint-Honoré in Paris for 300,000 livres tournois[15], which today would represent approximately five million euros. This money gathering operation could last between a year and a half (in the best case), and three years (in case of bad luck or malfunctions). Return on investment was very slow. Many shareholders (craftsmen or eventually servants) were involved in any given operation, so that the ship owner would not be the main shareholder. When the capital was fragmented the main resources for group ownership were acquaintances, friends, and relatives. In France, financing triangular operations primarily concerned powerful ship owners who diversified their oceanic activities while continuing to pursue their traditional ship centered activities, for example cod fishing, regular line navigation or tramping. Ship owners faced two possibilities: maintaining old and already de-

preciated ships (worth 15 to 20,000 livres tournois) or investing in newer and more powerful ships (worth 50 to 60,000 livres tournois).[16] Over time, the second option became the rule.

However, the ability to raise capital remained marked by differences depending on the ports. Therefore, in France, ship-owners and merchants of Atlantic ports were mostly outside the region, or even out of the country. In La Rochelle, the slave trade was mainly the doing of the Protestants, and it benefited from the financial support of members of the religious community.[17] In Nantes, the slave trade was shared between a few rich families of the city, families from Brittany, Normandy and Paris, and a significant colony of Dutch merchants. Finally, in Bordeaux, the financing was practically only a family or community business. Amongst the most known cases, there are the Nairac and Gradis families who respectively equipped 25 and 10 expeditions from Bordeaux, and made an important contribution to the establishment of networks for the financing and the fitting out of slave ships from Bordeaux, in direct competition with the port of Nantes. Despite these differences in terms of financing, the same trends are noticeable. On the one hand, the sums invested were returned only 12 to 18 months later (except in the event of a sinking). On the other hand, a well-organized ship-owner used a minimum of two boats, one arriving in the West Indies in June, while the other left France in August. This ensured the rotation of boats, as well as bringing back different plants according to the seasons.

Regarding the crews, they were particularly difficult to recruit. Sailors were aware of the high mortality rates in transatlantic slave trade.[18] For example, there was a 17 to 18% death rate during the 18th century according to studies conducted on a sample of 1,000 slave ships from Nantes, with higher mortality peaks for

extended stays in African waters. This was minor compared to the risk during excursions to the Indian Ocean and Asia where crew mortality rates reached 50% among Portuguese sailors and 30% among Dutch sailors. The *Compagnie des Indes* crews sailing from Lorient and La Rochelle into the same Far East waters averaged 28% mortality between 1644 and 1789. To make matters worse, there had to be twice as many crewmembers on a slave transport vessel as on a merchant vessel of equivalent tonnage. Studies have established an average of 20 to 25 men for one hundred tons, although this figure decreased over the centuries. On a slave vessel, there was an average of ten slaves per sailor.

Recruiting other high quality, diverse personnel was also vital. A captain with strong maritime capabilities, excellent leadership and proven trade experience in Africa was essential. He also had to be able to recover debts in America. A cooper charged with making barrels to store water or food (barrels were loaded in bunches to limit congestion) had to be recruited. A carpenter was also hired to mount partitions and false or lop decks to adapt a vessel for human freight transport. Finally, a surgeon was needed (often a practitioner of comparatively poor technical quality due to medical knowledge at the time) who was responsible for assessing slave health prior to boarding and preservation of the same during the voyage. The surgeon was also in charge of keeping the logbook, rigorously recording the number of deaths onboard, and the causes of death.[19]

Once these structural components were regrouped, a shipment of high barter value had to be pooled based on a classification of 110 to 115 products, including relatively expensive elements like textiles imported from India, or metals, tools, knives and firearms, porcelain, tobacco, brandy, spirits manufactured in Europe. "*Guinéaillerie*" (gold leaf, mirrors, beads, and

shells), although essential, was only a cargo complement. In the end, shipyards, mines, textile mills, the steel industry, producers of handicrafts, and dried fish or meat manufacturers, (to name but a few of the trades included) throughout Europe, the Baltic, and the southern Iberian Peninsula were involved in transatlantic slave trade.[20] Though lacking in-depth studies on the subject, in France, if sugar-refining activity is included, one worker out of eight was more or less directly involved in transatlantic slave trade during the second half of the 18th century.[21]

The African Stage

The role played by black Africa itself in the global movement of Africans to the Americas (and to the Indian Ocean, North Africa, and the Middle East) cannot be underestimated. Without a constant and large supply of "raw material", the slave trade would have neither begun, nor developed and persisted. Intertribal conflicts, raids, customary law, succession problems, convictions for debt, crime, adultery, etc., created sources of supply. In addition, fierce competition among Western powers benefited Africans who concentrate a captive resource. Africans seemingly exercised a more pronounced control on transatlantic slave trade than did Europe.[22] When the slave trade was in its infancy and disorganized, only 2% of the captives were kidnapped by slave traders.[23] Later, African chiefs entered the slave circuit as game masters.

Captives and future slaves came from the hinterlands. The local African "suppliers" had to have relays and relationships, as well as porters to barter goods. Funding an armed guard was, therefore, essential to protect slave columns from raiders and to avoid riots. According to Jan S. Hogendorn, if slave prices were

200 to 600% higher on the coast than inland, it was due to additional expenses (food, equipment, taxes, intermediate handlers, mortality) that profitability was inversely proportional to the inland distance traveled by captured future slaves to reach the coast.[24] Having a position in local political hierarchies helped providers of slaves maintain their business, and allowed them to impose exchange prices during final negotiations.

The catchment area extended from the Sene-Gambia region to today's Angola and was, in fact, limited to a few sites that seem to have been referral units where operations were carried out to group the "goods". These sites were indeed the real hubs of transatlantic slave trade: Judah in Benin (now Ouidah) and Lagos in Nigeria centralized nearly 60% of the offers, but also Loango in Congo and Luanda in Angola. The possibilities for procuring slaves were relatively concentrated. Europeans had counters on the African coast providing, in principle, goods only to vessels sailing under their own colors. These hubs have been likened to fortified logistical platforms intended, by design, to be protected from damage and surprises, and for which rent was paid to local authorities.

The first hub was built in 1482 by the Portuguese Diogo de Azambuja as, in theory, Portugal enjoyed by treaty the attendance and operation monopoly of Africa. Thereafter, with the gradual eviction of Portugal (that ended in 1637), the English and the Dutch built hubs for their benefit on what approximately corresponds to the current Ghanaian coast.[25] England and the United Provinces, of equivalent forces, were to be the dominant powers for a long period, but benefiting from their constant disagreement, the Danish and the Swedish were to, despite everything, manage to dig in by implementing their own hubs. The Danish took this opportunity to increase their share of the regional market, linked to the gold trade, from 5 to 12% during the 18th century.[26]

Once arrived at a hub, the captain (as the boat owner's representative) had to pay the "*coutume*" to the local broker. This was a kind of entrance fee enabling a captain to begin real trading transactions. Brokers were generally Africans, sometimes of mixed race, and were local supplier representatives. Any transaction started with establishing the composition for the purchase of a captive. The standard measure was what Westerners called a "*pièce d'Inde*", corresponding to a healthy man of 15 to 35 years of age, of good size, robust and without any impairment. Women, children or elderly or disabled individuals led to discounts: three children of between ten and fifteen years of age for two *pièces d'Inde*, two children from five to ten years of age for one *pièce d'Inde*, while old and ill individuals were valued at three quarters of a *pièces d'Inde*. In brief, the consideration value depended on local *utility value* assigned to the captive by the bidder.

Clustering could be prolonged due to a power balance firmly favoring the seller who could temporarily restrict supply to push up prices. Up to a year's wait was not rare. The duration of an operation depended on the moment and confrontation between supply and demand conditions, but it has been estimated that a good average was the accumulation of four to five slaves per day. Sales were executed in batches, the shipmaster having neither the power, nor especially the time to choose the quality or the composition of his cargo. Shipmasters negotiated for what was proposed to them in terms of *pièces d'Inde*. For each slave, a health check and branding (buttock, hip, chest, or shoulder) was performed prior to boarding to indicate their affiliation and provide a kind of traceability. In the main compartment men were chained in pairs and were separated from women and children, who were held in different compartments.

The American Stage

It is difficult to obtain entirely reliable figures; however, it is possible to estimate the number of voyages between Africa and the Americas to over 54,000 during the entire transatlantic slave trade, approximately amounting to 11 million slaves carried (see Table 2). Upon arrival on New World shores (mainly Caribbean islands for French ships[27]), slaves were routinely quarantined unless there were other arrangements with local authorities. This quarantine was for cargo "refreshment". The cargo was discharged in designated places so the slaves could recover from voyage-induced fatigue. Food of higher quality than the sea rations was provided. "Cosmetic" work to conceal lesions and injuries was undertaken to make slaves appear more attractive for potential buyers. Sales, after being advertised to local farmers, were done either on land or on the ship. There were three different possibilities depending on the circumstances:

– The most common method was the batch-bound sale, forcing buyers to accept some individuals of high quality and others of lesser value. This system favored selling all captives and avoided unsold slaves, also known as "cargo tails";

– The second method consisted of stocking slaves in a specific location and displaying them at a given time. Buyers rushed in and removed "items" they had previously identified, and then led the merchandise to the seller to determine the price. Slaves not selected were then sold in sets at discounted prices;

– The third method was to sell slaves to most the creditworthy colonists according to the highest and last bidder principle. If this method proved to be the most profitable, it was not always applicable because it depended heavily on the momentary equilibrium between supply and demand: many ships in the harbor could bring down prices.

Table 2. *Transatlantic Slave Carriers*

Country	**Voyages**	**Moved slaves**	**Percentage**
Portugal (including Brazil)	30,000	4,650,000	42.3
Spain (including Cuba)	4,000	1,600,000	14.5
France (including West Indies)	4,200	1,250,000	11.4
Holland	2,000	500,000	4.5
Britain	12,000	2,600,000	23.6
British North America, USA	1,500	300,000	2.7
Denmark	250	50,000	0.5
Other	250	50,000	0.5
Total	*54,200*	*11,000,000*	*100*

Source: Adapted from Thomas, *Slave trade*.

On site in the Colonies, the owner's correspondent played a determining role. Informed several months in advance of a ship's arrival, his role was to maintain a network, explore the market, inform settlers of a forthcoming shipment arrival, and to learn about the state of potential client finances. The owner's correspondent was also responsible for negotiating, buying, and storing the freight that was to return to Europe. Consisting of sugar, cocoa, coffee, cotton, indigo and tobacco, this cargo was generally worth one third of the slave sale value. The complement, which was debt subject, was paid in the following months, or even in the following years. It was not at all rare for "claim tails" (debt repayment) to extend for one or more decades.

Focus on the Maritime Transport Operation

Naval architectural progress enabled significant improvement in building quality to suit specific needs throughout the 18th centu-

ry. According to Jean Boudriot, these developments were threefold prior to 1780.[28] First, there was an increase in the average tonnage that rose during the 18th century from 150 to 250 register tons; this allowed accumulating more goods, transporting more slaves and the food necessary for the Atlantic crossing. Second, the development of ship hulls providing greater resistance for voyages in tropical waters teeming with gnawing shellfish or worms, especially during long term stationing off the African coast; from the middle of the 18th century, hulls were doubled with copper plates, but this highly effective system also increased vessel cost by 15%. Third, greater speed was sought to reduce journey time, avoid enemies in case of conflict, reduce the mortality rate and accelerate capital turnover; in 1761, units departing for Africa had a more distinguished and superior gait than that of King Frigates.[29]

However, we should note the significant differences in performance between the various countries regarding the time for crossing the Atlantic. Indeed, even though the crossing usually took from one to three months, and the average time was 66 days, the logistical skills and resources could lead to significant disparities. Therefore, while Dutch slave ships took 71 to 81 days to reach the West Indies, Brazilian slave ships carried out the journey between Angola and Brazil in only 35 days, by taking advantage of the smaller distance to travel.[30] Some countries therefore had more effective shipping than others; at least, this has been suggested for the Baltic trade in the Early Modern period that the Dutch, unlike the transatlantic slave trade, had a more effective management of vessels than some of their counterparts in the trade.[31] But the effectiveness of the transport from one country to another was also strongly linked to the perfect organization in the hinterland and ports, as in the case of Liverpool and its docks.

Between 1750 and 1800, Liverpool established itself as the major logistical center for transatlantic slave trade in England.[32] This is explained by an ideal location enabling the city's merchants to have access to finished products coming from all of England: textile from Lancashire and Yorkshire, metal items from Staffordshire and Cheshire, as well as alcohol from the entire country. The city's merchants were also in close connection with London and Amsterdam, from which they returned with silk from India and Asia, and glasswork from Venice. These products were exchanged in Western Africa against slaves, which were then sold in the West Indies or in the American colonies. In the early 1790s, the port of Liverpool already controlled 80% of the slave trade in England and nearly 40% in Europe. Each year, 130 vessels set off for America via Africa, and Liverpool's elite was then bound to this extensive trade, the success of which depended on leading logistical infrastructures.

When examining the transport issue again, slave ships can, for the most part, be likened to buildings with proved nautical qualities. They can, in no way, be likened to yachts; in their holds, traveling conditions were generally appalling, especially in inclement weather, where slaves were chained in darkness, stench, and excrement. Although often exaggerated in stories, overcrowding levels remained high. The European average in the second half of the 18th century was 1.5 to 2.5 slaves per load ton (1.44 m^3). For vessels from Nantes, between 1707 and 1793, the average was 1.41 slaves per ton.[33] Regarding relations between crew and slaves, two rules had to be observed: (1) there was an absolute prohibition on sailors beating slaves; this did not, however, completely rule out complaints of barbaric acts; (2) sexual abstinence for everyone (with separate and distinctive living quarters), but stories had been related of some misconduct on the part of captains or officers in the field.

Regarding slave mortality during the transatlantic trajectory

(the "Middle Passage"), relatively reliable figures are available.[34] Admittedly, mortality rates varied greatly from one slave shipment to another, and strong variations are observed related to the point of slave embarkation. The minimum, around 5%, appears to be realistic, yet all the recorded rates seem roughly equivalent. British mortality was around 10%[35], while the Dutch mortality ranged from 16.1 to 10.1% over the centuries, with one third of deaths occurring during the first ten days of the voyage. Data developed by Herbert S. Klein, Stanley L. Engerman, Robin Haines and Ralph Shlomowitz from a sample of 332 Nantes shipments gave the results shown in Table 3 in terms of slave mortality rates.[36] However, the diversity of data should not allow us to forget the essential element: it is impossible to identify a positive relationship between vessel crowding and Middle Passage mortality.[37]

Table 3. *Mortality of 332 Nantes Slave Shipments*

1597-1700	1701-1750	1751-1800	1801-1821	1822-1864	Overall
22.6%	**15.6%**	**11.2%**	**9.6%**	**10.1%**	**11.9%**

Source: Adapted from Klein, Engerman, Haines and Shlomowitz, "Transoceanic mortality".

Mortality on slave ships was incontestably higher than that experienced during the transport of soldiers or prisoners being taken to penal Colonies. Interestingly, it was also lower than that of crews, especially thanks to the improvement in transport techniques. Thus, the adoption by the British slave traders of the technique of sheathing ships' hulls with copper reduced the death rates of slaves on the Middle Passage by about half.[38] But drawing compelling conclusions from these numbers would be very unwise. On one hand, convicts did most of their sailing in the temperate zone,

while the slave journey took place in tropical areas, thus more conducive to disease. On the other hand, slaves suffered the violent psychological shock experienced by beings who are uprooted and know nothing of their destiny. Suicide was a major cause of mortality during slave trading. Finally, slaves were confined in ships for a few months while sailors lived on board for between one and a half to three years. This comparison would probably be much more relevant, and the results very different, if calculated in terms of a ratio of mortality/distance or mortality/time spent on a ship.

The Transatlantic Slave Trade as a Global Supply Chain

The transatlantic slave trade is one of the first expressions of economic globalization, on a large scale and over a long period.[39] At an operational level, the organization of the three stages presented above led to the implementation of a particularly effective logistics between two continents, by heralding what were to then become the global supply chains of the triumphant capitalism of the 20th century.[40] The interest of a transatlantic slave trade analysis, pairing history, and management, is thus to underline that the success of a project as ambitious, independently of moral criticism, stems from a developed entrepreneurial spirit. This entrepreneurial spirit led to the creation of original logistical models, which were to be formalized later and refined to constantly improve the turnover of products at a global level. One of the best known is the hub-and-spokes model, of which the transatlantic slave trade provides a remarkable illustration.

Supply Chain Framework

Referring to a supply chain comes down to naming a system of offerings through which organizations deliver their goods and ser-

vices to their customers. This chain constitutes a network of interrelated organizations with a common objective.[41] The effort made to result in an integrated management, considered more effective, of logistical activities involving several actors gave rise to an original approach which aimed to unite companies around a common objective of value creation: the *supply chain management* (SCM). The latter has been widely publicized since the 1990s, and it obviously reflects in the applied research, as shown by the hundreds of articles and submissions during conferences on the subject every year. Such enthusiasm has its roots in the companies' will to meet the customer's demands in near real time, by being capable of maintaining itself on a high level in the competitive environment through the regular introduction of new products in satisfactory conditions of cost and quality of service.[42]

The SCM-type approach has an integrative and systemic vision by nature rather than a functional and partitioned vision. Indeed, it considers logistics above all according to a strategic angle (and not instrumental), regarding an extended company that goes from the suppliers' suppliers, upstream, to the customers' customers, downstream. As noted by John T. Mentzer, William DeWitt, James S. Keebler, Soonhong Min, Nancy W. Nix, Carlo D. Smith and Zach Zacharia, the SCM is indeed defined as "the systematic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and tactics across these business functions within a company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole".[43] Coordinating is using an articulated set of means and resources to guide the activities of interdependent units to achieve a goal of logistics performance.

If the interest of numerous managers for the theme of inte-

grated management of supply chains appears to be very significant today, it is because many of them wish to see their company focus on the core business to meet the customers' specific demands and delegate a part of physical assets management to external partners. More broadly, the design and production of a product and/or a service requires the use of external skills, and only a coherent grouping of several entities with complementary knowledge, with a common purpose, can face national, or even global, competition. Good inter-organizational coordination in terms of flow of materials and goods consequently becomes a source of sustainable competitive advantage. It shows, to take up the analysis of Togar M. Simatupang, Alan C. Wright and Ramaswami Sridharan, the will of improved *logistics synchronization* the aim of which is to value the operational links between actors to improve the value creation process.[44]

The reasoning is even more relevant when we place ourselves at the level of global supply chains, extending over extensive geographical areas. The stakes of global supply chains monitoring are known. It must be ensured that the contracts signed with the various supply chain members are detailed and precise in terms of responsibility regarding two major elements: (1) the damage or theft of the product, during the transport or during the loading and unloading stages; (2) the delay resulting from the storage and transit stages. The packaging could potentially require a specific design, suitable materials, well-specified rules, and a limitation of the quantity depending on the nature of the product and according to the regulation in force. In the end, a global supply chain relies on the most economic and reliable solution to bring a product to a given destination within the set deadlines and security conditions. Contemporary history has been influenced by the globalization of economies with one

of the founding principles being the development of logistical techniques aiming to remove borders and improve the flows of international exchange. The case of the container is sufficiently known to avoid going over it again.[45] To a certain extent, the transatlantic slave trade constitutes the first signs of globalization we know today, especially through an organization like the hub-and-spokes model conceptualized in the 1960s.

Logistics and Geographical Spread

Although temporally distant, the decomposition of logistical processes associated with transatlantic slave trade can be compared in structure and network organization (with reference to "stars", now well known in international logistics) to the hub-and-spokes model.[46] In the 1970s, this model revolutionized the airline industry, and is now widespread in air, rail, and sea transport organizations.[47] This model uses a procurement system that enables resource capturing in a geographical area. The resource is then directed to another geographical area, playing on the concentration phenomenon to reduce costs. The hub-and-spokes model corresponds to a network architecture based on a central point with radiating spokes reaching peripheral targets. François Fulconis, Gilles Paché and Gérard Roveillo point out that the hub-and-spokes system, which differs from a point-to-point system, was conceptualized in 1965 by Frederick W. Smith, a student at Yale University. Smith gave life to this idea in 1971 by creating Federal Express (renamed FedEx in 2000) a delivery company proposing a fast link service to industrial customers in eleven cities in the United States. To this end, he replaced the idea of point-to-point connections between the eleven cities and developed a single platform based

in Memphis (Tennessee), connected to twenty-five cities, expanding volume effects and scale economies.[48] Finally, through flows mass and timing synchronization, implementation of a hub-and-spokes strategy allowed an optimal use of transportation, including filling rate.

The hub-and-spokes model means that spatial proximity is no longer a priority for organizing large-scale market exchanges. What matters is coordinating complex logistical operations by conducting routing and then sorting operations (flows of goods or people), to regroup and then transport them over long distances, and finally ungroup and redirect to other destinations. Effectiveness is therefore measured at these different levels. Applying this to transatlantic slave trade, the transport sequence between bundling and unbundling was particularly sensitive and had to be carefully managed. This was even more problematic given that no vessel was designed exclusively for transatlantic slave trade. Owners wanted to mobilize their ships for other uses (such as deep-sea fishing) between slave/trading runs. Furthermore, during the course of a triangular expedition, a ship starting from Europe carried, for example, building materials (wood from northern Europe, nails from Spain, iron from Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg and London, copper from Hamburg and Ostend, etc.), and once in Africa had to be "transformed" into a person mover, making the whole case extremely expensive and complicated. To absorb these fixed costs, it was therefore essential to move large volumes of product through the "spokes".

These large volumes of product required "capturing" the goods over extensive geographical areas. All of Europe was involved in transatlantic slave trade, as stated earlier. To give an idea of the diversity of the good's origins there were chains

from Spain, Sweden and Prussia, weapons from Holland and Denmark, and textiles from Brittany, Normandy, Silesia, Utrecht, and Lancashire.[49] Specifically examining the origin of the goods loaded on the ship *L'Amiral* from Bordeaux in 1743, Eric Saugera provides a clear vision of the vastness of a typical supply area: the fabrics were from Hamburg, Amsterdam, Rouen and Nantes, guns from London, shells and metal pipes from Amsterdam, powder, and hats from La Rochelle, eau-de-vie from Saintonge, flour, and tallow from Nérac and rifle stones from Saint-Savinien.[50] This leads us to the traditional question of international logistics regarding the risk linked to global supply chains, due to numerous links interconnecting a wide network of supply chain members.[51] The coordination of activities in the transatlantic slave trade is very similar to that of companies. Indeed, the aim is to improve its performance by accelerating the capital turnover, in the presence of many actors who need to synchronize their activities in the best possible manner.

The same organization had to be applied to the acquisition of slaves and their subsequent transfer to a central hub for shipping to their final destination, bearing in mind the extremely long distances and period implied by the "commercial" cycle. Historical documents demonstrate that transatlantic slave trade was based on codified, developed organizational principles. Counters (slave trading ports) in Africa served as hubs where slaves were grouped for export. Developing sufficiently large clusters of slaves for export could take several months, so it was essential to properly feed them. Thus, the need to procure and manage a sufficient food supply was crucial. All this required effective supply chain management, an idea that is also found with John T. Dalton and Tin Cheuk Leung.[52] Thus, they offer to assess the comparative performances of different logistical cy-

cles regarding the ship tonnage, number of crewmembers at the voyage's outset, number of slaves disembarked, and number of days spent to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Our analysis, of a more general nature, highlights the transatlantic slave trade and the presence of desynchronized logistical flows with a process of mass transport that managed to maintain an intact workforce despite complications. In the end, well before the model was conceptualized in the context of lean and agile supply chains, the hub-and-spokes was probably the backbone of a redoubtable economically efficient machine that trafficked in human beings.

Conclusion

The discovery of the New World and its colonization by the large European maritime nations are at the root of an economic system that influenced, and still strongly influences, the minds. To guarantee the exploitation of wealth and territories of America, an abundant and cheap workforce appeared necessary. Therefore, neither the European migrants, too little in number, nor the Indians, decimated by the exploitation and illnesses, were sufficient for the task. To face the needs, a transatlantic slave trade was organized as from the 16th century. European slave traders left Europe with manufactured products to trade on the African coasts for the captives provided by some unscrupulous kingdoms and African slave traders. The European vessels then transported their live commodity across the Atlantic, in a horrible voyage similar to deportation. The fact that this economic system worked over several centuries, that the benefits of each expedition comprised between 15 and 20%, and that the transatlantic slave trade contributed to the economic boom of sever-

al European ports, are unquestionable facts. Obviously, it is at the cost of victims the number of which is impossible to establish, whether we are referring to the deaths of captives during their walk to the coast, before embarking on the slave ships, or the degrading and violent conditions in the Colonies.

This chapter has chosen an original perspective, at the junction of economic history and management. Its aim is indeed to show that the transatlantic slave trade is based on a logistical organization in a specific good running order. We can even assert that the transatlantic slave trade is the pioneer in global supply chains that was to emerge in the 20th century. Our approach is clearly part of the business history current, developed at the University of Harvard in Alfred D. Chandler's movement.[53] This movement has already worked towards the rehabilitation of an historical approach of companies' management. However, it seems important to go further, by providing, from the resorting to supply chain processes, an analytical perspective with a universal aim of different historical phenomena. Indeed, the dive into economic history can reveal the permanence of organized economic systems that are also based on a constant logistical performance. Here, we can allude to the logistics of drug trafficking, or the logistics of weapon trafficking. Even though this vision may be shocking, it must not hinder the researcher's investigation, and must enable a productive dialogue between economic history and management.

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"The population question is, in short, a question of our people's survival"

Reframing population policy in 1940s Finland

Sophy Bergenheim

Introduction

In the nineteenth and twentieth century, population policy in Europe and the Nordic countries has been tightly intertwined with several other policies, ideologies and lines of thought, such as eugenics (or racial hygiene, as it was called in the Nordic countries), public health and family and gender policy. All of these various forms of biopolitics have also been closely linked with nationalism – 'race', for instance, was understood as synonym for nation or national (e.g., "the British race"),[1] which also applies for 'population' and 'people'.

In this paper, I study how Väestöliitto, the Finnish Population and Family Welfare League, framed population policy. Väestöliitto was founded in 1941, after Finland had undergone the Winter War (1939–40) against the Soviet Union. While Väestöliitto officially was a non-governmental expert organisation, it had close and official ties with the government (most notably the Ministry of Social Affairs) and soon gained an established role in Finnish public policy, influential in several public policy areas, such as family welfare and housing policy. The strong role but nevertheless non-govern-

mental status of Väestöliitto makes it an interesting study subject from the perspective of population policy, a central and multifaceted policy strand with marked nationalist features. In its population policy, Väestöliitto largely followed the population policy developed by the Swedish Social-Democrat couple Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. However, Väestöliitto followed the Myrdalian model only in form – the core ideology and rationale remained conservative rather than progressive-reformist.

Research questions, material and methods

This article deals with the founding and first years of Väestöliitto; the aim is to analyse how the actors behind Väestöliitto constructed population policy and its problems. The main focus is on the founding phase 1940–41 and the following years 1942–43, during which the founders and actors of Väestöliitto diligently framed population policy, its issues and its objectives. This will be complemented by a post-war follow-up, in order to form a more comprehensive picture of the population policy framing of Väestöliitto in the 1940s.

I will approach this research problem through the following research questions: What did Väestöliitto's actors frame as the main population policy objective in Finland? Respectively, what did the actors of Väestöliitto define as the main population policy problem? According to the organisation, who or what caused the problem and why? What was perceived as the solution for these problems, and, respectively, as the means for achieving the main objective of population policy?

My primary source material consists of Väestöliitto's archive material. I use Väestöliitto's minute books with appendices and drafts from 1940–43, the first official programme and rules of Väestöliit-

to from 1941, as well as annual reports and other printed material directed at policy-makers, experts and the general public. The follow-up analysis is based on various published material from 1946, with a similar broad target audience.

In my analysis, I draw upon a combination of methods. The constructionist analysis of social problems, in accordance with Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, problematises the problem nature of phenomena perceived as social problems. In other words, it does not focus on social problems *per se*, but on the processes through which phenomena are identified, defined and represented – i.e., *constructed* – as social problems and on the actors conducting these processes.[2] Carol Bacchi's WPR approach (What's the Problem Represented to be?) is a similar method of analysis. It focuses on the way a phenomenon is represented, the actors' presumptions, unproblematised aspects of the problem representation, and so forth.[3] Following Spector and Kitsuse and Bacchi, I will concentrate on similar focal points in order to analyse how population policy and its problems were constructed.

As a systematic and structuring tool, I apply frame analysis, following Robert Benford and David Snow. Frames are sets of beliefs and objectives through which actors interpret and label phenomena. Frame analysis, as defined by Benford and Snow, includes three core tasks or stages of framing. 'Diagnostic framing' is the process of identifying problems as well as the entities and causes the problems can be attributed to. 'Prognostic framing' entails finding solutions and strategies for solving problems. 'Motivational framing' serves as the final thrust for mobilisation, seeking either consensus or action. In addition, framing has an interactive and discursive feature, meaning that frames are defined or articulated as well as amplified through specific discourses.[4]

Population policy in Finland and Sweden

The Nordic countries share many characteristics in their population and family policy development. Population policy, eugenics, public health and family policy have often been more or less the same thing, and they have overlapped or intertwined with social policy and social hygiene/medicine. Population and family policy as well as public health were strongly influenced by race and degeneration theories, which interlinked with nationalist ideas. The objective was to study and cultivate the Nordic race, on the one hand, and control and isolate the deviant and asocial, on the other. These objectives translated into various positive and negative eugenic measures, such as eugenic marriage legislation, sterilisations and mother contests.[5]

Many studies associate Finnish inter- and post-war population and family policy, as well as its legacy in contemporary policies, with the Swedish Social Democrat 'power couple' Alva and Gunnar Myrdal.[6] Rightfully so, since Finnish experts and policy-makers explicitly referred to the Myrdals' renowned population policy publication *Kris i befolkningsfrågan*[7], in which they promoted positive population policy: universal social and family policies that eased the economic and social burden of child-rearing and thereby encouraged procreation. These social policy reforms would ultimately raise productivity, as quality of the population increased and the social costs of poverty, unemployment and criminality decreased. In the Myrdalian vision, the quality of the population was a public and national issue, and the good of society preceded the good of the individual.[8]

Finland followed the Nordic development in several respects. It did, for instance, adopt similar marriage and sterilisation laws in 1929 and 1935, respectively.[9] However, Finland has a distinctively different political, cultural and social background compared to, e.g., Sweden, which needs to be taken into account when analysing Finnish actors and developments. The Finnish development

is marked by what I have labelled 'underdog trauma', rooted in its history as an autonomous grand duchy under the Russian rule and in neighbouring the powerful and hostile Soviet Union, against which it fought in the Winter War (1939–40) and Continuation War (1941–44) during the Second World War. In addition, immediately after Finland gained independence in 1917, it descended into a bitter civil war, in which the bourgeois White eventually won over the socialist Red. The civil war left the Finnish society with a deep class-based hostility and mistrust, which did not ease until the 1940s.

These events have had a significant impact on the nation-building of Finland; one could say that nationalism has been particularly pronounced in the Finnish development. The so-called national project dates to the nineteenth century, when the Finnish cultural and political elite embarked on a nationalist and moral education project. The goal was, in short, to civilise the Finnish people and to strengthen the political and cultural status of Finland. After the civil war, the classist feature of education was strengthened even further, as the winning party sought to educate and control the working class. This was mixed with eugenic ideologies, as the working class was seen by some Whites as 'degenerative material'. Indeed, in interwar Finland, eugenic arguments served as tools for class, gender and motherhood politics.[10]

Founding Väestöliitto: actors and context

19 November 1940, the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity took the initiative and invited Finnish social and health policy associations to a consultation meeting on 9 December. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the prospect of founding an umbrella organisation for associations engaged in population pol-

icy.[11] In a speech held at the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, V. J. Sukselainen noted how "the population question is perhaps one of the most central issues regarding our nation's survival" and how the time was fruitful for active population policy.[12]

As a result of the consultation meeting, a new association, Väestöliitto, was founded on 14 February 1941. In addition to the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, the founding organisations consisted of 20 social and health policy organisations and politically engaged associations (often with a nationalist stance), for example Rising Finland, the Social Democratic Working Women's Association, the Social Policy Association in Finland, the Finnish Society of Obstetrics and Gynaecology and General Mannerheim League for Child Welfare. Sukselainen was elected as the chair, and Aarno Turunen (Finnish Society of Obstetrics and Gynaecology) and Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio (Rising Finland) as vice-chairs. The board also had two representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Niilo Mannio and Rakel Jalas. In 1943, Heikki von Hertzen was appointed as the managing director of Väestöliitto.

The board members and managing director of Väestöliitto represented various fields of expertise. V.J. Sukselainen was a social scientist, trained in sociology and economics. He was also a politician: the president of the centre-right Agrarian League (1945–64), one of the biggest parties in Finland, Prime Minister (1957; 1959–61) and director general of the Social Insurance Institution (1954–71). Heikki von Hertzen was legally trained with a background in the banking industry. Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio and Rakel Jalas were both actively involved in the association sector and women's issues, and both were members of the conservative National Coalition Party. Enäjärvi-Haavio was a docent of folkloristics, and she was the prime figure behind Väestöliitto's home aid activities. Jalas was a physician and psychiatrist, and she was very involved in sexual education and family policy.

Population policy was not a new topic. In the early twentieth century, the neo-Malthusian discourse, fearing overpopulation, was being challenged by a pronatalist discourse. In 1934, statistician Gunnar Modeen held a presentation at the Finnish Economic Association, in which he presented calculations predicting a halt in Finnish population growth in the 1970s, which would lead to serious economic difficulties.[13] Also the Myrdals' *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (1934) attracted interest in Finland. In line with these concerns, in 1937, the Finnish government appointed the Population Policy Committee to address this development.[14]

Yet, according to Väestöliitto, the Finnish population policy discussion gained momentum only along the Second World War:

> Not even the [Population Policy] Committee seized the opportunity to wake our country into acknowledging population policy issues. This task was performed by the war. During the Winter War, the entire people of Finland was forced to note what the former Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner crystallised in his radio speech on the day of peace-making: "Our sole fault was that we were too few".[15]

Framing the population crisis

The 'population question'

The early minute books of Väestöliitto reveal meticulous diagnostic and prognostic framing. The core problem was constructed without hesitation, which was also reflected in the rhetorical framing. The 'population question' formed a self-explanatory representation of Finland's too small population as well as the looming halt in population growth and its consequences.

After the consultation meeting, the Central Commission on Pop-

ulation Policy (hereinafter CCPP) was established as the governing body until the official founding of the organisation. In December 1940, the CCPP sent a letter describing future activities to the Population Policy Committee and prospective member associations.

> In your circles, as well as elsewhere in our country, you surely have come to notice […] the startling fact: we are too few.[16]

The sentence reflects the unproblematised views on the population question. For one, Finnish people being "too few" was considered a "fact", and secondly, it holds the assumption that this fact was generally acknowledged and accepted.

According to the same letter, the duty of the Finnish people was to exploit the economic possibilities offered by the country, to achieve a standard of living as high as possible, and from this material basis cultivate a culture as developed as possible. The letter presents statistical predictions that population growth will come to a halt at four million around 1975. As a result, a threat scenario is portrayed, in which Finland is occupied by other countries – i.e., the Soviet Union – and Finland, with such a small population, is morally and physically incapable of defending itself.[17] This was not an isolated and sporadic notion, but was repeated and printed in Väestöliitto's official programme.[18]

The factual nature of the population question is reaffirmed in the above-mentioned letter. Firstly, it notes how it is a "self-evident truth to every rational person" that a population of four million is incapable of gaining the production capital necessary for harnessing the Finnish nature to serve man and culture. Secondly, it brings up how "there are many among our people who are eager to refer to the economic difficulties the current generation is facing and who assume

that a smaller population could live a better and more decent life". Such neo-Malthusian viewpoints are dismissed as false:

> It must be made clear to them that poverty does not stem from Finland having too large a population, and that unemployment in our country is not a result of an oversupply of workers. […] Poverty and unemployment are questions related to the economic organisation of the society, not the size of the population.[19]

Väestöliitto's official programme crystallises its alarmed nationalist and pronatalist perspective:

> The population question in Finland is, in short, a question of *our people's survival*.[20] [Original emphasis.]

The citizen as culprit

What, then, had led to the population question becoming an issue? Diagnostic framing consumed much of the CCPP's time and attention. The issues framed as the underlying reasons can be roughly divided into two categories: the citizen as the culprit, and society as the culprit (and the citizen as victim).

In his speech at the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity's meeting in November 1940, Sukselainen shed some light on the historical development:

> [F]or a long time, people of more limited means have taken care of raising the future generations also for the part of the wealthier. Now when they do not engage to the same extent, it is essential to re-evaluate the situation. Every citizen must learn their responsibility in this sense.[21]

In other words, the reason behind the population question was the citizens' neglect of their reproductive duty, in particular the wealthier individuals'. The 'child limit', i.e., voluntary refraining from procreation, was perceived as a form of this neglect. The CCPP admitted that raising a new citizen imposed an economical strain on the caretaker. It was therefore possible for an individual to raise their standard of living, i.e., to gain personal economic advantage by refraining from child-rearing.

> [I]t must be made clear that this is not to the advantage of the national economy. *For the part of the society, raising a child is an investment in capital.* It is a saving that starts to grow interest as soon as the child engages in useful work in the society. It is therefore clear that the rise in the standard of living that people have achieved by adhering to a child limit and by neglecting to fulfil their part in maintaining the nation's healthy growth, that advantage has been achieved by hindering the economic development of the society.[22] [Original emphasis.]

The CCPP had formed divisions for preparing and organising certain tasks in regard to establishing the new organisation. One of these divisions was the Public Health Division, which provided the CCPP with a comprehensive experts' report on the population question and its underlying reasons from a medical point of view. According to the report, it was necessary to focus on factors that had an impact on birth rates (which should be increased) and death rates (which should be lowered), in order to affect the development of Finland's population growth. The division outlined five factors that had a negative effect on these objectives: a late marrying age, childless (sterile) marriages, prevention of fertilisation, abortions,

and maternal mortality and childbirth-related disabilities.[23]

According to the division, abortions were condemnable both due to the deed itself, but also for the multiplicative effect, harming population growth. "Almost all" so-called criminal abortions (i.e., medically induced miscarriage; abortions were illegal until the Act on Induced Abortions in 1950[24]) led to serious infections that were difficult to cure and "very often" led to permanent sterility. This prevented new generations from being born – generations that could have created yet new generations.[25]

Abortion and family planning developed into a central theme for Väestöliitto in the 1940s–50s. It was tightly linked with normative and eugenic conceptions of marriage, family and procreation. On the one hand, Väestöliitto stressed how even single mothers should be persuaded to keep their child rather than grant them an abortion – even though in general, Väestöliitto deemed sexual desire and fertility control of single women as a 'sexual problem'. On the other hand, eugenic grounds for abortions were seen as a natural extension of the existing eugenic sterilisation and marriage legislation.[26]

According to the CCPP/Väestöliitto, the core factor behind the population question was thus the reproductive duty of women of fertile age. Any kind of deviation or neglect in this regard was perceived as individualistic and selfish, and therefore unpatriotic. The rhetorical flipside of the coin was utilised as well, glorifying and praising childbirth and -rearing:

> Giving birth is the most valuable national service a woman can do for her country, and it is by no means effortless or danger-free.[27]

Rakel Jalas used a similar wording in her book from 1941 dealing with sexual health and family life:

> Motherhood is the great task of the active years in a woman's life. Other work is done only after she has fulfilled this national duty.[28]

Representing reproduction as the civic duty of the mother had already been part of the Finnish Enlightenment and nation-building project in the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Such representations resurfaced strongly in the 1940s throughout the Western world, as motherhood was stressed as the important and primary duty of women.[29] The Finnish word for national service, as used by Väestöliitto and Jalas, refers explicitly to military service. This created a pronounced nationalist analogy of the reproductive woman as the female equivalent of the male soldier, performing her national duty in defending her country.

The society as culprit and the citizen as victim

In this section, I will analyse the second causal category constructed by the CCPP, later reaffirmed by Väestöliitto in its programme, among others. Namely, the diagnostic framing of the society as culprit and citizen as victim.

According to Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, Sweden and Denmark have attempted to unify or identify 'state', 'society' and 'people'. Following Knudsen and Rothstein, Pauli Kettunen notes how 'society' in the Nordic countries refers first and foremost to the *moral* relationship of the state to people and individuals, whereas *organisational* forms linking together state and civil society come secondary. The idea of a virtuous circle between economy, politics and ethics, based on class compromise, can be seen as a constructive factor in the Nordic concept of society. The society is both a subject and an actor, it has rights and duties, goals and values.[30]

This largely reflects the views of Väestöliitto's actors in the 1940s, with the exception that they also emphasised the organisational forms. In my source material, 'society' is used in an ambiguous sense. Depending on the context, it refers to a) the state, i.e., the public sector and government as a whole; b) the society in the broad sense, encompassing both the state and other actors (e.g., employers) as well as societal structures; and/or c) the citizens as a community, or the general public. In other words, 'society' and 'individual' or 'citizen' are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the citizens as a community or the general public may victimise a specific sub-group of citizens.

A text by Heikki von Hertzen, in which he outlines the principles and practice of population policy,[31] illustrates the blurred line between the various forms of 'society' and its responsibilities. On the one hand, he notes how the core reason behind the "population problem" lies with the urbanisation of society, and how the state has not realised its role in governing this change, thus distinguishing between 'state' and 'society'. On the other hand, he attributes the responsibility to the broader organisation of and atmosphere in the society, thereby encompassing all aspects of 'society'.

While Väestöliitto framed women who neglected their procreative duty as the main cause behind the population question, they did not bear the blame all by themselves. The society was seen as a partial culprit by not creating favourable conditions for them to fulfil their duty, thereby victimising mothers and families. The society had to do its part in lessening the economic burden of child-rearing, so that economic hardships would not hinder couples from reproducing.

> What is the relation between the standard of living between different individuals in the society, with or without families? Does the society favour the former, or the latter[?] *This* is the *core* of the population question.[32] [Original emphasis.]
>
> [It] is essential to address the societal reforms that are necessary for providing each citizen the economic prerequisites, so that they can fulfil their duties in regard to future generations and the economic and social well-being of generations to come.[33]

Other societal actors played a role in the hardships of families as well. As noted above, urbanisation was one of the core factors to which the population question was attributed. Families and family farms were less self-sufficient, work outside home was becoming more commonplace, and children attended school for a longer period of time and therefore contributed less at home.[34]

The idea of the child limit was seen to be disseminated by the general public; "uncomprehending" people had begun to portray the child limit as a means for achieving a higher standard of living, which had also translated to negative attitudes towards large families. "Everyone can now see the results in the current statistics."[35] This statement puts the blame on couples' and mothers' fellow citizens who had discouraged them from producing large families and had lured them into seeking a higher standard of living by refraining from reproduction.

The Public Health Division did not see the general public as the sole factor to encourage child limits, but pointed the finger at the state as well. In its experts' report's section on fertility control, it notes how

> [t]he public, albeit silent, opinion seems to accept [contraception] as a means to control the family's number of children, and apparently even the society, primarily in order to prevent the more dangerous way for reducing the number of children, criminal termination of pregnancy, has somewhat given it its acceptance by establishing special consultation clinics that advise women, sometimes even men, on how to prevent fertilisation.[36]

In addition to attributing the problem to the state as well as fellow citizens, this statement reflects class-based conflicting viewpoints – and the conservative nature of Väestöliitto. Whereas conservative and bourgeois women deemed contraception as selfish and individualistic, left-wing women saw contraception as a means for liberating working class women, burdened by constant childbirth and violent and unhappy marriages, from both class and male oppression. The consultation clinic refers to the contraceptive consultation clinic in Helsinki, which was established in 1935 following the initiative of female left-wing city councillors. The clinic's doctors, however, delimited consultation to married women and imposed strict criteria based on "medical indications", to which only few qualified. As a result, the clinic was closed in 1936.[37]

Childbirth-related health risks and maternal care in general was another aspect where the society should support and protect its citizens. The Public Health Division, for instance, stated that "it is a matter of honour for each country to take as good care as possible of birth-giving mothers and to make childbirth as safe as possible through all usable means".[38]

In short, Väestöliitto constructed four main external factors that prevented citizens (i.e., women) from fulfilling their reproductive duties: economic challenges, the child limit, hostile attitudes to-

wards large families and early marriages, and health risks. The first three were closely linked, since both economic challenges and general attitudes encouraged families to adhere to a child limit. All three aspects of society played a part in sustaining these three factors. Health risks, on the other hand, were seen as being only within the sphere of the state. It did not provide adequate facilities (hospitals, maternal care) in order to make pregnancy and childbirth as safe as possible, and thereby neglected its important duty towards its citizens. All of these factors rendered (prospective) mothers victims of circumstance – even though women were simultaneously seen as the main cause behind the population question.

Addressing the population question

Mission: Elevating the number and quality of the population

In order to change the looming population development and to hinder the population question from materialising, the CCPP/Väestöliitto saw that there was only one solution: to elevate the number and quality of the population. This section, in other words, reflects the prognostic framing of Väestöliitto.

In its official rules from 1941, Väestöliitto states that its purpose was to

> spread information on the importance of the number and quality of the population both for the nation's existence as well as its material and spiritual development, to follow, in that sense, the development of Finland's population, and to affect, through awareness-raising education and by furthering necessary societal reforms, the growth of the population and the improvement of the population's living conditions.[39]

According to the CCPP, poverty and unemployment could not be addressed through population control, but only through population growth. In order for Finland to offer its population the best livelihood possible, production must increase, and the increase of production can only be achieved through larger new generations.[40] Similarly to the Myrdalian view, population growth was perceived as a virtuous circle: the more people, the more production and workplaces, and therefore also higher living standards. Higher living standards, for their part, removed obstacles for child-rearing, and new citizens eventually meant yet an increase in production, and so forth.

The ideal number of children per family was set at "at least six" – four was defined as the "normal family" that society had the right to demand its members to produce and maintain by themselves.[41] This would elevate the population from four million to six million, although the long-term goal was implied to be doubling the population, i.e., to eight million.[42]

The quality question was an issue that also the Ministry of Social Affairs pushed Väestöliitto to focus on. Referring to the elevation of the population's quality, the Ministry emphasised the "social side of population policy". This, in turn, referred to improving living conditions and other conditions that should "meet satisfactory social requirements".[43] 'Quality' thus encompassed a broad gamut of themes, many of which fell under the Myrdalian 'positive population policy': improving standards of living in terms of housing, hygiene and economic situation, combatting infant mortality and childbirth- and maternity-related health risks through prenatal, maternal and child care, as well as improving public health in general. 'Quality' also referred to the improved composition of the society, as the upper socioeconomic classes performed their reproductive duty.

Negative eugenics was also a central feature in the quality objectives

of Väestöliitto. The organisation was explicitly in favour of eugenic compulsory sterilisation and abortion as well as the eugenic marriage law, in order to protect the population from degenerative material. Similarly, its conceptions of 'people', 'population' and 'public health' (in Finnish, literally 'people's health') included marked inclusive and exclusive features, which were linked with this eugenic understanding.[44]

According to the Public Health Division, compulsory sterilisation was

> a measure through which the society limits or prevents people from reproducing who have such criminal characteristics or illnesses which would, if inherited, render their descendants as asocial, dependant individuals. Sterilisation, in other words, is used for improving the race.[45]

The Sterilisation Act of 1935 was deemed "a complete failure", as it had had "no social impact whatsoever". The division favoured a new sterilisation law, since "a properly implemented sterilisation policy has a positive effect on the composition of the society", even if it naturally had a small negative impact on birth rates.[46] Reforming the Sterilisation Act became one of Väestöliitto's main objectives, particularly of Aarno Turunen, professor of obstetrics and gynaecology, who drafted a letter for the Ministry of Social Affairs with detailed reform suggestions.[47] The form in 1950 did indeed emphasise the eugenic qualities of the legislation, which led to a peak in compulsory sterilisations in 1956–63.[48]

To conclude, the grand mission of Väestöliitto was to elevate the number and quality of the population. Population growth was to serve the national economy and improve the nation's defensive position in its geopolitically challenging situation and location. Elevating the population's quality referred to improving public health

in its various forms, which entailed marked exclusive features and negative eugenics as well.

Achieving these objectives required action on two fronts: education and knowledge production, and furthering and participating in policy-making, which will be scrutinised in the following section.

Education and knowledge production

The Finnish word for 'education' (*valistus*) used by Väestöliitto does not have an exact equivalent in English. It refers to awareness-raising as well as communication and distribution of knowledge (i.e., propaganda, as it was called at the time), and the same word also refers to (E/e)nlightenment. However, it does not have a dual meaning of education in the sense of school education.

In this article, 'education' is to be understood as raising the Finnish people's awareness and to distribute knowledge regarding different aspects of the population question. This was a concrete form of Väestöliitto's own motivational framing – i.e., what the organisation itself should do in order to further a healthy population policy. The objectives of this work can be coarsely divided into two categories: firstly, affecting the public opinion, and secondly, increasing the general public's knowledge on population policy matters.

One of Väestöliitto's goals was to change the general atmosphere so that the reproductive duty would be internalised as a general norm. This was explicitly expressed in Väestöliitto's programme:

> The most important task of population policy education is to remove the ideological conditions that allow the child limit idea to spread. We have to achieve a change of mind in regard to the home, children and the family, 'a new world view' on these matters.[49]

This topic had, of course, already been raised during the preparatory stage. For instance, a newspaper report after the consultation meeting read: "We have to stand up and fight against false prejudices and general misconceptions."[50] A letter describing future activities noted how "the public opinion must be changed to understand that child-rearing is not, in the current conditions, a private matter, but a duty towards the nation and society."[51] This duty aspect was reaffirmed in a draft for the short version of Väestöliitto's programme, which calls for "making every healthy individual understand their responsibility as procreators and securers of the nation's future".[52] Note the phrasing 'every healthy individual', referring to the quality aspect of population policy.

Population policy-related knowledge that Väestöliitto sought to spread dealt with diverse themes. For example, the Public Health Division saw that many pregnancies were terminated on dubious grounds, since women were simply unaware of the dangers of the procedure. This could be avoided through education.[53] In the draft for the short version of Väestöliitto's programme, "in order to increase the number and elevate the quality of the population", the federation saw necessary to "give every citizen a basic education in healthy sexual behaviour". This basic education was to raise children and young people into a "healthy and societally positive direction".[54] This education aimed at raising healthy, reproductive and child-rearing generations.

The population question in post-war Finland

Birth rates increased already during the war, and in 1945, the baby boom was underway. This dampened the alarmed nature of Väestöliitto's pronatalism and transformed it into a family-positive focus. The main objective of Väestöliitto was to create a fam-

ily-friendly society both on the level of the state and individuals. Or, as it formulated in an educational booklet directed at the general public:

> We do not want 'propaganda children' in a society that is unkind to them, nor in loveless homes in which they are not cherished![55]

The main objective of increasing the population remained unchanged, however. In Väestöliitto's first annals[56], published in late 1946, V. J. Sukselainen outlined the main tasks of population policy in post-war Finland. He emphasised how Finland differs from Sweden in that the objective was to increase the size of the population, not merely maintain it at existing level. In this task, he stressed the citizens' responsibility – reproduction was still explicitly referred to as a civil duty. In particular, Sukselainen frowned upon the better-off who neglected their responsibilities. Yet, citizens were still not the only one who bore duties: Sukselainen also highlighted how the state and society had to provide social and economic safety for families with children.[57] He again brought up the issue of how the economic burden of child-rearing should be distributed more evenly among all taxpayers – a topic both he[58] and Väestöliitto[59] published about in 1950, as well as proposed a reform bill as Member of Parliament, supported by Rakel Jalas, among others.[60]

Throughout the 1940s, Väestöliitto framed urbanisation and industrialisation as detrimental for population development. City life was portrayed as unhealthy, cramped and detrimental to morals, and waged work in all its precariousness created an unstable and discouraging environment for reproduction and family life. This view was present the first annals of Väestöliitto, but a pro-

nounced expression of this framing was presented in *Homes or Barracks for Children*[61], a housing policy booklet commissioned by Väestöliitto and written by Heikki von Hertzen. Finland suffered from a severe housing shortage resulting from the baby boom and the war, in which the Soviet Union annexed large areas in Karelia and Northern Finland, leaving Finland with 400,000 evacuees in need of settlement. Not surprisingly, housing policy – ensuring good homes and living environments – soon developed into one of the core foci of Väestöliitto.[62]

To summarise, the diagnostic and prognostic framing of Väestöliitto remained intact during its first years, through the war and in the post-war situation. The organisation was still markedly pronatalist, and reproduction was still understood as a civil duty. Respectively, the society had the responsibility of providing a family-friendly environment and eliminate all factors that discouraged procreation.

Conclusions: Productive population policy

During the nineteenth and twentieth century, interventionist population policy and family policy have evolved in the Western world from the idea of protection to the idea of production. Traditionally, bourgeois ideology has not favoured state or other public intervention (cf. private, individual freedom). However, as Ritva Nätkin has formulated, intervention became acceptable when it was framed as protection. Who was protected, and from what, varied according to time and place. In terms of maternity protection, women have been protected from, among others, the harms of working life, industrialism and urban environments, decaying civilisation and morals, uncontrollable male sexual drive, and their own unpredictable self (the so-called biology of the female body).[63]

Finland itself has also been framed to require protection from various threats, which has shaped the Finnish nation-building process and given Finnish population and family policy a pronounced nationalist stance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Finland needed political and cultural protection from Czarist Russia, which entailed cultivating the Finnish people and civilisation. After the civil war, in the 1920s–30s, the perspective of the winning party prevailed. The Finnish civilisation, race and people needed to be protected from degeneration, and the threat comprised of the Reds, the working class in general, as well as the poor, delinquents and the hereditarily ill. This idea translated into eugenic legislation, among others. In the 1940s, the Finnish nation needed to be protected against the Soviet Union.

According to Ilpo Helén, in the 1930s–40s, the attempt to subject the family under the bourgeois-national discipline transformed from protection to a matter of organising the family to serve the nation. The family became a population production unit, a reproductive factory. The people itself formed the core of the national project, and the state adopted the role as the organ treasuring, calculating and effectivising the nation's life force and life processes.[64]

Alberto Spektorowski and Elisabet Mizrachi have analysed Myrdalian Social Democratic population policy and its rationale for eugenics and sterilisation. They apply the concept of welfare eugenics, which refers to an ideology that stems from and promotes welfare reforms, but also focuses on productive elements. Due to the high cost of social reform, membership of or exclusion from the community was not based on race, but on the productive quality of the individual. Non-productive elements had to be defined and controlled; they were not denied social welfare, but their right to procreate.[65]

In her reading of Alva Myrdal's sociological contribution, Hed-

vig Ekerwald concludes that Myrdal reframed the family, traditionally considered private and a conservative trope, and used it for feminist and emancipatory purposes. As Ekerwald puts it, Myrdal sought to make the private public. Rather than addressing low fertility as a biological and private matter, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal sought to address it through positive population policy, which focused on the social and economic reasons behind low population growth. Moreover, the Myrdals endorsed birth control: when families could control pregnancies, it would lead to a positive attitude towards reproduction. Alva Myrdal also advocated working women's right to marry and have children. According to her, social and economic responsibilities and rights should be the same for men and women. The economic burden of children should also be borne by the entire society, not only families with children. Following this ideology, the Myrdals also rejected the conservative degeneration fears associated with the reproduction of poor people.[66]

Väestöliitto largely adopted the framework of the Myrdalian positive and productive population policy. The representatives of the organisation indeed viewed family and reproduction as a public, national issue. They promoted various social and economic means for making procreation more attractive – also for poor families. Väestöliitto also became a pioneer in researching and developing contraceptives for married women, precisely with the rationale that birth control promoted marital happiness and thereby also positive attitudes towards reproduction. Väestöliitto also embraced the Myrdalian notion that the good of the community prevailed over the individual, and that population policy should seek to foster productive citizens.

However, the difference between the Myrdals and the actors of Väestöliitto was their core ideology. Whereas the Myrdals promot-

ed statist intervention for furthering progressive social reform, Väestöliitto utilised a modern framing for solidifying conservative, traditional values. It held tightly on to the bourgeois nuclear family model: it represented motherhood as the most important duty of the woman, and respectively, advocated the male breadwinner model. These goals were furthered, e.g., through family taxation, child benefits and family-friendly housing, which would make the housewife model economically possible and socially attractive.

The conservative perspective of Väestöliitto is connected with the 'underdog trauma'. Väestöliitto constructed elevating the number and quality of the population as a geopolitical matter of life and death: the nation would not survive without a large, productive people. The 'population question' was, in other words, an attempt to politicise and depoliticise population policy. On the one hand, Väestöliitto questioned the prevailing situation and discourse and sought to initiate action; on the other, it framed the population question as inevitable and represented its own solutions as the only option.[67]

The population policy framing of Väestöliitto linked nationalism and pronatalism intrinsically together. The ultimate goal was, as said, to increase the number and improve the quality of the population, and the prospect of a deviating development (i.e., a declining and degenerating population) was framed as a problem, the 'population question'. In its diagnostic and prognostic framing, reproduction was perceived as a civic duty – something society had the right to demand from its members. Respectively, neglecting this duty was seen as a breach against the nation itself. However, individuals were seen as a part of the society, and all parties involved played a role in the development, be it in causing the 'population question' or in solving it. The productive people, the society and the nation were one and the same.

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Campaign Country Going Green?

Danish Government Campaigns for Saving Energy and the Rise of Environmental Concern, c. 1973-1995

Bo Poulsen

Introduction

Internationally, and not least nationally, Denmark is often put forward as a country at the forefront of environmental awareness, energy savings, and the transition towards a cleaner pattern of energy consumption.[1] Even critical voices like Danish Greenpeace echoes the view of Denmark as a "frontrunner in energy transition", and in 2013 the World Wildlife Fund presented the state of Denmark with their 'Gift to the Earth Award' in recognition of the efforts made to curb CO_2-emissions.[2] On the website of *State of Green*, a government supported and public-private partnership platform, this idea is summarized in a statement on behalf of the Danish Energy Agency that "Denmark is a pioneer on greening the energy system and has since the first oil crisis in 1973 had a solid tradition for ever more energy efficiency and renewable energy oriented policies".[3] Further, in an article entitled 'The history behind Denmark's energy transition,' a commitment to environmental conscience is presented as integral to official Danish energy policies since the early 1970s: "Denmark was severely affected by the oil crises of the 1970s. It was decided to take a new path to

meet growing energy needs and, at the same time, to cater for environmental concerns".[4]

Indeed much has happened in Denmark with regards to curbing energy consumption since the early 1970s. The total primary energy consumption peaked in the late 1970s at a time when the varying growth rates of GDP seemed closely tied in with growth in energy consumption. Since then, GDP has grown substantially, while the level of energy consumption has remained stable. In other words, Denmarks as an energy consuming unit has succeeded in breaking the curve, entering a new track towards a much more energy efficient society.[5] According to government statistics, the share of renewable energy sources by 2015 covered 56 percent of domestic energy consumption.[6]

Equally over the past half century, there has been steady growth in concern for the natural environment internationally. Both internationally and in Denmark, the negative environmental impact from the rapid economic growth post World War Two has gained public attention and political awareness and action since the 1960s.[7] Thus, in Denmark the administration of environmental issues became institutionalized from the 1970s onwards, while sustainability as an issue of its own entered the government administration from c. 1990.

This means that history of Danish energy policy as well as the history of public environmental awareness to some extent has run on parallel tracks through the last more than 40 years. However, as we will see in this chapter, the Danish history of raising awareness of sustainable energy consumption is far from linear, when looked upon in a multi-decadal perspective.

This paper investigates more than 20 years of government led attempts to have Danish consumers curb their energy use. Looking at previously unexploited campaign material a number of results emerge, qualifying, the notion of Denmark as a front runner,

when it comes to environmental awareness. The first attempts to cut energy consumption came about as a direct consequence of the international oil crises of 1973-74, and for the following 15 years the government standing committee on energy savings issued a string of energy saving campaigns, fueled entirely by an appeal to common sense household economics and not least a significant portion of patriotism. Environmental justification was almost entirely absent throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

This changed only from 1989 onwards, as government initiatives to curb the ever rising consumption of energy commenced an extensive use of environmental justification.

This paper finally discusses the reason for this greening of government initiated Danish energy saving campaigns, which is seen as an indirect result of the 1987 UN report, *Our Common Future*.[8] The 1988 general election in Denmark led to the formation of a new center-right government coalition (1988-1990), where recommendations from Our Common Future became part of the new government program. The early 1990s witnessed a rare consensus on promoting environmental sustainability, which extended across traditional left-right party lines.

The Great Gamechanger

In the modern post-World War Two era, few events have had such a profound impact on Danish society as the so-called first oil crisis of 1973 and 1974. The oil crisis was a game changer in society and in politics, which highlighted modern societies' profound dependency on fossil fuels. In October 1973 the Yom Kippur War played out between Israel on one side, and most of their Arab neighboring countries on the other side. As Denmark along with many other Western countries were looked upon as pro-Israel, the oil produc-

ing so-called OPEC countries of the Middle East unleashed what was partly a boycott on selling oil to the small Danish Kingdom in Northern Europe. Prices soared, and there was a genuine fear in the Danish government that the boycott would be total, resulting in a potentially devastating shortage of oil. Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s Denmark had become increasingly reliant on cheap oil from the Middle East for heating as well as for transportation. Denmark now found itself in the so-called first oil crisis of 1973.[9] The later so prolific oilfields in the Danish part of the North Sea were yet to be discovered, and the wind mill industry was yet to take off as an important business and noteworthy source of sustainable and locally produced energy, hence Denmark was totally dependent on foreign imports of fossil fuel. The number of cars alone had risen more than tenfold from 1955, and by the early 1970s, more than 1,000,000 cars were registered in Denmark.[10]

As early as 19 October 1973, the social democratic Minister for Trade and Commerce, Erling Jensen formed a 'committee concerning fuel saving information activity' later known as Energispareudvalget, a standing committee for saving energy. Just a fortnight later, 31 October prices soared, and the crisis became very concrete.[11] The government then enacted a series of measures to save on energy, in particular mineral oil from the Middle East and for the Danish consumers a new era had begun, and an era in which saving energy became the order of the day.

One week later, the ministry of trade and commerce put forward general speed limits of 60 km/h in towns and 80 km/h in the country side. A more profound chock treatment was the enforcement of the so-called 'car free Sundays,' prohibiting cars from driving on Sundays. This was in place from 25 November and lasted until 10 February 1974, while other types of consumption and modern life in general was affected by restrictions on the lighting of shopping

windows, Christmas decorations in the street, as well as deliveries for private stoves heating with oil.[12]

Apart from the speed limits, these measures were all fairly short lived and very unpractical for modern society. However, the standing committee on energy saving continued to operate until well into the 1990s, and the idea persisted for decades on that the behavior of the everyday consumer could be altered through campaigns for a more prudish use of energy. The official arguments would differ over the years, as we shall see in the following.

Material and methods

This paper analyzes the arguments presented in six different government backed campaigns for saving on energy in between 1974 and 1995. Four of these were initiated through the government standing committee on energy saving, the so-called Energispareudvalget, whose campaign material is kept at the Danish public records office, the *Rigsarkivet* (RA).[13] From 1974-76, the committee was behind the campaign, 'Spar på energien – det lønner sig,' while in 1978-79 a follow up campaign was named 'Spar på energien – det er nødvendigt.' From 1979 until into the early 1980s, another campaign was labeled 'Spar på energien – lyt til energisten. Then most recently the Energispareudvalget was backing the 'Bilkørsel og miljø' campaign in 1995, where the environment is at the forefront for the first time.

In between however, the Danish government sponsored a three year long campaign (1989-1991), 'Vor Fælles Fremtid,' which was a specially assigned committee appointed by the Ministry for the Environment. Considering the extensive character and game changing environmental expression to emerge from this campaign, this campaign will be discussed more extensively than the others in this paper.[14]

In the following, the argument presented in the campaign

material is analyzed with an eye to the Toulmin model of argumentation. According to this, any argument presents a claim or a conclusion. Considering the game changing nature of the first oil crisis of 1973, the claim from the first government campaigns was the call to consume less energy. The claim is backed by a fact, which in the initial case was the statement that there was a lack of oil, which then had become expensive. To enhance the strength of the argument, the claim also needs a warrant. In the following, the typical warrant for the claim tells the consumer that saving energy is good for his or her own household economy or that it would be beneficial for the overall economy of Danish society. Another warrant would be that saving energy would be good for the environment. Finally, the argument would frequently contain backing for the claim. In case of the energy campaigns, a range of beneficial side effects would tend to be enrolled. Toulmin's model has been criticized for not really grasping the complexity of many arguments presented, but in this situation, where, by necessity of being advertisements, the arguments are simple this model will be used as a framework for opening arguments, where the warrants are shifting over time.[15]

Save energy – it pays off

The first campaign under the umbrella of the committee for energy savings unfolded in 1974 and 1975 under the heading 'Spar på energien – det betaler sig' which translates to 'save on energy – it pays off.'[16] Much of the campaign was formed as posters, where the claim to save energy, was backed by the warrant that it paid off to follow the advice presented in the published material. However, it is implicit that it paid off for the individual household. As a concrete example the campaign stated that one family could save 2,000 Liters

of hot water every year, provided they did their dishes in a tray filled with water, as opposed to have the tap running with hot water.

Figure 1. One of the posters of the first campaign. The headline translates; 'In the future we shall save on heating, and be comfortable.' The only hint of environmental awareness as such is the 'PS' at the bottom right corner asking: 'Did you consider that saving energy is an improvement for the environment as well?' (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).

One of the campaign adds was directed at insulation of houses, "… to make the birds keep warm by themselves". One suggestion was that individuals could mount an extra layer of windows in winter, while another proposal was geared towards insulation of attics. 10 cm. of insulation could provide savings of 1,000 Liters of oil, the campaign claimed, indicating that with current prices such an investment was profitable already after one year.

Finally, as a mere backing of the central economic warrant for the argument, however, the advertisement contained a *PS:* "Did you consider that saving oil, is also an improvement for the environment?" Why, this should be good for the environment is not explained explicitly, but one can deduce from the concerns of the 1970s, that it relates to air pollution (Figure 1).

It is noteworthy that a collective noun, 'We' is used a lot in the advertisement posters. Combined with the use of the Danish flag in the shape of a drop of water – or perhaps a drop of oil, the reader gets a sensation that the appeal is directed towards all Danes collectively, or in other words, as an appeal to patriotism. Saving energy becomes a patriot act, even if the concrete recommendations are geared towards individual households in particular, secondarily at people's work places.

'Insuler NU' for instance was a booklet 48 pages long, with a number of recommendations such as how to secure window frames from cold air using rubber linings or duct tape. This was followed by more general appeals such as this one: 'Has enough been done to save energy, where you live and work?' Again a 'PS' is inserted at the bottom of the poster, drawing attention to the possible effect on the environment, when energy savings are implemented.

In 1975 and 1976 the campaign continued, again with the same dominant facts and warrant to back the claim to curtail energy consumption. Air pollution was now explicitly addressed with the

slogan: 'don't send energy up in the air – both lose their value,' yet the concerns of the environment was merely used as backing for main warrants.[17]



Figure 2. Recommendations for farm houses focus on the attractiveness of keeping machinery, stoves and chimneys in prime condition. Households in the countryside however, are also urged to think about alternative sources of energy. (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).

One of the novel posters from 1975 was the so-called Energi-sparegården, which translates as the Energy-save-farm (Figure 2). Here the targeted audience is people living in the countryside in general, and in particular farm households, which in the 1970s still made up a sizeable part of total Danish households as well as some 100,000 farming units. Recommendations for farm houses focus on the attractiveness of keeping machinery, stoves and chimneys in prime condition. Households in the countryside however, are also urged to think about alternative sources of energy. This suggestion is accompanied by a drawing of a wind mill, but not the modern type of wind mill with delta wings. Rather, this 1975 drawing is accompanied by a 1920s type windmill, which in its day had been a popular solution for making one's own electricity in the countryside, during a time period, where electric wires from central power plants had not yet reached every corner of the Danish countryside. Yet, by 1975 these wind mills attached to generators was largely a thing of the past.

One advertisement read 'Last winter we learned something about saving energy.' To sum up for those, who might have forgotten, the advertisement explained that heating had now become more than twice as expensive as it had been the previous winter. Moreover, the total Danish oil expenses had soared from 3 billion in 1973 to 9 billion Danish Kroner in 1975. "This will have a serious impact on our foreign currency reserves," the poster stated, only to add: "and your wallet. Therefore, we need to save energy. We cannot afford not to".[18] To make the point that everyone in the country is making a difference, the poster showed an image from the Ministry of Housing, where an office corridor just outside the personal office of the minister appears gloomy, from the lack of effective lighting. The accompanying text ex-

plained that the ministry recently called upon all employees in the public sector to cut down on the use of heating and lights everywhere possible.[19]

'Save energy – it is necessary'

Another campaign was launched in 1978-1979, "Spar på Energien – det er nødvendigt", which translates as "energy savings is a necessity".[20] The timing and focus was no doubt related to the outbreak of the second oil crisis. With the Islamic revolution in Iran overturning the shah and creating great political instability, 1978 saw another significant rise in oil prices World wide. Following the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in 1980, the tense situation in the Middle East continued into the early 1980s.

The focus in Danish government advertisement on energy savings was completely on economics and very much on patriotism, no environmental concerns. The urgency now sprung from the headlines of a series of posters with the message: "Denmark's new room temperature: 20 degrees Celsius". The number '20' was shaped and coloured to remind the reader of the Danish national flag. The accompanying text added to this. Now it was no longer the pockets of individuals being targeted, but overall wellbeing of the Danish nation state: "Denmark must lower energy consumption with at least 5 percent. It is serious. Therefore, certain restrictions have been imposed. However, there are still some percentages to be earned voluntarily. We can do it: When everyone agrees to turn down the heat everywhere and maintain a sensible temperature in the living room at no more than 20 degrees, we will have saved a great deal of what we have to save" (Figure 3).[21]

Figure 3. The patriotic message is embedded in the Danish flag on top of the '20 degress' (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).

Compared to the previous campaign, the appeal to personal economic gains has vaporized into the chillier room temperature. Looking through the methodological framework of Toulmin, the claim is the same, that energy consumption must be curbed. Nonetheless, no factual reason for this is presented in the campaign material. The committee on energy savings must have taken for granted that the consumer was well aware that the dependency on foreign imports of fossil fuels was draining the state economy. This is the reason the warrant for the argument is centered on the consumer as a patriot citizen, who is expected to act in the best interest of the country, even if this should result in cold feet in one's own living room.

This campaign was also geared to magazine spreads, such as the one running the headline: "We have turned energy saving into a sport".[22] Here, the reader encounters a number of private citizens who all have a story to tell about how they have succeeded with saving energy in their homes. One family has taught their children to turn off the lights, when they leave a room, while another family has insulated their window and door frames. All the highlighted individuals were labelled with a noun, as they became the *energisparere* – 'the energy savers.' In the magazine spread as well as in a leaflet for car owners, the advert plays on the economic incentive to save money, while the patriotic aspects were less prominent that in the posters.

'Save energy – listen to the 'energist"

The next campaign from the early 1980s was the most ambitious so far in terms of outreach. "Listen to the energizer", was the headline, introducing small cartoon figures, the 'Energisterne,' which would roughly translate into English as the 'energizers'. The energizers appeared not only on posters and newspaper adds, but on more specialized leaflets. One of Denmark's most popular writers and poets

at the time was Benny Andersen, who had been commissioned to write a number of short poems concerning energy savings.



Figure 4. The 'Energizers' in full swing advicing on how to save energy (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).

The energizer campaign was targeted at almost every corner of Danish society, at least within the public sector. For the school children special stickers and small comic strips with the energizers were constructed. If anyone had to go to their General Practitioner, to a hospital or they went to the public library, they would be met by posters and leaflets with information on how to save energy. Again there was a direct appeal to public moral and patriotic duty. In some of the posters the energizer was red on a white back-

ground, suggesting that this was particularly Danish. "Deep down, you know how to minimize your energy bills", the advert ran, suggesting that after almost a decade of being exposed to campaigns for saving energy, the Danish consumers were now well equipped to take the wise decision and cut down energy consumption. There was a clear appeal to citizenship when the campaign continued: "Like everyone else, you have a little energizer in you".[23]

Vor Fælles Fremtid - Our Common Future in Danish

The government initiated committee, Vor Fælles Fremtid, came about as the result of a broad majority decision in the Danish parliament across party lines. From 1988-1990, the Danish government was made up by a center-right coalition, where the Prime Minister represented the Conservative Party, (Det Konservative Folkeparti) while the coalition partners were the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the somewhat smaller social liberal party (Det Radikale Venstre). Lone Dybkjær from Det Radikale Venstre held the post of Minister of the Environment. One aspect of the coalition agreement in 1988 dealt with the issue of addressing the issue of sustainability, as this had been put forward in the recent (1987) UN report, Our Common Future.[24]

In the spring of 1989 the government Standing Committee on Environmental and Development issues initiated the formation of a committee to "promote a campaign to raise awareness concerning sustainable development". The committee was to plan and oversee the campaign financed through government and private funds. Furthermore, the work of the committee built on the experiences of the past government campaigns to save energy as well as the most recent experiences with promoting the European Economic Council's 'Year of the Environment' in 1987.[25]

The framework of the campaign was to promote "new solutions

and collaborative patterns" to promote the principle of sustainable development, as this had been coined in the *Our Common Future* report. This included the desire to support global thinking coupled with local action, as well as a promotion of knowledge of how society is connected through ecology and economics. To be successful, the government stipulated that these ideas should be embraced widely in society by individuals, NGO's and the corporate world.

The concrete activities were scheduled as TV-advertisements, leaflets, newspaper ads and posters on public transportation, while more targeted educational material was to be produced. Finally, the dream was to foster new solutions and ways of living for individual citizens and families. The committee therefore should encourage funding applications for green projects from all around Denmark from various interest groups, including the concept of 'green city councils.'[26]

To ensure a broad sense of ownership to the campaign, the Minister for the Environment, Dybkjær appointed representatives for the committee from across political and societal divides. In May of 1989 appointed her younger party member, Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen as Chair of the committee, and as well as Jonna Petersen from the same party.[27] Gerner Nielsen was a fresh face on the public arena, 29 years old, and when Dybkjær was asked by the newspaper, *Jyske Vestkysten*, why she chose Gerner Nielsen, her reply was firm: "I only appoint women to positions like this one, I always do, and I always have done in my time in office as Minister for the Environment. There are men in top positions everywhere in society, so I can't see there is anything wrong with that".[28] Indeed, this comment on gender was in tune with public sentiments at the time and was not questioned in the reports from the conference. Only the tongue-in-cheek satirical commentator, 'Teddy the Troll' commented that it was no news that women were asked

to do the cleaning.[29] Pia Kjærsgaard from the right wing populist Fremskridtspartiet labeled it *silly*.[30]

The environment stayed in focus. The press conference to kick-off the campaign was situated outdoors at the scrapyard of the recycling company, Uniscrap, where the minister welcomed the press by saying that "everyone needs to start thinking in a new way. We need to change our behavior and live more eco-friendly".[31] She continued stressing the tragedy that so few are choosing unleaded petrol for their cars. Then she echoed some of the energy saving slogans from the previous couple of decades since the first oil crisis of 1973-74, as the emphasized the need for shorter showers, while jeans perhaps could be worn for more than one day before they went into the laundry. Everyone knows we have environmental problems. Finally, the planning group behind the campaign launched what in the press was dubbed 'the ten commandments,' ideas where individuals could make a difference. These were: 1) use unleaded petrol, 2) drive together in cars, 3) drive less, 4) wash yourself less, 5) sort your garbage, 6) don't use chemical cleansing for the toilet – use boiling water instead, 7) use less detergent, 8) do the laundry less often, 9) recycle your leftover foods and finally for 10) share freezers with your neighbour.[32]

Gerner Nielsen told the readers of another daily paper, *Aktuelt*, that she was rather naïve herself when it came to environmental politics, but as a child of the post-1968 era of environmental conscience, she had grown up with the belief that human kind had to take action if we were to have clean water 50 years ahead.[33] The Christian oriented daily paper, *Kristeligt Dagblad* reported from the press conference that Gerner Nielsen had made a plea for 'spiritual compost' in the way Danes were thinking about the situation with the environment. She explained that it "is so dire that we can no longer leave it to politicians and experts to solve the issues at hand. The environment must and shall be a common responsibility. However, the biggest barrier is the

dominant lack of belief in the future. We no longer believe that we can actually interfere and change the course. Therefore, we should initiate a spiritual compost process, where fear and lack of action is turned over, to be championed by public engagement and a belief that you, and I, and we together are shaping the future".[34]

The presence of Kirsten Toxværd, also appointed by Dybkjær, covered the interests of the conservative party, while the journalist Bertel Bavngaard most likely was approved by the liberal party.[35] By early July the entire committee was ready. In addition to four members appointed by the minster herself, the list of members of the executive committee included representatives from the Danish society for nature conservation, (Svend Bichel, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening), the business council of the labour unions (Hardy Hansen, LO/Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd), the employers' organization (Niels F. Gram, Industrirådet), the youth organization of the social democratic labour movement (Anders Hasselager, DUF) and Margrethe Clausager from Dansk Folkeoplysnings Samråd, an umbrella organization for educational institutions. The executive committee was backed by a board of 38 people representing as many organizations, such as the Danish car owners' society (FDM), the association of Danish electricity plants (Danske Elværkers Forening), Danish hunters' association, the Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi working for sustainable energy, the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, the Danish Chamber of Commerce and the Danish Tourist Board just to name a few participants from across the traditional political divides.[36] As the campaign gained momentum in 1990, many more organizations followed suit, thus by the end of 1990 63 organizations had joined in.[37] The daily management of the campaign was in the hands of a secretariat, first headed by the social democrat, Ole Løvig Simonsen, later by the former development aid consultant, Lars Norman Jørgensen, who became Secretary General in 1990.[38]

In the summer of 1989 the campaign was announced in a press release,

where Minister Dybkjær pointed out that to solve environmental problems, the lawmakers should take initiatives, but in order to truly foster a more sustainable development, citizens needed to take responsibility as well and change their way of living. This was the way forward, she stated, not only for the benefit of the environment, but also for ourselves, for our children and for our grandchildren.[39]

"We must think in a new way…" the Minister specified, and the Danes therefore should "think in totalities and change our behavior in many ways. This goes for taking big decisions, but it also affects us in our daily business of deciding on whether or not to buy unleaded petrol, commodities that are sensibly packaged, taking short showers etc."[40]

One of the draws of participating in the campaign for Our Common Future was the special government grant to spend 21 million Kroner on campaign activities in 1989, 1990 and 1991. 6 million Kroner was assigned to running the secretariat from 1989-1991, and the rest to actual activities. 10 million Kroner was to be spent following application from interested parties.

Miljøkaravanen – The environmental caravan.

To raise awareness, on the first outreach activities scheduled for the summer months of 1990, was the so-called Miljøkaravanen (The environmental Caravan) visiting 16 towns around the country, often in association with local town festivals. The tabloid newspaper *Ekstra Bladet* reported from the kick-off event that was launched at the small Port of Vedbæk North of Copenhagen. The then minister for education, Bertel Haarder from the liberal party graced the opening, answering quiz questions and writing the first sentences on what was planned to the World's longest list of environmental advice. "Don't be late, when it comes to cleaning

the World", he wrote. Meanwhile though, the newspaper reported a slip of the tongue of his, as he declared the recent invention of energy saving light bulbs to be "a piece of shit". Nonetheless, the caravan signified that in practice as well as in theory, the 'green issue' was able to unite associations and politicians across party lines in 1990. Thus the event in Vedbæk was co-sponsored by the Danish Train Service (DSB), the association of Danish housewives, the Nepenthes NGO working to save the rain forest, while according to the news report, most children were occupied by the presence of a giant panda teddy bear with a sweaty man inside, representing the World Wildlife Fund.[41]

The Green Families

Vor Fælles Fremtid initiated a campaign, where 26 families around Denmark volunteered to live in a more sustainable fashion for more than 4 months in the fall of 1990. In the county of South Jutland, the county administration advertised in the newspapers to have families sign up. They received 90 applications, but could only select a few. This suggests that the chosen families were very motivated to adjust their lifestyle. Each family was handed a manual with ideas on how to be more sustainable, and at the same time they were tasked to keep a diary with their experiences. The green families project served the double purpose of advertise to other Danish consumers that green awareness was possible, and the action could be taken on a family unit level. However, at the same time, the project was to inform producers, green organizations and decision makers on possible obstacles for meeting the requirements of a greener lifestyle.[42]

Fritid Fyens Stiftstidende 3 Lørdag 28. juli 1990

Grøn familie

Fynboer med i miljø-eksperiment

Familien Rasmussen i Højby har lært meget af forsøget med at leve miljørigtigt i forløbig et par måneder. Forrest Gitte, 12 år, bagved Birgit Krogh Rasmusen og Torben Rasmussen. Ved kompostdyngen Anja på 15 år. Familiens femte medlem, Jens på 18 år, var ikke hjemme.

Figure 5. One of the families involved in the Green Families project (source: RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid, scrapbøger).

One of the families taking part in the experiment was a mother and daughter in Esbjerg, in West Jutland. The mother, Jane Lykke told the regional newspaper, *Vestkysten* about their experiences with the four month long project they were taking part in. The family had moved to Esbjerg only six month earlier, and they found it a very difficult town to shop in, when trying to be eco-friendly. As supermarkets did not cater for their needs, they had had to shop in smaller specialized shops. Jane Lykke readily admitted that she missed Copenhagen, where she was used to many more 'green' commodities, and to find them she was using the *Den grønne forbrugerguide* (the green consumer) a book by journalist, Kjeld Hansen. "Our new bible", Jane Lykke stated.

In Esbjerg both her and her daughter experienced eyes rolling with shop assistants, implicitly declaring that they mother and teenage daughter were 'eco-fanatics' (miljøfanatikere). Some had responded in a friendly manner, when they asked about the availability of organic meat, but excused themselves that this was a no go, because of the price.[43]

The Energy Weekend

For the weekend 24-25 November 1990 the campaign secretariat teamed up with the association of Danish bakers, the YMCA/YWCA scouts organization to promote the use of 'one's own energy,' for transportation in the weekend going to the church on Sunday, or when heading for the local bakery to buy fresh bread in the weekend. Boyscouts and girlscouts from all over Denmark enlisted to distribute leaflets, such as the *Energiavisen*, the 'energy newspaper' to the customers at bakeries, and the churchgoers in the Danish Lutheran Church. In total more than 120 bakers took part in the event.[44]

To further stimulate interest, a number of the so-called 'green families' had visits from energy consultants from their local electricity providers. This was set to stimulate interest in this service from the various electricity companies.[45]

The energy weekend was planned months in advance, and the press release was scheduled to go out on 22 November. As it turned out, the Prime Minister Poul Schlüter, called a general election on the same day, which undoubtedly curbed the attention of the general public towards the energy weekend. Nonetheless, several pieces of press coverage surfaced from the weekend over the next few days.

Generational contract for the environment

In many ways, the campaign *Vor Fælles Fremtid* was riding on a rising wave of green awareness around 1991. On the initiatives, which appears to have been well received, were leaflets produced to inform the business sector about ways in which they could cut their energy consumption, and in turn cut expenses associated with their production. One such case was in the Århus county in East Jutland, where the leaflet, *Rent Miljø* (clean environment) was sent out to more than 4,000 small and large businesses, sponsored by the campaign, jointly with the employers' association, the Confederation of Danish Industries (DA) and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). Here, some best practice examples of companies that had succeeded in cutting the resource use. One sports retailer had saved 34,500 Danish Kroner annually when they switched to energy saving lightbulbs.[46] On a somewhat larger scale, the local brewery, Ceres had cut the water spending from 2.8 liters a year to 2.3 liters, which earned them a cost reduction of 1 million Kroner, and a nearby dairy had succeeded in saving

1.4 million Kroner a year, when they changed their cooling system from water to air, while the cooling water they did use, was reused for cleaning the plant.[47]

The regional chairman of the employers organization, Mogens Boyter, even went so far as to proclaim that "in the 1990s the typical CEO in East Jutland will be an environmental activist", and in concrete terms he advocated that each and every company should work out a dedicated environmental policy for their own internal use. "When developing new products, processes and systems, we need to look at the total environmental impact, or to put it in another way, the route of the product from cradle to grave. This is to reduce the impact as much as possible. We should all be determined to leave East Jutland to the next generation, just as clean as it was when we were young".[48]

Mogens Boyter was a fairly flamboyant figure in East Jutland, who combined his ownership of a factory producing toilet seats, with a string of elected positions, including at one point the chairmanship of the local professional football team, AGF. However, it is perhaps particularly noteworthy that he was also an active politician rallying for the conservative party, whom he represented in the regional county council. A conservative appeal for environmental activism on behalf of CEO's would be rare before the 1990s, and it has become rare again in the past one and a half decades as well. Yet, at this moment in time, Boyter could issue a statement that it was timely to be pro-environment, for the sake of the environment, as much as for the sake of the corporations in East Jutland, he was representing.

Approaching children

As an example of the approach to children, some of the protest

songs of the 1960s for instance, were dusted and re-written to meet the new challenge of addressing environmental problems. The social democratic youth association (DUI Leg og Virke) teamed up with more liberal leaning association of free kindergartens (Frie Børnehaver og Fritidshjem) to produce an environmentalist version of Tom Dooley, a folk song made popular by the Kingston Trio in 1958, portraying the tragic hanging of Tom Dooley, who perhaps did not commit the murder, for which he was sentenced to death. In the 1990 version, we the people on planet Earth are the perpetrators causing harm to the planet we inhabit. In English translation the gloomy text reads: The sea is filled with oil / the forest is dead / The fish is dying in streams / the winter just rain and sleet / the hour is near for the planet / the hour has come my friend / the time has come / we will preserve it / In a direct call for the parent generation, the targeted audience for the children's singing, one of the sentences reads: We want to breathe the air / not having water from cartridges / grownups use your senses / don't you understand a thing?

In a Scandinavian song tradition, Norwegian composer, Nordahl Grieg's *Til Ungdommen* (*For the Youth*) is even more famous. Written in 1936, Grieg calls for fighting guns with knowledge seeking, and emphasizes the responsibility of people for changing their own lives and conditions, as well as those of other people, for the common good. Thus, the recognizable tune itself carries a number of connotations, even if the text is different in the environmentalist version:

> The grown ups are polluting / more than they think / they don't consider / our common earth / they think they can just / keep being dirty / without asking / you or me

Following two verses of statements on the pollution from factories and cars, the last verse again returns directly to the intended audience, the adult population:

> Now we will thank you / who listened to us / asking all of you / stand up against the pigs / stop pollution / it concerns us all / otherwise the earth / will end on the dumpyard.

While the concrete impact of these protest songs can be difficult to measure, there is no doubt the campaign as such made an impact while it was in business from 1989-1991.

Vor Fælles Fremtid – policy making and the new government

In the Danish parliamentary system, general elections can be called by the Prime Minister, whenever he or she chooses, but it has to be within 4 years from the last election. However, the 1970s and 1980s, were marked by the formation of coalition governments, where the governing coalitions never had a majority of seats in the parliament between themselves. Compromising with political parties outside the government was the order of the day, and whenever a deadlock appeared, the Prime Minister would call a new election. This happened again the end of 1990, which resulted in a change of the composition of government. The center-right coalition was dissolved, and the social liberal party, Det Radikale Venstre left the government. However, the conservative Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter was still able to cajole support for another minority government consisting also of the liberal party.

As the campaign, Vor Fælles Fremtid was financed over three years, activities continued unabated by the political turmoil, yet

in year three of the campaign, in 1991, the leaders of the campaign, Gerner Nielsen and Normann Jørgensen took sides against the government in such issues as the planning of a bridge between Denmark and Sweden. "The decision to build a bridge across The Sound is not consistent with the ideas laid down in the Brundtland-report", a press release ran. This was the case both in terms of the decision making process as well as the anticipated environmental impact of the new bridge. As for the policy process, there ought to have been a general election on a topic so important, while the environmental risks associated with constructing a large bridge was not thought through. The Vor Fælles Fremtid recommended that, while it was desirable from an economic and cultural point of view to strengthen the infrastructure between Denmark and Sweden, which at the time was connected only by way of ferry transportation, the environment would suffer from a bridge. While no one new exactly, how significant the impact would be, measures should be taken so as not to disturb the then current flow of water in The Sound, the salinity as well as the habitat changes which might impact seal populations and bird populations in the area. To safeguard nature, the Vor Fælles Fremtid recommended that a tunnel was dug all the way between Copenhagen and Malmø in Sweden, which would then not disturb The Sound.[49]

In the end though, the decision was maintained that the new connection would consist of the combination of a tunnel for the first third of the way from Denmark to Sweden, while a large bridge was constructed for the remainder of the distance. There is no indication whether or not, this interference with actual policy making, was questioned within the executive committee of the campaign.

Summary of activities

Towards the end of the campaign in 1991, the Chairman, Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen summed up the result in a letter to the then conservative Minister of the Environment, Per Stig Møller, who represented the two-party minority government of the conservative and liberal party (1990-1993).

Gerner Nielsen emphasized that c. 160 public lectures had been held, targeting some 8-10,000 people around the country, which added to the impact of 20 publications on sustainable consumption, sustainable farming, sustainable workplaces etc. In the area of 100,000 attendants of evening school for mature students had been presented with leaflets, while television viewers had been watching advertisements, such as the ones for the activity, 'Green Families'. 600 schools had been involved in raising children's awareness through specific targeted broadcasts from the national broadcast corporation, Danmarks Radio. Eight different conferences under the heading of sustainable farming, 'Bæredygtigt Landbrug' were held in collaboration between the nature conservation movement, The Agricultural Council's educational association, and the liberal education association, (LOF). By then, some 620 local projects had received support from the committee Vor Fælles Fremtid.[50] Midway through the campaign some 201 local project had been initiated, where exhibitions and happenings in schools had been the most sought after activity.[51]

When it comes to focusing on the environment, and linking environmental concerns to the issues of energy policy, the Vor Fælles Fremtid had provided a platform reaching out to many more people than before, and the wave of green concern continued in the years thereafter. Thus, when in 1995, the Energispareudvalget again launched a campaign to save energy, the environment had taken center stage, for the first time ever.

'Car driving and the environment'

In 1995, the Energispareudvalget sponsored a campaign targeting car drivers, under the heading Bilkørsel og Miljø, which translates as car driving and the environment. Now, the dominant discourse had changed completely. The claim of the argument was still, save energy, but the environment had now taken center stage, as the campaign opened with the following statement from the preamble of a campaign leaflet:

"Today there is hardly anyone in doubt that we are facing significant problems with the global environment. Almost every day, we hear about the greenhouse effect, the thinning of the ozone layer, clearing of the rain forest, acid rain and the pollution of the sea around us. A significant portion of these problems stems from our consumption of energy for transportation".

In other words, the claim of the campaign is to cut down the use of petrol. The section cited above however, establishes a series of facts (planet Earth suffers) which is backed by the warrant that we as daily commuters have created a sizeable portion of the problem.

In this 1995 leaflet there is no reference to the notion that cutting down on energy consumption is beneficial for the economic wellbeing of individuals. Rather the appeal is directed at factors outside the family unit or even the nation. Car drivers instead are urged to think globally, and internationally at any rate. As the preamble further stated: "We must follow the international call for reducing our energy consumption with 50% during the next 50 years".[52]

The whole text is very factual and the ideas presented are clearly reflecting science based recommendations from the UN Climate Panel. Carbon dioxide pollution is to be reduced with 25% by the year 2030, catalyzers are already being installed in new cars, and lead should be removed entirely from petrol sold in Denmark with

a span of a few years. In addition the plan expressed the wishful thinking that from 2030, we will have cars able to drive 50 km on one liter of petrol. Nonetheless, the concrete recommendations for what people can do themselves are in tune with the advice from previous decades: Walk to the baker in the weekends instead of driving, use public transportation when possible, and fill up the car with people to and from work. Finally, chauffeurs are urged to drive more calmly thereby saving as much as 20% fuel over a given distance.

It is worth noting that the preamble of the leaflet was signed by Ib Thyregod in his capacity as chairman of the Energispareudvalget. Thyregod is a Danish lawyer, who has also represented the liberal party in the Copenhagen City Council. This suggests that even if by 1995 the concern for the environment was shared across left-right party division. From 1993-2001 Denmark was ruled by a center-left coalition government with a rather strong minister jointly for the environment and energy planning, Svend Auken from the Social Democrats. At any rate, Thyregod from the liberal party, traditionally the choice of farmers and people in rural areas, appears not to have had quarrels signing a document underlining this new plan for changing the transportation patterns of the Danes.

Conclusion

This paper has revealed a number of developments in the way in which the Danish government tried to convince the citizens of Denmark to save energy from 1974-1995. During the first wave of campaigns, the environment was treated as a secondary issue, which would also profit, as a side effect, from saving on energy, but the environment disappears as a recognizable factor in campaigns

Hvilken forurening kommer der fra bilerne?

I forbindelse med bilkørsel udledes der flere forskellige affaldsstoffer, der virker skadelige på både mennesker og miljø. Her er nogle af de væsentligste:

1. KVÆLSTOFOXIDER (NO_x): Kvælstof omdannes i luften til salpetersyre og salte.
Af bilernes bidrag til belastningen stammer i dag 2/3 fra benzinbiler og 1/3 fra dieselbiler.

2. PARTIKLER (sod og støv): Stammer primært fra dieselbilerne. Partiklerne er små og kan trænge dybt ned i menneskers lunger. Partiklerne er bærere af forskellige skadelige stoffer.

3. KULILTE (CO): Stammer primært fra benzinbilernes udstødning. Kulilte kan være meget skadelig selv i små mængder.

4. KULBRINTER (HC): Stammer efter indførelsen af katalysatorer primært fra dieselbiler. Kan skabe meget ubehagelige lugtgener og sundhedsmæssige lidelser.

5. SMOG : Et sammensat ord af det engelske smoke (røg) og fog (tåge). Det er koncentrationen af svovldioxid og kvælstofoxid, der måles som smoglag. Den forekommer især i byområder med mange biler.

6. BLY (Pb): Stammer primært fra benzinbiler, der kører på blyholdig benzin. Bly virker skadeligt på menneskers helbred.

Vejviser til et bedre miljø.

Hvis vi vil være med til at bevare miljøet, kan vi som bilister gøre en vigtig indsats for at begrænse forureningen.
De næste sider er udformet som en slags håndbog, der kan virke som vejviser til et bedre miljø. Nogle af de gode råd handler om at ændre køremåde – andre om at holde bilen i god form.
Hvis vi kan overholde disse råd, kan trafikkens miljøbelastning nedsættes væsentligt og privatøkonomien vil få det bedre.

● **ACCELERATION.** Undgå kraftige accelerationer. De koster unødigt meget benzin.

● **BENZIN.** Undersøg om bilen kan køre på blyfri benzin. Det kan næsten alle nyere biler – og danske bilister kan umiddelbart spare miljøet for 60-80 tons bly om året.

● **BREMSER.** Sørg for at få justeret bremserne jævnligt. Hvis bremserne "hænger", skal motoren bruge mere benzin.

● **DÆKTRYK.** Kontroller dæktrykket regelmæssigt. For lavt tryk koster ekstra liter benzin.

● **GEARSKIFT.** Kør i det højst mulige gear. I visse situationer kan det være en fordel at skifte direkte fra 2. gear til 4. gear – eller fra 3. til 5. gear.

● **HASTIGHED.** Det gælder om at tilpasse hastigheden efter trafikrytmen og være forudseende, så man kan holde en jævn fart.

● **KARBURATOR.** Få indstillet karburatoren, så den er justeret i overensstemmelse med bilens specifikationer.

● **KATALYSATOR.** Fra 1. oktober 1990 skal alle nye, benzindrevne personbiler være forsynet med katalysator. Biler med kat. forurener 80-90% mindre end biler uden.

Når der skal købes ny – eller brugt – bil.

Undersøg benzinforbruget nøje, når der skal investeres i en ny – eller brugt – bil. Der kan være stor forskel på forbruget selv mellem biler af samme størrelse. Vælg den, der kører længst på literen.

4

Figure 6. By the mid-1990s the green wave had swept across Danish society. By then the style of car driving had become a means to help save the planet (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).

for saving energy for the next almost 15 years until 1989. Around 1975 and 1980 in particular there was a particularly strong appeal directed at the survival of the Danish state through prudent energy consumption, which then became an act of patriotic duty. Only after the release of the UN report, *Our Common Future* in 1987, did the environmental start to play a role for the way in which campaigns to save energy were justified to the public.

The campaigns initiated through the Energispareudvalget became more and more distinct in terms of which audience they tried to address. The campaigns of the 1970s were targeted pri-

marily at changing the behavior of private citizens as home owners and commuters, whereas from c. 1980 the campaigns using the 'energizer' cartoon figures had a wider ambition of targeting children in schools as well.

Eventually, the environment came to the forefront of arguments for why to save energy in the late 1980s. The onset of the 1989-1990 campaign, Vor Fælles Fremtid was directly inspired by the recommendations in the UN Report, *Our Common Future*. Now, the citizens of Denmark needed to cut down on their energy consumption, and in general to lower their use of the scarce natural resources of the planet Earth. The Vor Fælles Fremtid campaign came about in 1988, when the parliamentary situation in Denmark led to the formation of a center-right government where the Conservatives and the Liberal Party teamed up with the pro-environment social liberal party, Det Radikale Venstre. This campaign became the most ambitious government campaign so far, trying to reach out to all age groups and social groups in Danish society. Open university lectures and open science conferences, leaflets, children's songs, Lutheran priests and bakeries around the country were all instruments in spreading the message, or the wave of opinion that we should take better care of the environment, including the lessening of dependency on fossil fuel.

This change in discourse, or ways of arguing for saving energy however, was most closely related to the overall rise in environmental awareness, which had matured in most societies in the Western World in the preceding decades.

During the 1960s a number of important developments took place which was all linked to the future availability of sufficient natural resources. In 1968, the American biologist Paul Ralph Ehrlich published the influential book, *The Population Bomb*, in which he warned that the growth in the World's population would even-

tually lead to overpopulation and a dire shortage of natural resources. Then in 1972 the United Nations held the so-called Stockholm Conference, which led to the Stockholm Declaration, where the countries of the UN agreed that social and economic development was tied to the solution to a number of environmental problems, not least the availability of natural resources. The shortage of resources was also the focal point of the book, *Limits to Growth*, which also in 1972 prophesized that Planet Earth would run out fossil fuel and other important natural resources within less than half a century.[53]

Three main events catapulted the rise of the new environmental discourse in policy as well as in the campaign material analyzed above.

First of all, there was a reservation towards implementing nuclear power into the Danish energy supply, which was linked to concerns of potential radioactive contamination if the power plant leaked or was damaged. While this had been a concern throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 1986 explosion at the Sovjet Union's nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, sent a shockwave through all of Europe, as heightened levels of radioactivity was registered from Poland to Northern Sweden. In the case of Denmark this event effectively shut down any further debate concerning the implementation of nuclear power, putting further emphasis on alternative ways to meet the demand for energy.[54]

Secondly, the United Nation's report, *Our Common Future* was released in 1987, making sustainability and sustainable development buzzwords around the World. This was linked to the recent realization that the ever more extensive use of fossil fuel caused the release of large amounts of CO^2 into the atmosphere. The additional amounts of CO2 would block more of the sun's radiation from exiting the Earth's atmosphere, thereby leading to the greenhouse effect.[55]

Thirdly, and this is perhaps speculative, by the late 1980s the Danish oil and gas pipes from the North Sea had begun to supply mainland Denmark with the country's fossil fuel, thereby lessening the threat of unpredictable prices and supplies from the OPEC Countries in the Middle East. This may also have played a role in the way energy savings were presented. When Denmark was now self-sufficient with oil and gas, it was no longer possible to claim that the state finances were crippled by soaring prices on fossil fuel.

Still, the Danish government did not play what one might call 'the green card' until the late 1980s when it comes to promoting prudence in energy consumption. This is in line with the central themes in post-oil crisis Danish energy policy as identified by Mogens Rüdiger. According to Rüdiger, the security of supplies was central until 1990, when the center-right government proposed a new energy plan, the so-called *Energy 2000*. Now suddenly the focus had shifted towards lowering CO^2-emissions and thereby prioritizing the environmental impact of energy consumption.[56]

What this also means, is that apart from the scant reference to air pollution in the campaigns from the 1970s, the discourses prominent in government induced campaigns did not attach themselves to the discourses of the environmental movement before the 1988 change in government, when the *Vor Fælles Fremtid* campaign a discourse of sustainability. In an international context, this is early for a government led initiative to focus on sustainability. Nonetheless, the claims made by the current energy awareness initiative State of Green, referred to in the opening section of this article, the State of Denmark did not in any great measure commit itself to environmental concerns right from the time of the first oil crisis in 1973. When trying to sell energy pru-

dence to the Danes prior to 1988, household benefits and appeals to the patriotic deeds associated with literally turning down the heat were of paramount importance.

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Heritage and Imaginary Childhood Landscapes

On the Impetus of Tourism Entrepreneurs in Stockholm Archipelago

Christian Widholm

Introduction

There have been tendencies within the research field of critical heritage studies to regard the producers of heritage as almost manipulative. As such, the heritage producers have been treated as unprofessional historians that inoculate a distorted collective memory in the minds of visitors at the heritage attractions.[1] At the same time it appears that tourism studies have treated the producers of heritage as more or less neutral mediators of history. And instead the focus of investigation in these studies has been how visitors understand and consume heritage attractions. There are, however, some tourism analysts that have come up with the idea that also the heritage producers might influence our view on bygone days.[2] Among the more critical researchers of heritage a rather common point of departure is that heritage consists of myths, ideology, nationalism, parochialism, romanticism and hunger for profit.[3]

Despite the polemical tone among the critical researchers they rewardingly illuminate that heritage is a result of several intertwined mental structures, such as those mentioned above. The following tentative analysis, inspired by perspectives from critical heritage

studies, focus on one of these structures, memories of and notions about childhood, articulated by heritage producers.

Method and material

Present study analyse three heritage entrepreneurs and their enterprises, all located in the Stockholm area. One of the entrepreneurs is Martin Eriksson, also known as the former pop-singer E-type. For the sake of research ethics, I have strived not to reveal the identity of the other two entrepreneurs. I have conducted traditional source studies, and also done observations and interviews. The interviews have been conducted in connection with the observations. The empirical substance is somewhat limited. The ambition is, however, to be able to discuss general social historical questions through the use of this slightly narrow material. In other words, by pointing at a few concrete examples of how heritage is constructed and managed I hope to highlight a larger context about how collective memory is constructed and sustained.[4]

The main focus is to analyse commonplace acts within the heritage enterprises and in what ways these might be connected to the impetus of the heritage entrepreneurs. Thus, I am not necessarily interested in matters that probably would be the answer to the question of "What's the motive behind your enterprise?" An answer to this question would probably read: "I have a genuine interest in history", "I'm a natural entrepreneur" or "I want to contribute to the economic growth of this region" etc. Instead I want to focus on the taken for grantedness in their enterprises, such things that might seem trivial or idiosyncratic at face value, since it is often that memories of and notions about childhood materializes in commonplace acts or in the seemingly banal. A methodological crux might be whether it is possible to analyse childhood

memories. They can, some may argue, be flawed or just anachronistic constructions of contemporary times. In this investigation, however, the veracity of the memories is of minor concern since even an erroneous memory expresses a notion about childhood that could be of interest for this study. And the reason for using the term memory is that the informants sometimes expresses notions about childhood in terms of childhood memories. Thus, the analysis aims to de-naturalize representations of childhood and to present them as crucial elements of the enterprises at heritage attractions.

The heritage attractions analysed are all a part of the maritime heritage sector. This circumstance influences the analysis and call for caution when it comes to comparisons with other types of heritage, since the maritime heritage bears with it sedimented narratives, e.g. of naval battles and war heroes, that do not appear in the same disguise in other types of heritage.

The concept of heritage

Before the 19th century, when nationalism became popular, heritage was only a concern for the wealthy elite, according to the historian David Lowenthal.[5] In Sweden the word heritage (the 19th century word "kulturarv") was reactivated during the 1990s. Before the 1990s it was more common to use terms like "our tradition" or just "our history".[6] Assuredly the new vocabulary from the 1990s seemed to have resulted in new practices, like the creation of heritage attractions, and an increase in commodification of history.[7] However, the increased interest in history and the commercial dimensions of it during this period was not a novelty. Already during the late 19th century it was possible to capitalize on history in an innovative manner. Scholars have called the practices during

this phase *The Invention of Tradition*.[8] These enterprises, says the historian Peter Aronsson, originated from social upheavals. When it comes to the Swedish context, we can e.g. understand Götiska förbundet's (a romanticist and nationalistic literary society during early 19th century) romantic praise of seemingly archaic Swedish farmers as personifications of positive Nordic virtues, i.e. an immaterial heritage, in the light of the loss of Finland in 1809. Another Swedish example is Artur Hazelius' work to realize Nordiska museet (the Nordic Museum) and Skansen (an open-air museum) during the latter part of 19th century as a kind of therapy to ease the trauma caused by industrialization and urbanization during that period. Today, like then, our engagement in heritage can be understood in the light of swift changes in world politics but also as a result of more prolonged social transformations.[9]

David Lowenthal presents a similar line of reasoning and claims that the heritage industry of today is fuelled by challenging social transformations like migration, enhanced mobility, globalization and changes in technology. Thus, we tend to use heritage as a way to reach safety and to reassure ourselves that our identity has a unique value. Uncertainty, loss and mourning are all conditions that support heritage.[10] Lowenthal also writes that heritage discourse is treacherous: it is self-congratulatory and an uncritical "declaration of faith in [the] past", not a serious investigation to gain an understanding of the past.[11] A similar perspective is presented by Bella Dicks who says that "history is dedicated to making forgotten pasts understandable, while heritage aims to fashion the past into forms that serve current needs".[12] This rather orthodox division between professional historians and the amateurs from the heritage industry appears to be relatively common among the more critical researchers of heritage and it is probably most salient in Lowenthal's works.[13]

The archaeologist and heritage researcher Laurajane Smith emphasize the aspect of action within heritage in her work *Uses of Heritage*.[14] Smith is not the only one who highlight this aspect, but she probably does it more clearly than others. But in general there seems to exist a unity among scholars that heritage is a practice more than an objective entity.[15] The prevalent view in the West, says Smith, is however that heritage has to do with something tangible. According to Smith there is a discourse in the West, "authorized heritage discourse," with global pretentions about how to define heritage.[16] This discourse usually demand material evidence that proves a specific heritage. Thus, it preserves and restore places and objects, e.g. by constructing tourism attractions, since a material heritage confirms with tangible evidence that "our" identity is real.[17] Smith says that "[t]he materiality of heritage" is "a brutally physical statement […] of the possessors of that heritage".[18] At the same time, we might add, heritage consists of elusive elements as well, like nostalgia.

Heritage as nostalgia and childhood memories

The term nostalgia originates from the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer who, during the late 17th century, diagnosed depressed students and soldiers scattered over Europe. The reason for their depression was homesickness. Hofer labelled the severe homesickness nostalgia. The word was a combination of the Greek words "nostos", meaning returning to one's home, and "algos", meaning suffering, pain and mourning.[19]

A cursory reading of the theories on heritage and nostalgia indicates considerable overlapping. Today we do not treat nostalgia as a psychiatric condition, but if that was the case it would probably be possible to diagnose advocates of heritage as well. Such

striking similarities are to be found within the logics of nostalgia and heritage.

According to Svetlana Boym nostalgia erupts in the wake of revolutions or during times of real or perceived socio-political instability and stress (cf. Aronsson och Lowenthal on heritage above). Nostalgia, Boym says, is a defence mechanism.[20] It offers comfort and an imagined safe past during unsafe present times. Boym says that nostalgia is "a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values" and a longing for "a home that is both physical and spiritual, the edenic unity of time and space".[21] In Boym's *The Future of Nostalgia* this time-space is conveyed several times through references to childhood memories.

The literary historian Joe Moran suggests that the heritage industry depends on notions about childhood. Moran claims that heritage industry regards childhood as a Barthesian myth and as such it is used to convey naturalness. It can be used by a variety of actors with diverse agendas to cover social conflict. Thus, the childhood myth can be mobilized to present an idyllic national past.[22] Historian Raphael Samuel has connected the heritage industry's use of childhood with the advent of the middle class cult of childhood during 19th century. It is this cult that has resulted in sentimentalization of the nursery and commodification of old toys. In Great Britain, says Samuel, one of the latest childhood cults coincided with the final decay of the British Empire during 1980s and 1990s that followed on urbanization and social transformations that started after the Second World War. It is during upheavals like this that practices of heritage restore traditional values like patriotism and pastoralism and sanction acceptance of an aristocratic and royal prerogatives.[23]

The first tenets of the childhood myth were formulated during

18th, and 19th century when several transformations among upper and middle classes resulted in ideas that separated the world of children from the world of adults. One of these transformations was the advent of the nuclear family which meant that parents were able to create emotional bonds to their offspring due to the limited amount children. Another was the introduction of educational institutions that separated children from the world of adults for a fixed amount of years. And third, the development of a market that commodified childhood, e.g. through children books, toys, clothes etc.[24]

An additional aspect of childhood that makes it useful for the heritage industry is its quotidian qualities. This is a convenient dimension for heritage which tend to present the past in in personal and existential terms, not social and political. Thus, Moran argues, childhood is idealized as a period of natural rhythms, a time apart from adults' worries, duties and appointments. Childhood nostalgia can be said to be a false consciousness constructed by the dominant ideology, but, Moran says, at the same time it is a feeling that resonates of our most profound wish for a stabile identity, safety and belonging.[25]

One of several hot tempered arguments in Lowenthal's *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* highlights the centrality of childhood references within the heritage discourse. Lowenthal seems to be of the opinion that childhood elements in heritage are tools in a conspiracy planned by those who want to legitimize their specific version of the past.[26] However, as we will see, the childhood card is not always flagged as a result of systematic, and conscious, strategies.

Notions of childhood and maritime heritage in the Stockholm region

An extensive demilitarization took place in the archipelago east of Stockholm a few years after the end the Cold War and vast areas were made available for cottage owners and the tourism enterprises. A similar process took place in other regions of the Baltic Sea basin as well. Since the beginning of the 1990s political programs on national and supra national level have been formulated to encourage the development of maritime heritage around the Baltic Sea. The EU's interest in this heritage has been expressed through both symbolic and economic rhetoric: referring to the Hanseatic League hopes have been voiced of a possibility to create a peaceful and productive region that the Baltic Sea once was. In addition, the development of maritime heritage attractions has been thought to cure unemployment that followed upon deindustrialization and demilitarization in the region. For the Baltic Sea nations the rhetoric has echoed that of EU's, but the symbolic content expressed on the national level has originated from national narratives and references to a common European heritage have been few. Hence, among both public and private stakeholders in Sweden the engagement in Swedish maritime heritage is still considerable.[27]

The significance of the constellation of heritage-childhood-tourism depends on the context. Thus, just to mention a couple of examples from the Baltic Sea region, in Latvia there is an increase in the number of Russian tourists at the seaside resort of Jurmala. During the Soviet Union this resort was a tremendously popular destination for Russian tourists. With the fall of Soviet, however, the Russians disappeared, but after the turn of the century the Russians are returning in large numbers for nostalgic reasons.[28] Could it be that the Russian tourists want to return to the idyllic holidays of their childhood? And in Germany several museums

have opened based on the specific nostalgic register, Ostaliga, that recalls the times in East Germany. One of the museums, *DDR-Museum der Alltagskultur*, opened in 2006 and it displays everyday life of East Germany. According to Roberta Bartoletti, childhood nostalgia is a crucial fuel for the existence of these museums.[29]

Let us now take a look into a tiny museum located in Stockholm archipelago. This is the place (see pictures below) where Anders Franzén worked as an autodidact marine archaeologist from 1950. He died in 1993. Franzén detected several ship wrecks during his carrier as a marine archaeologist and in 1961 he was one of the managers during the salvage of a regal ship Vasa that sank in 1628. Franzén's cabin could be regarded as the cradle of the modern maritime heritage in Sweden, for without Franzén's achievements one of the most successful museums in Stockholm, the Vasa museum, would not exist. And without the Vasa ship, the crown jewel within the Swedish maritime heritage, the narrative of the Swedish naval exploits would be far less tangible. Both the Vasa ship's so-called majestic materiality and Franzén's seemingly heroic achievements underline a core element in Swedish popular history, that the Swedish fleet once ruled the waves of the Baltic Sea.

However, almost nothing in and around Franzén's museum refer to this grandiose naval history. Instead the interior of the cabin conveys an atmosphere and the aesthetics of a boy's bedroom from roughly the middle of the 20th century.

The single room cabin is cosy and playfully overloaded with all sorts of paraphernalia: maps, souvenirs, archaic weapons, modern shell cases, posters, flags, toy models, figurines, a human skull, all sorts of badges, a bunk bed etc. Very little here indicates that Franzén was a crucial agent in the construction of an imposing Swedish national maritime history. The room conveys a feeling of privacy.



The dimensions are almost cosy. The decoration and furnishing look boyish.

Just outside the cabin at a jetty lies a boat that is used for ship wreck tours. In this part of the archipelago there are many wrecks. A customs office resided here from 1636 to 1927. This resulted in busy shipping traffic and obviously a lot of losses of ships. The tours have been running for a couple of years. There are basically two types of tours: the cheaper one consists of a trip to locations where wrecks lie on the sea bottom. The passengers watch films from the wrecks, filmed by divers, and a recorded voice inform the passengers about the story of the wrecks. The person telling

Two glimpses (p. 193 and 194) of the interior from Anders Franzén's museum. Photos by: Christian Widholm

the stories, Herman Lindqvist, is a famous amateur historian (at least in Sweden), known for his ability to dramatize bygone days. The more expensive tour includes an ROV-vehicle that films the wrecks live.

I have interviewed one of the managers of the ship wreck tours who is also the curator of the Franzén museum. He is actually the director of most of the touristic attractions at this destination. He runs a tourist centre that resides in an old customs house that is protected by the Swedish National Heritage Board. There is also an exhibition in the house that displays how this community looked like roughly one hundred years ago. The rent is paid by the municipality and the two employed get their salary from the jobcentre. The manager that I interviewed is in his late 60s. He is a full-blown entrepreneur with a neo-liberal perspective on business and politics. At the same time, he appears very conservative. He dislikes the traces of modernization at this seaside destination, e.g. concrete piers and the petrol station, probably from the 1950s to the 70s. Thus, he wants to restore the place to what it looked like during the seemingly picturesque late 19th century.

As an obvious point of reference the Vasa ship was mentioned a few times during the interview. Rather spontaneous, however, without me asking about his childhood, he told me that he recalled how thrilled he was, as a boy, when he watched the live television broadcast of the salvage of the Vasa ship in 1961. But at the same time as this childhood memory probably is nurtured here, at the Swedish Mecca of ship wrecks, he appeared to forcefully distance himself from anything that could be regarded as childish. He told me that he was dissatisfied with the first recording of the narrative that passengers listen to during the ship wreck tours. I assume that the famous amateur historian overdramatized during the recording, it is his distinguishing-mark, the informant touched

upon this, and he said – obviously meaning that overdramatizing is childish – that he did not want the ship wreck tours to resemble "Bolibompa", which is a tv-show for small children that has been broadcasted for more than two decades in Sweden.

Another maritime heritage stakeholder in the Stockholm area is Martin Eriksson. He is a well-known face in Sweden because of his former carrier as the rather successful pop-singer E-type. Eriksson is an entrepreneur in what we might call the Viking business. He is the owner of the Viking restaurant "Aifur" in the tourist dense Old Town of Stockholm and a former owner of a Viking shop, "Aifur's plunder", which also was located in the Old Town. Both the restaurant and the shop appear as seemingly serious enterprises with an ambition to uphold a healthy distance to so-called false interpretations of the Viking world.[30]

On the homepage of the restaurant it is stated that: "Aifur Restaurant & Bar is named after the legendary Viking ship Aifur and the result of 15 years of accumulated knowledge and research about life, food and culture from the years 700–1100, merged with skilled and knowledgeable staff".[31] The ambition to live up to rigid authenticity standards was also made salient in a newspaper interview about the shop "Aifur's plunder" when it opened in 2013: "There is too much knick-knack [in the Old Town], there are plastic Viking helmets, clown Vikings, t-shirts with misspelled texts and moose motifs. This is rubbish, nothing more nothing less. [But my shop] is a serious Viking shop".[32] Among other objects, the shop sold replicas of objects displayed at the National History Museum in Stockholm and the cutlery that is used in the restaurant "Aifur".[33] The shop was, however, closed down one year after it opened, in spite of the rigid authenticity standards.

Even though the business is presented as serious it also appears to be somewhat playful, even boyish. For example, in the photo

gallery of the restaurant's homepage there are both conventional, and seemingly serious, pictures of the restaurant interior and pictures of playful adult men dressed and armed as Vikings. Another childhood element is memories of childhood that seem to have been an important incentive for the Eriksson's Viking interpretations:

> If you understand [the Viking island] Birka you also understand [the lake] Mälaren [where the island is located] and Sweden's history, but you can't ever understand it fully. I've returned to Birka every summer since I was a child and I'm still surprised [when I get there]. My Mother was a history teacher, daddy wrote books and we went to this place every summer, in our old sailing boat. To go for walks, then my parents told me stories, and just to lay on the deck, enjoying the sunshine and read books. Birka is relaxation at the same time as it is a monument.[34]

Then the third heritage stakeholder. This real enthusiast is in his 70s with a character that differs a lot from Eriksson's personae. He is involved in the development of a heritage project in the outer parts of the archipelago. The project which still is in a planning phase aims to construct a heritage centre that will be more than a tourist attraction. The plan is to erect a building that can be used for education, research and tourism experiences. The prospectus (which I will not reveal the source of for the sake of anonymity) says that the centre will be

> a knowledge centre for [the island] and the Baltic Sea. It will make the maritime heritage visible and accessible at

> the place where it actually happened. It will be a place for tourists to experience and to be inspired; a place for high school pupils to learn and to understand; and a place for researchers to create knowledge.

Every part of the project appears sincere and the architect drawings depict a rather vast but tasteful building with a discreet exterior that blends in with the surroundings. The project has received funds from the Swedish National Heritage Board but the informant told me that more funds are needed and that both public and private financiers will be contacted. During the interview this heritage entrepreneur touched upon the problem of selfishness, gentrification and privatizations which he thought is widespread today. He implied that these evils threaten a dynamic archipelago and also his project. He is a member of an association that has published opinion letters to the local press. The association wants the Swedish state to remain as the land owner of the island where the project is located and where the informant has a cottage. Consequently, they oppose another association and the municipality in favour of the privatization of the island. In a letter to the press the informant and his peers express concern for the island's future. They fear the process of privatizations seen in other parts of the archipelago where deserted islands, according to the letter, only awakens three weeks of the year when cottage owners return to their "summer paradise" with signs stating "private property". And the letter ends with a question to their antagonists: "Is this what you call a living archipelago?"

During the interview the informant mentioned his seemingly idyllic childhood summers on the island. He said that he used to operate pilot boats and that he collected weather data for the Swedish National Weather Institute (probably he was in his late teens by

then). He also told me how his newly renovated cottage looked like when he was a child and that his father erected the house.

Childhood – an innocent trump card?

There is certainly a fair amount of playfulness within Martin Eriksson's Viking interpretations. However, there is also a common relation to serious facts in all the enterprises presented above. The rigid fact standards connects to the new wave in Sweden of popular interest in history that the historian Samuel Edquist has analysed. This popular interest in history puts facts in the forefront. Thus, the motto seems to be that real history has to do with facts, not theory and problematizations – if professional historians wants to deal with that it is up to them. In addition, Edquist says, the popular interest is characterized by the traits of an older version of schoolbook history with a weakness for monarchs and war.[35] The heritage practices' obsession with facts could be understood as a business that wants to be regarded as serious and rational, or the opposite of anything that might as childish. But, then, what about the references to childhood?

Memories of and notions about childhood are represented in several ways in the examples above. To some extent they resonate of the theoretical perspectives stating that heritage is a quest for safety and stability, and also, that it can be an expression the seemingly personal and genuine, thus a-political.

The setting for the enterprises in this study could not be seen as a context in flux. But perhaps it would be possible to place them within a framework of prolonged social transformations. In the empirical examples we can trace both outright and implicit critique of these transformations: One of the informants thinks that the infrastructure of the latter half of the 20th century, even though

it can be regarded as rather old by now, is ugly at the destination of his tourism business and instead he wants to promote the picture of the supposedly picturesque society from the turn of the 20th century. This informant's opinions sometimes appear as disguised expressions of rather salient political views. Implicitly, this informant also criticises the so-called radical history writing and heritage practices of the 1970s when the age of Greater Sweden during the 17th century was devalued and the society of the turn of the 20th century was presented as a highly unequal class society.[36]

Another informant criticizes privatizations and gentrifications of the archipelago, which to some extent are results of demilitarization in the region and a general tendency among politicians and associations of the civil society to advocate the sell-out of public resources. The same informant, paradoxically, seems to lay claim to the island as his own, since it was here he spent a good deal of his upbringing. He knows the island and do not want anyone to change the surroundings, apart from himself. The house his father built has been enlarged and modernized and now he wants to erect a heritage centre that, even though it looks inconspicuous in the architect drawings, probably will stand out in the small scale village on the island. And the entrepreneur in the Viking business oppose turistification of the Old Town in Stockholm, i.e. the commodification of the past, especially the age of the Vikings. The decay of poor copies for sale in the Old Town is contrasted to his genuinely personal memories of an idyllic childhood on the Viking island Birka.

The Viking entrepreneur's memories of a commitment in the world of Vikings already during his childhood resemble a quality hallmark of the knowledge he produces today about the Vikings. The childhood references are a naturalization of that knowledge. Thus, in front of a backdrop of childhood innocence disapproval

of contemporary matters (e.g. mass tourism and commercialism) is expressed at ease. A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the wreck tour administrator. His sometimes overt political views are toned down when the childhood trump card is flagged and his determined opinions of contemporary society are endowed by a touch of a-political innocence. At the same time, it is important to uphold a distance to anything that could been seen as childish – the heritage business is a serious matter.

At this stage I would like to remind of the unconscious dimension. To treat the childhood references as conscious strategies for the benefit of one's particular perspective on the past, present and future is not fertile. Rather, it is probably a bit more productive to treat the references as culturally constructed knee-jerks and conventions. And a possible political content in the childhood references should be regarded as side-effects.

The heritage entrepreneurs in this study represent a common tone that resonates of memories of and notions about childhood. Their childhood representations are not universal since it originates from the boys' bedroom. And it is probably through an analysis of this childhood discourse that it is possible to understand the reasons for the protection of Franzén's cabin. Assuredly the cabin seems to be a formidable display of authenticity, an alluring circumstance for fact freaks, but the cabin is also a materialization of the common tone that helps recalling a particular childhood. The tone may be vague, but it will easily seep through the cracks of the official heritage discourses[37] about everyone's right to their heritage and socio-economic arguments on regional development.

From this limited study it may not be possible to determine whether the childhood references are parts of an impetus for the heritage entrepreneurs. However, it is likely that the references

make up of a tone, or an emotional register, which influences the heritage enterprises.[38] The references can be regarded as idiosyncratic. But to dismiss their importance as such would be a mistake since it is their idiosyncratic qualities that make them potent. As expressions of something personal they tend not to be seen as formulated from a system of systematic ideas. As idiosyncrasies, they will probably not be questioned or even noticed, since the childhood usually is looked upon as an element of the individual, which makes it immune to the perpetual signifying contests on a collective level in a given culture. Consequently, we tend to regard childhood as a-political.

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NOTES

1 See e.g. Frans, F. J. Schouten, "Heritage as Historical Reality," in *Heritage, Tourism and Society,* ed. David Herbert (London: Mansell, 1995); David Lowenthal, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

2 Sabine Marschall, "Personal memory and a wider exploration of the tourism-memory nexus," *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change* 10:4 (2012).
3 Brian Graham and Peter Howard, "Introduction: Heritage and Identity," in *The Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity*, ed. Brian Graham & Peter Howard (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Schouten, "Heritage as Historical Reality".
4 The ethnographical approach is inspired by Carina Sjöholm's method in her article "Jakten på regional tillväxt," *Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidskrift* 16 (2013).
5 Lowentahl, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, 63.
6 Lars-Erik Jönsson, Anna Wallette, and Jes Weinberg, *Kanon och kulturarv: historia och samtid i Danmark och Sverige*, (Göteborg: Makadam in collaboration with Centrum för Danmarksstudier, 2008), 9.
7 See e.g., Birgitta Svensson, "På naturliga äventyr i kulturarvet," in *Nonstop! Turist i upplevelseindustrialismen*, ed. Tom O'Dell (Falun: Historiska media, 1999); Lotta Braunerhielm, *Plats för kulturarv och turism*. Grythyttan: *en fallstudie av upplevelser, värderingar och intressen* (Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2006).
8 See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P, 1983).
9 Peter Aronsson, "Historiebrukets ekologi," in *Astrid Lindgrens världar. En studie om kulturarv och samhällsutveckling*, ed. Leif Jonsson, Leif (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2013), 107pp.
10 Lowentahl, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, 9–11.
11 Lowentahl, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, 121.
12 Bella Dicks, *Heritage, place, and community* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 60. A similar perspective can be found in Svensson, "På naturliga äventyr i kulturarvet," 123.
13 Lowenthal is certainly not an advocate of heritage. See *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, 122: "To vilify heritage as biased is […] futile: bias is the main point of heritage. Prejudiced pride in the past is not a sorry consequence of heritage; it is its essential purpose."
14 Laurajane Smith, *Uses of heritage*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2, 3, 11 and 12.
15 Besides Smith's *Uses of Heritage* this perspective is found in Lowenthal, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*; Svensson, "På naturliga äventyr i kulturarvet"; Aronsson, "Historiebrukets ekologi," just to mention a few works.
16 Smith, *Uses of heritage*, 4.
17 Smith, *Uses of heritage*, 11–12; 48.
18 Smith, *Uses of heritage*, 53.
19 Adam Muller, "Notes toward a theory of Nostalgia: Childhood and the evocation of the past in two European 'heritage' films," *New Literary History* 37: 4, (2006).

20 Svetlana Boym, *The future of nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), xiv.
21 Boym, *The future of nostalgia*, 8, 41–49.
22 Joe Moran, "Childhood and Nostalgia in Contemporary Culture," *European Journal of Culture Studies* 5:2 (2002), 157.
23 Raphael Samuel, *Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture* (London: Verso, 2012), 93.
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25 Moran, "Childhood and Nostalgia in Contemporary Culture," 157–158.
26 Lowenthal, *Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History,* 4.
27 Beate Feldmann Eellend, *Visionära planer och vardagliga praktiker: postmilitära landskap i Östersjöområdet* (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2013), 34–57.
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35 Edquist, Samuel, "Bilar, herrgårdar och krig," *Historisk tidskrift*, 131:4 (2011), 777–778.
36 For a discussion on history and the radical 1970s see Peter Aronsson, *Historiebruk: att använda det förflutna* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004), 146pp. and 169.
37 C.f. the concept of "structure of feeling" in Raymond Williams, *Marxism and literature* (Oxford: Oxford U.P, 1977), 132.
38 C.f. Barbara Rosenwein's concept of "emotional community". Rosenwein says that this community is a group in which people have a common stake, interests, values and goals. The goals etc. are reached through representations of emotion with-

in in a system of norms and conventions. The childhood references in my study can be treated as conventions. There are also interesting norms about childhood, paradoxically a norm saying that you should not appear as childish. See Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (New York: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006), 24–29.

Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer

En teori om Norden i et civilisationshistorisk perspektiv

Jørgen Elsøe Jensen

Introduktion

I denne artikel redegør jeg for en ny teori om civilisationsfænomenet. Udgangspunktet er en konstatering af, hvad der i fællesskab karakteriserer menneskers situation i de såkaldte civilisationer, som er et liv i afhængighed af omfordelingssystemer. Dem findes der to forskellige af, og dermed også to forskellige civilisationsformer. For at teorien kan blive konsistent, må man fastlægge betydningen af de centrale begreber, som er omdiskuterede, og hvordan og de står i forbindelse med hinanden. På det eksterne niveau for forklaring optræder civilisationsfænomenet i en fødestrategisk og økonomisk-biologisk kontekst, hvor i menneskets natur og de biologiske rammer om livet har en final betydning. Den større hensigt er at beskrive og forstå de sociale relationer, der knytter sig til civilisationsformerne og samtidigt forstå, hvorfor de er så varige. Det korte svar er, at civilisationsformerne er en konsekvens af to nyere generelle fødestrategier, som bygger på hver sin grundlæggende indstilling for kooperativ adfærd i menneskets natur: Den ene bygger på slægtningefavorisering, mens den anden bygger på reciprok altruisme. En sådan sammenkobling af civilisationsfæ-

nomenet med vilkårene for livet er en mulighed, som har åbnet sig med de nye videnskaber om livet og om menneskets natur og adfærd.

I den kognitive niche

Føde er grundlaget for, at alt liv kan opretholdes, og udnyttelsen af eksistensmulighederne i et økosystem er selve selektionsfilteret i den naturlige evolution. Ad den vej er der opstået et væld af forskellige arter og fødestrategier. For mennesket og dets hominine forgængeres vedkommende er Tooby og DeVores tese fra 1987 for længst accepteret.[1] Teorien går ud på, at allerede for 6-10 mio. år siden begyndte de at indtage den såkaldte kognitive niche i Jordens økosystemer. En biologisk niche defineres som den eksistensmulighed en organisme udnytter i et økosystem, og den kognitive tilføjelse udvider blot betydningen til også at omfatte den aktivitet, som gør det muligt for en organisme at eliminere andre organismers fikserede forsvar ved dels at forstå, hvad der er årsag og virkning, og dels ved kooperativ handling.[2] Til det anvender homininerne deres evne til at danne mentale modeller af omverdenen gennem en intuitiv forståelse af fysik, biologi og psykologi.[3]

Det er lykkedes for homininerne at sammenfatte deres spredte erfaringer i tre generelle fødestrategier og gennem tiden at udnytte deres potentialer i Jordens mangfoldighed af økologiske nicher og skiftende naturgivne og selvskabte muligheder. Den slags fødestrategier, som ikke er et resultat af naturlig evolution, men af erindring om erfaringer, kræver altid nye institutioner for at fungere, idet institutioner betegner det sæt af regler og normer for adfærd, der skal til for at et omfordelingssystem kan fungere. Det er med evnen til at tilpasse sin adfærd til sine egne fødestrategiers institutionelle krav, at homininerne har påført sig biologisk, social

og kognitiv evolution, men det er foregået inden for rammerne af deres temmelig fikserede natur, som lægger rammerne for social kooperation.

Den ældste af disse generelle strategier er ibrugtagningen af ild til madlavning for o. 1.8 mio. år siden. Det er Richard Wranghams fascinerende teori, at ild til madlavning ikke alene ændrede fordøjelsessystemet og igangsatte en hastig udvikling af hjernen, men også fastlagde en varig mand-kvinderelation som et grundlag for arbejds- og omfordeling.[4] Denne strategi er så gammel, at en lang række af dens følger for længst har fæstnet sig i arvemassen. De to efterfølgende fødestrategier er derimod nye og forbundet med det fænomen, vi kalder civilisation.

Om civilisation og civilisationer

Civilisation er et vanskeligt begreb, fordi det er blevet tillagt en vilkårlighed af betydninger siden fremkomsten under 1700-årenes borgerlige revolution. Dermed er det blevet umuligt at fastlæggende et betydningsindhold, som alle kan tilslutte sig.[5] Fraværet af en leksikal enhedsbetydning gør begrebet uanvendeligt i en videnskabelig sammenhæng med mindre meningsindholdet præciseres i den aktuelle kontekst.[6] Det er en forudsætning for at opstille en konsistent teori om civilisationsfænomenet.

Civilisationer forstået som samfund med højere organisationsformer er blevet studeret siden 1800-årene, men det har hele tiden været omdiskuteret, hvilke kriterier der må gælder for at udpege dem. På deres hjemmeside oplister ISCSC (International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations) omkring 30 anerkendte og forskellige og antyder dermed samtidig, at der findes mange flere. I 1969 gav Norman Cantor denne fælles karakteristik, som er almindelig accepteret, i det mindste i den angelsaksiske forsker-

verden. Civilisation betegner: "the functioning, integrated system of ideas and institutions that constitute the whole way of life and thought of a society over an extended period of time." Videre hedder det hos Cantor, at civilisationer adskiller sig fra primitive kulturer i kraft af "… coherent ideas expressed in written form, and institutions that allow for a complex organization and vocational specialization in the society".[7] En sådan deskriptiv karakteristik afgrænser en mængde, men den er uanvendelig til at kategorisere tilfældene i sammenlignelige grupper efter deres økonomiske og institutionelle fællesskaber, og den er også uanvendelig til at forklare fænomenet. Udpegning af en mængde fungerer som det første nødvendige skridt, før en analyse af et materiale kan foregå.

Civilisationsfænomenet kan selvfølgelig studeres på samme måde som alle andre historiske fænomener; det har blot en større tidslig og rumlig skala. Derfor adskiller en empirisk funderet teori om civilisation sig ikke fra andre lignende teoribygninger. De er blot helhedsopfattelser, som fastlægger betydningen af de centrale begreber, og hvordan og på hvilke abstraktionsniveauer de står i forbindelse med hinanden. Empirisk funderede teorier er imidlertid deskriptive og statiske og må nødvendigvis betjene sig af et eksternt forklaringsniveau, som kan redegøre for den skabende dynamik. På det niveau er det evnen til at regulere sin adfærd for at opnå biologiske fordele af nye fødestrategier, som tiltrækker sig opmærksomhed. Civilisationsfænomenet må betragtes som et led i menneskets og dets forgængeres lange historiske rejse gennem selvpåført institutionel evolution i den hensigt at skaffe sig biologiske fordele af nye generelle fødestrategier. Det ligger i direkte forlængelse af Annalesskolen, hvis medlemmer for længst har peget på, at en forklaring på civilisationsfænomenet kun kan gives ved at inddrage alle andre relevante videnskaber. Målet for dem var et integreret historiefag, ikke et isoleret.[8]

Min teori om civilisation tager udgangspunkt i en simpel iagttagelse om den mængde, der almindeligvis betegnes som civilisationer. I dem befinder mennesker sig en bestemt situation – at leve i afhængighed af fungerende omfordelingssystemer for skabte værdier. Jeg reserverer begrebet *civilisation* til at betegne selve livssituationen, som er et *conditio sine qua non* for civilisationsfænomenet, mens *civilisationer* betegner den mængde af fortidige og nutidige samfundskonstruktioner, som fødestrategierne kommer til udtryk i. *Situation*, forstået som generel fødestrategi, institutionel tilpasning og social samværsform, er forudsætningen for *eksistens*. Afskeden med selvforsyningsevnen træder dermed frem som den centrale begivenhed, og den vigtigste opgave i al civilisationshistorie består i at beskrive og forklare det komplicerede samspil af forudsætninger og omstændigheder, som førte til afskeden og realiseringen af et liv i afhængighed.

Civilisationsformerne

Afskeden er taget i to forskellige historiske sammenhænge, og selv om den førte til den samme afhængighed af et omfordelingssystem, så adskiller de bagvedliggende strategier sig grundlæggende fra hinanden. I den ældste har et segment fravalgt selvforsyningsevnen for i stedet at tage sig til rette af det, andre har produceret (*klassisk civilisation*), i den yngste måtte geografisk adskilte producentgrupper samarbejde om at producere og udveksle nødvendighedsartikler til livets opretholdelse på et udviklet plan (*vestlig civilisation*).

Den klassiske strategi knytter sig indirekte til det primitive jordbrug, som begyndte at udvikle sig i Den Frugtbare Halvmåne for 10.000-13.000 år siden. De primitive jordbrugeres mere effektive økonomi fik den konsekvens, at befolkningskoncentrationen i

særlig frugtbare områder steg så meget, at den spontane sociale kontrol begyndte at svigte.[9] Det trak en rivalisering om ressourcerne med sig og åbnede en mulighed for, at eliter af krigere og trosforvaltere kunne skille sig ud som et autoritært segment, der betjener sig af tvang som et middel til at ekstrahere værdier til sig selv.[10] Afhængigheden er kun til fordel for dem, som tiltager sig magt til at opkræve og har midlerne til betale et tjenerskab for at gennemføre den, mens de udbyttede påtvinges et tab. Al klassisk civilisation er fast forankret i denne arkaiske økonomi, der kan bredes ud over enhver form for produktion, således også den, der er bærer af den vestlige civilisationsform. For den klassiske fødestrategi er det derfor uden betydning, hvordan produktionen foregår eller hvilket naturgrundlag, der udnyttes; klassiske civilisationers fællesnævner er alene ekstraktionen af værdier og det socialpolitisk ulige forhold mellem mennesker, som Eric R. Wolf allerede anførte i 1966.[11] Det er en relation, der hersker mellem vogtere og deres kreaturer.

Den elitære udbytning indvirker altid alvorligt på det menneskelige miljø i elitære samfund. Eliter ser med foragt på dem, de udbytter, og de forsøger på alle måder at fastholde dem i en underordnet socialpolitiske situation, så de bliver ude af stand til at agere politisk. Set fra deres synspunkt er den producerende del af befolkningen undergivne, man må holde i ave og skille sig ud fra – i rigdom, klædedragt, manerer, lokalisering. De mentale konsekvenser for de udbyttede er om end endnu mere fatale. De befinder sig i et fjendtligt socialt miljø, som præges af konstant undertrykkelse og vilkårlighed. Det trækker dybe skygger af mistillid og misantropi ind i deres sindstilstand. Det dystre mentale landskab medvirker i høj grad til at gøre elitære samfund dysfunktionelle og økonomisk tilbagestående, præget som de er af vold, undertrykkelse og stærke sociale skel.[12]

Den vestlige strategi bygger derimod på samarbejde mellem geografisk adskilte, men gensidigt afhængige producenter, der udnytter hver sin naturressource og udveksler deres produktion af nødvendighedsvarer over et marked. Denne strategi er integreret i det jernforbrugende plovbrug, der udbredte sig i det transalpine Nordvesteuropa i 1000- og især i 1100-årene.[13] Plovbruget var i og for sig blot en udvidelse af det samarbejde, almindelige mennesker altid har praktiseret, men på det langt mere sofistikerede plan, som markedet tillod. De, der betjener sig af denne fødestrategi, har overlevelse som primært sigte. Derfor udveksler de ligeværdige arbejdsværdier og deres samfund bliver ofte egalitære og demokratiske.[14] Den gensidige afhængighed er civilisationsformens domesticerende element, for de involverede må nødvendigvis tilpasse deres adfærd til de institutioner, der er nødvendige for funktionaliteten af det økonomiske arrangement. Vestlig civilisation præges tilsvarende af moralske og tillidsskabende fællesskaber, der værner sig mod fribyttere. De økonomiske og biologiske fordele var gennemgribende. Karl Polanyi beskrev allerede i 1944 forskellene på de to omfordelingssystemer.[15]

Konsekvenserne af fødestrategier

Det civiliserede menneske må nødvendigvis tilpasse sin adfærd til den fødestrategi, som opretholder den afhængige livssituation. De tilhørende institutioner drejer sig kort og godt om at undgå et sammenbrud for den fordelagtige økonomi og udnytte dens potentialer inden for den givne ramme af økologiske og historiske omstændigheder. Derfor er de institutionelle miljøer lige så varige, som fødestrategierne. Det er med evnen til institutionel tilpasning af sin adfærd, at homininerne har opnået biologisk succes og samtidig modelleret på sig selv, fordi kravet om tilpasning selekterer

de fra, der ikke har den nødvendige kognitive og sociale kapacitet. Resultatet kan med tiden fæstne sig som arveligt betingede egenskaber, men menneskets to civilisationsbærende fødestrategier har udviklet sig inden for de sidste 6-10.000 år, så tilpasningen findes udelukkende på et institutionelt niveau.

Det er fødestrategierne, som er civilisationsformernes varige grundlag, og det er den sociale, mentale og kognitive tilpasning, som er de varige følger. Derfor følger de to civilisationsformer hver sit karakteristiske og ret ufravigelige spor og vil gøre det, så længe de to fødestrategier eksisterer. Denne identifikation af det varige har vidtrækkende konsekvenser for historiefaget, hvor der findes en stærk tradition for at fortolke den historiske udvikling som en konsekvens af tilfældigheder. De spiller imidlertid en underordnet rolle i forhold til det varige. Mennesket kan ikke undslippe de krav, deres fødestrategier konfronterer dem med, men fordi de udspringer i de to meget forskellige grundindstillinger for social samarbejde i menneskets natur, altså slægtningefavorisering[16] og reciprok altruisme,[17] selekterer de for vidt forskellige menneskelige egenskaber. De civilisationsbærende fødestrategier renskærer to menneskelige arketyper.

Det er usædvanligt, at der inden for den samme art har udviklet sig et segment, hvis grådighed og rovdyradfærd vender sig mod en bred mængde af artsfæller, og det er måske lige så usædvanligt, at en bred mængde har fundet sammen i et fællesskab om overlevelsen, men endnu ikke udviklet et effektivt værn mod sine udbyttere. Fødestrategier tjener imidlertid et mål i den naturlige verden, ikke et kvalitativt. Mennesket skaber selv sine adfærdsmiljøer på grundlag af den nedarvede natur og den adfærdsmæssige selektion, som fødestrategierne kræver for at kunne fungere. Set fra den synsvinkel er institutionel selektion og historie et artsspecifikt fænomen, der knytter sig direkte til vilkårene for livet, til

mulighederne i den kognitive niche og til grundindstillinger og basale kategorier i menneskets natur.

Som det blandt andet er blevet påpeget at Francis Fukuyama har den klassiske strategi eksisteret gennem adskillige årtusinder, og de mange kendte former for institutionalisering af magten er kun et udtryk for, at den denne fødestrategi har haft tid til at udvikle en bred vifte af organiserede tvangsmidler til at sikre ekstraktionen og bekrige indre og ydre fjender.[18] Ikke desto mindre så er disse forskelle at regne for variationer og repetitioner over det samme fødestrategiske grundtema, så de er blot et udtryk for den kreative indpasning af en arkaisk og elitær økonomi i mangfoldigheden af Jordens historiske og naturgivne miljøer. Den vestlige civilisationsform har kun eksisteret i ca. 900 år, og den var oprindelig kun udbredt i et ganske lille hjørne af verden, fordi plovbruget var afgrænset af de naturgivne forhold, men til gengæld udbredt blandt en stor gruppe af mennesker. Den eksisterede som en geografisk isoleret fødestrategi, der lige som alle mulige andre måder at producere på kunne gøres til genstand for elitær udpresning. Desuden fandtes ekstraktionen som en mulighed i det varebytte, de gensidigt afhængige producenter måtte forlade deres overlevelse på. Det var den mulighed, der blev fristillet med den borgerlige revolution i 1700-årene. Moderne vestlig civilisation kan med rette betragtes som en hybrid af de to civilisationsformer.

Vestlig civilisation

Vestlig civilisation har sit ophav i det plovbrug, der udbredte sig i Nordvesteuropa i 1000- og især i 1100-årene med et tyngdepunkt ca. 1140-1170.[19] Overalt fra Loire i Frankrig til samtidens Danmark og fra England til ind i Østeuropa kom hjulploven i brug som det centrale markredskab, og omlæggelsesprocessen fortsatte indtil al

brugbar jord var lagt under plov hen mod overgangen til 1300-årene og nogle steder i det af germanere koloniserede Østeuropa endnu længere.[20] Plovbrug kræver en stenfri og fugtighedsbevarende jord, og markafgrøderne var klimafølsomme. Det satte grænserne for udbredelsen: Syd for Loire var det for varmt. Mod vest lå havet, og mod nord og mod øst var det for koldt og dyrkningssæsonen for kort. Plovbruget ebbede ud ved sine naturgivne og økologiske grænser.

Omlæggelsen til plovbrug bestod af en transformationsperiode og en ekspansionstid. Først flyttede de eksisterende landsbyer til egnede steder for opdyrkning, hvis det var nødvendigt. Dernæst flyttede nye generationer herfra ud i landskaberne til nye egnede steder for opdyrkning. Antallet af landsbyer steg, og befolkningerne voksede formentlig til mere end det tredobbelte gennem hele perioden indtil grænserne for vækst var nået. Gennem udbredelsestiden voksede agerjordens andel fra måske omkring 5% til hen mod 30% i datidens Danmark, hvis østlige del især blev stærkt opdyrket. Noget tilsvarende gjaldt overalt på de store nordvesteuropæiske agerbrugssletter. Hjulploven omstrukturerede agerbruget, som blev mere frugtbart, alt imens omlæggelsen åbnede for vækst i de tre klassiske produktionsfaktorer, kapital, jord og arbejde. Sammenhængen er enkel: Med hjulploven kunne langt større arealer tages ind til opdyrkning end med den gammeldags ard, og samtidig kunne brakperioderne nedsættes ved at overgå fra tovangsbrug (et års besåning, et års hvile) til trevangsbrug (to års besåning, et års hvile). De større marker og intensiveringen af driften trak betydelig mere arbejde ind i agerbruget.

Før udbredelsen kunne komme i gang, måtte man imidlertid først have løst et praktisk problem og overvinde en barriere fra fortiden. Det praktiske problem bestod i, at hvis man ville nyde fordelene af plovbrugets avancerede økonomi, måtte arbejdet de-

les efter ressourcernes naturlige forekomst. Hjulploven forbrugte nemlig store mængder af jern,[21] det slides ganske enkelt af de skærende jerndele ved gangen gennem jorden, og samtidens jern var slidsvagt og uhomogent på grund af fremstillingsmåden.[22] I lavlandene var skovene allerede trængt tilbage i århundrederne forinden.[23] Ofte var forekomsterne af malm til jernudvinding desuden af en dårlig kvalitet. Det store jernforbrug og ressourcernes geografiske fordeling medførte, at agerbrugerne på de store sletter allerede fra begyndelsen var ude af stand til selv at producere det nødvendige redskabsjern. Træ og malm fandtes til gengæld i de bjergrige randegne i det sydlige og østlige Frankrig, det vestlige og sydlige Tyskland, i det vestlige England og i Norge, Sverige og i Skånelandene. Her tog jernudvindingen stærkt til gennem 1000- og især i 1100-årene, viser en ny norsk undersøgelse.[24]

I plovbrug fungerer jern både som et effektivt skæremateriale og som et lager af energi, der forbruges under dyrkningsprocessen. Dets rolle kan forekomme os ubetydelig, men med omlæggelsen blev jern en økonomisk nøglefaktor, som overlevelsen afhang af. Den ene gruppe havde brug for jern til at producere mad, den anden havde brug for mad til at producere jern. Nogen måtte tage sig af udvekslingen mellem de geografisk adskilte, men gensidigt afhængige producenter. De slog sig ned sig, hvor to transportkorridorer mødtes, den ene fra det lokale opland, den anden fra vejene over havet. I udbredelsesperioden blev der anlagt mellem 4-5.000 nye handelsbyer i Nordvesteuropa. Markedsøkonomi blev til et omfordelingssystem for produktionsmidler og føde, som alles overlevelse afhang af. Inden for jernudvindingen gik en voldsom teknologiudvikling i gang styret af kapitalinteresser og magt (højovne, den indirekte metode), og også skibsteknologien kom under stærk udvikling.

Effekten var overvældende – massiv befolkningstilvækst, ud-

bredt markedsøkonomi, kooperativ adfærd, fredeligt samkvem og kristne fællesskaber. Processen fremstår i det ydre som markante og synkrone forandringer i det nordvesteuropæiske kulturlandskab – flytning af eksisterende landsbyer og udflytning herfra i mange nye, kirkebyggeri, især i det nyligt kristnede Sydskandinavien, nye åbne landskaber med overdrev og pløjede vange, nye handelsbyer og funktionel tilpasning til handel i de eksisterende, ny infrastruktur af veje mellem land og by og ruter over havet, og i de omliggende højlande jernovne og trækulsmiler. Lugten af jord og røg blandede sig med de visuelle indtryk af det nye kulturlandskab. Alle aspekter af den nye fødestrategi og det adfærdsregulerende miljø, der fulgte med, gav sig til kende, for kulturlandskaber er altid en orkestrering af de fremherskende relationer mellem mennesker og mellem mennesker og naturen.

Når overlevelsen afhænger af, at føde og produktionsmidler udveksles gennem et marked, er det nødvendigt at beskytte og sikre systemets funktionalitet ved at opbygge og vedligeholde økonomiske institutioner, der sigter på at eliminere egoistisk adfærd. Det drejede sig om at minimere transaktionsomkostningerne, som er det centrale element i alle økonomiske institutioner.[25] Det var den barriere, man måtte overvinde, og ikke en teknologisk, for plovbruget havde man kendt til i mindst 1000 år og jernudvinding endnu længere. Forudsætningen for det udbredte plovbrug var, at folk domesticerede sig og lærte at leve i fred. Samtidig åbnede det langt mere komplicerede jordbrug for, at bønder og købmænd kunne lagdele sig efter deres evner til at håndtere deres bedrift og for at planlægge, tale, regne og forhandle. Et lag af gårdmænd og købmænd skilte sig ud, deres større husstandsøkonomi gav dem en reproduktiv fordel frem for andre. Generation efter generation af deres afkom måtte stræbe efter at opnå de samme fordele, for der eksisterede stort set ingen muligheder for social avancement,

og det fremmede konkurrencen og støttede middelklasseværdier som at være arbejdsom og orientere sig, for de, der klarede sig bedst, fik også flest overlevende børn.[26] Der var en klar selektion for høj intelligens i en række vestlige samfund fra middelalderen og til ind mod midten af 1800-årene.[27] Plovbruget krævede med andre ord en investering i både fysisk kapital i form af henlæggelser i husholdningernes investeringsfonde til redskabsjern, bygninger, redskaber mv. og i social og human kapital i form af de færdigheder, som var nødvendige for at vedligeholde den fordelagtige fødestrategi. Det var en erobring, måske den vigtigste i menneskets historie, men den førte ikke til et effektivt værn mod elitær udbytning.

Forudsætningerne og konsekvenserne

I og for sig bestod forskellen mellem primitiv og højere jordbrug blot i skalaen af de adfærdskrav, som hørte til. De primitive jordbrugere opgav ikke selvforsyningsevnen, og deres fødestrategi gav som sådan ikke anledning til civilisation, men deres arbejde krævede, at de domesticerede sig og både akkumulerede social og human kapital. Det nordvesteuropæiske plovbrug krævede en endnu højere grad af domesticering og udviklingen af sociale, kognitive og intellektuelle færdigheder, fordi det er forudsætningen for, at fødestrategiens omfordelingssystem kan fungere. Plovbrug udbredte sig i et område af verden, hvor økonomisk fordel af sofistikeret kooperation mellem fremmede kunne få fodfæste. De mange forudsætninger opstod i hver deres kontekst, men skabte på et tidspunkt og i en geografisk ramme det miljø, som fremmede evnen for social kooperation mellem fremmede, der er en grundindstilling i menneskets natur. Plovbruget var en generel fødestrategi, der forudsatte adfærdsmæssig tilpasning til de tilhø-

rende institutioner. Det er det redskab, mennesker må tage i brug for at opnå økonomiske fordele af nye generelle fødestrategier. Set fra den synsvinkel var Nordvesteuropas bønder og jernudvindere Jordens første civiliserede almue.

Alle plovbrugets tekniske og driftsmæssige forudsætninger var udviklet gennem et årtusinde forinden af de primitive jordbrugere selv, mens alle de øvrige forudsætninger i form af et marked, infrastrukturer, handelspladser, omsætningsmidler og ejendomsret knyttede sig til de elitære behov. Plovbrugets udbredelse er utænkelig uden eksistensen af klassiske civilisationer i denne del af verden, som desuden udviklede sig i en særlig retning, fordi den katolske kirke i høj grad medvirkede til den individualisering, som førte til en kapitalisering af det ejede, og til den ejendomsret, der er et særkende for Europa.[28] Handel har eksisteret i alle elitære samfund, fordi eliter skiller sig ud gennem et demonstrativt forbrug. Men der er en grundlæggende forskel på, om det, der handles med, er nødvendigt for livets opretholdelse eller til socialt forbrug, om det er produktionsmidler og føde på den ene side eller husgeråd, våben og luksusgenstande på den anden.

Med plovbruget blev fødeproduktionen afhængig af at forbruge et lager af kulstof, som er bundet i et oparbejdet råstof. Vestlig civilisation indskriver sig i den lange historie om, hvordan mennesket og dets hominine forgængere har evnet at bruge ild som et middel til biologisk succes og tilpasset sin sociale adfærd som en konsekvens. Denne erfaring med en energiforbrugende produktion var derfor temmelig uproblematisk at bygge videre på, da lejligheden bød sig flere århundrede senere, det historiske forløb frem til denne hændelse i øvrigt ufortalt. Der fandtes et økonomisk potentiale i at forene de sameksisterende civilisationsbærende fødestrategier, men deres institutioner er moralsk uforenelige. I opposition til den traditionelle elite greb det vesteuropæiske borgerskab om

produktionen og tilpassede plovbrugets institutionelle grundlag til den variant af en ekstraktiv økonomi, som køb og salg via et marked åbnede for. Siden spredte denne hybrid af to civilisationsformer sig til andre områder på Jorden med elitære samfund. Det har givet anledning til en forbløffende syvdobling af Jordens befolkning i de 200 år mellem 1800 og 2000.[29] Samtidig genererede forbruget af nye lagre af ekstern energi og de teknologiske krav i produktionen til arbejdskraftens uddannelse og udviklingen af samfund med visse egalitære træk, men langt fra så markant som inden for det oprindelige plovbrugsområde, hvor traditionen for kooperation mellem fremmede er ældst. Vestlig civilisationsform findes imidlertid ingen steder i rendyrkede udgaver, og den klassiske måde at tilegne sig værdier står som den moderne verdens centrale politiske problem.

Konklusion

Plovbrug bredte sig ikke længere nord på end til datidens Danmark. Samtidens Norge og Sverige lå uden for det område, som kunne opdyrkes med hjulplov. Til gengæld fik jernudvindingen en stor betydning, først i det sydlige Norge, og allerede fra 1200-årene især i Sverige på grund af de særlige gunstige ressourcer i Mellemsverige.[30] Med plovbrugets udbredelse i datidens Danmark og den stærkt tiltagende jernudvinding i de skandinaviske egne trådte folk i Norden ind i et nyt civilisatorisk fællesskab. Det knyttede dem meget tættere sammen og forbandt dem med de øvrige regioner i Nordvesteuropa med et tilsvarende institutionsgrundlag. Det ændrede sig ikke substantielt, da den økonomiske vækst, som plovbruget genererede, gik i stå hen mod overgangen til 1300-årene. Det kunne ikke svare sig at opdyrke mere jord, for der måtte være en balance mellem markjorder og græsgange af hensyn til

markjordenes gødningstilstand. Fødselsraten kom igen i balance med dødsraten. Pest blev bragt til verdensdelen i midten af 1300-årene og var her i 300-400 år, og det entreprenante borgerskab havde vanskeligheder med at organisere sig under den elitære undertrykkelse før i 1600-1700-årene. Det borgerlige oprør hvilede på det, der var skabt i 1100-årene, både af produktionsformer, infrastruktur, handel og menneskelige egenskaber. Endnu i dag giver grænserne for udbredelsesområdet sig til kende som et skel mellem demokratiske og autoritære traditioner, mellem mennesker der lever i tillid, og mennesker der lever i skyggen af eliter.

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