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To Whom It May Concern

Henrik Jøker Bjerre

Dear! Receive this dedication; it is given as if blindly, but therefore also undisturbed by any consideration, in honesty! Who you are, I do not know; where you are, I do not know; what your name is, I do not know. And yet you are my hope, my joy, my pride, in ignorance my honour. (SKS 16: 85).

To whom do you think he is writing? For me it is always more important to know that than to know what is being written; moreover I think it amounts to the same, to the other finally. (Derrida: 17).

Søren Kierkegaard's writing has a peculiar status within the field of academic philosophy, especially in his homeland. On the one hand, he is the only really noteworthy philosophical author, Denmark has ever produced, on the other hand, he is, strange as it may sound, rarely treated as a philosopher at all. Most of the scholarship on Kierkegaard is either focusing on his religious and theological ambitions, or dissecting the intricate and highly elaborated poetological reflections that inform the oeuvre. In France, the more literarily informed philosophy of the 20th century has made some use of Kierkegaard, just as he has of course had some reception in existentialist and ethical thinking, but it is a rare exception, when an academic philosopher like James Conant (Conant 1996) is directly addressing the otherwise obvious question of the 'point of view of the authorship' and the implications *for philosophy* of Kierkegaard's relation to his writing and to his reader. (We will therefore return to Conant in the following). The lukewarm celebration among Danish philosophers of his 200th anniversary in 2013 symptomatically emphasized this ambivalence. ('He was not a real philosopher', as it was tellingly summarized in an article in the daily Information from March 2013 (Syberg)). Nonetheless, one of Kierkegaard's main achievements could be said to be precisely an acute reflection on what it means to write philosophy, both from the perspective of the author (who is writing, what is being expressed in philosophical propositions, in which ways does written language express thoughts) and of the reader (to whom is philosophy addressed, and how does it have an effect in the reader). Such reflection is remarkably absent in most contemporary, scholarly philosophy, even in the most basic sense of reflecting on forms of reasoning, styles of writing, modes of publication, evaluation of impact, etc. Kierkegaard is a very rich resource for reflection on precisely these issues, and the aim of this paper is therefore to investigate one of these perspectives, the one that concerns the receiving end: To whom is philosophy addressed? It might not seem obvious that this question is pertinent for philosophy, but I think it is, and I think Kierkegaard gives good reasons to think so.

In order to introduce the theme, I want to start out by some considerations on the very idea of addressing someone philosophically: What does it mean at all that we attribute to someone the ability to and the interest in communicating philosophically? What does it say about the human being that it can be addressed as a philosopher? I claim that the tradition of German Idealism preceding Kierkegaard provides a good way of introducing this question, and that Kierkegaard's particular emphasis on the 'singular individual' makes it possible to define it more precisely.

Homo noumenon

Philosophy, in its traditional, and especially written form, is aimed at the universal subject, anyone and everyone. Unlike a prayer or a confession, a letter or an instruction, philosophy is addressed at an impartial spectator, a neutral witness without divine qualities, but nonetheless strangely above any particular situation or interest. It does not tell good stories, like a novel, or provide answers to questions with a direct practical importance, but much more reflects on the very concepts and

thoughts with which human concerns are being expressed. It does not require empathy, like most literature, or designate a particular field of objects, like science, but concerns general questions of language, being, existence, etc. A philosophical text is rarely addressed to any distinct individual or group, but to whom it may concern, the learned reader *in abstracto*. It thereby, in its very form of address, identifies the human being as something with a 'higher interest', as Immanuel Kant called it: something more than immediate gratification or confirmation of our way of living in the world. Philosophy concerns us all, but it is almost casually unspecific in its address. It could be picked up by anyone – or no one.


To employ the concept of 'to whom it may concern', therefore, we must qualify it a bit. When one writes on a letter (e.g. of recommendation) that it is addressed to 'whom it may concern', the usual meaning of that phrase is in fact to someone particular, although yet unspecified, namely to the group of people that may be concerned with such matters as the letter concerns. (The 'known unknowns', as Donald Rumsfeld would have called them: We know that they are there, we just don't know precisely who they are). If, for instance, I am writing a letter of recommendation to a student for a particular job, the 'to whom it may concern' concerns the potential employers, the referees or the assessment board. The sentence thus says: Of all people there is a group to whom this is of concern. The question is, whether or not you belong to this group. This is not the form of address of philosophy. Instead, philosophy says: This may very well concern you. And if you read it and find it appealing or thought provoking in any way, *you are the one, it is addressed to*. The address works backwards in philosophy: This may concern you, and if it does, you are the addressee of the text. Philosophy is delivered *poste restante* – it needs to be picked up by someone, and only when it is, will the one, to whom it is of concern, be its addressee. The addressee of a philosophical text is, in other words, the 'unknown unknown' – we don't know who he or she is, and we don't even know if he or she will be there at all.

Put more precisely, philosophy is an activity that concerns what Immanuel Kant defined as the 'public use of reason'. It addresses anyone and everyone, but only by virtue of their being addressees in the most general sense, i.e. someone that might read and engage with the text ('the world of readers', as Kant called it (Kant:18)). Thereby, philosophy, ideally, short circuits the way we commonly make use of reason, namely what Kant defines as the 'private use of reason', which is the use a person can make of reason, e.g. in a particular civil office or task. This distinction might seem counter intuitive. Often, we understand the 'public space' precisely as the realm of commerce, negotiations, proclamations, claims of respect and ways of organizing the infra structure of society, while the 'private' would more likely be understood as that which is not fit for public discourse, e.g. one's personal religious or ideological convictions. Indeed, to philosophize would often be understood as an activity that only concerns oneself, like some form of meditation, which is the luxury and privilege of those with enough leisure time to just sit around and think. Kant's point is the opposite. The private use of reason is that which we do, when we take care of our own interests in the broadest sense. We talk, negotiate, work, exchange etc. in order to fulfill each our own place in the world. A police man, for instance, who regulates traffic, is in fact making a private use of reason, according to this definition, because he is performing a particular function that makes things run smoothly, while at the same time furthering his own aim of generating an income and taking part in sustaining social order. A teacher in the school, similarly, has to perform certain functions, with due consideration of the legislation, interests of parents, colleagues, etc. Also a private use of reason. By public use of reason, on the other hand, Kant understands the use, which a person may make as a learned person in front of 'the entire public of the world of readers'. The public use of reason, in other words, is that which you might make at home, in your armchair, when you are writing a letter *poste restante*, to anyone who might care to pick it up.

Another way of formulating Kant's distinction would be to translate it as the distinction between the *homo phenomenon* and the *homo noumenon*. When I approach you as a *homo phenomenon*, I deal with you as a 'natural' creature that obeys the laws of nature in the broadest sense, while approaching you as a *homo noumenon* would mean addressing that in you, which reaches beyond

the world of natural causation, i.e. that which distinguishes you from the (rest of the) natural world as a being endowed with reason (*nous*).

There are at least two different ways this might be understood such that the ‘homo noumenon’ does not necessarily end up as a postulate of some divine, extraterrestrial substance. In one interpretation, obeying the laws of nature would resemble belonging to what John McDowell calls ‘the realm of law’ or ‘first nature’, while being susceptible to linguistic normativity (including moral demands) could be interpreted as being a ‘homo noumenon’, i.e. a creature endowed with reason, belonging (also) to the ‘space of reasons’ through the acquisition of a ‘second nature’. In another interpretation, ‘obeying the laws of nature in the broadest sense’ could be said to mean that one, as a ‘homo phenomenon’, obeys the laws of natural causation *and* the laws of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) as it is contingently practiced, which implies viewing the normal functioning of an ethical community as a sophisticated natural life form, much like anthropologists traditionally viewed the so called ‘primitive’ societies. In other words, on the second interpretation, the term ‘homo phenomenon’ would refer to that which is covered by ‘first’ *and* ‘second’ nature in McDowell’s sense, while the term ‘homo noumenon’ would be reserved to something ‘more than’ second nature; something in second nature that obstructs its normal functioning, distances itself from it, or indicates some ‘higher’ level. Now, if we relate this back to the pair private/public use of reason, something seems to speak in favour of the second interpretation. Making use of reason in the ‘private’ way precisely meant to participate in and sustain the public order, *Sittlichkeit*, the community of language users, in ways that would be very difficult to describe only in ‘realm of law’-terms, but which are not the employment of reason solely in terms of its presentation in front of the world of readers, either. In other words: The distinction between private and public use of reason seems to require some form of non-trivial distinction *within* the space of reason, between one use of reason that is an ordered, reasonable and legitimate civil use, and one that is aimed at more universal aspirations – addressing anyone and everyone as a part of the learned audience at large, *merely in their capacity as reasonable creatures*.



The problem in adopting the second interpretation is that, on the face of it, it is hard to make sense of what should be counted as ‘beyond’ second nature. If the ‘homo noumenon’ is to be understood as something distinct from the reasonable practice of giving grounds for what one is doing, then how can one address it all? How can one address a second nature creature endowed with reason *in virtue of that capacity alone* – in its pure form? The problem resembles the one, which is closely attached to Kant’s concept of a ‘kingdom of ends’ in which all rational creatures act entirely and directly in accordance with the moral law. Freed from all ‘phenomenal content’, such creatures seem to be mere figs of the imagination, and their harmonious co-existence in the kingdom of ends a mere fantasy, which just emphasizes (what has been criticized as) the empty formalism in Kant’s moral philosophy.

The empty, formal subject in Kant could, in a next turn of the screw, be compared to the subject that appears just before the stage of recognition in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. This subject is negatively defined as the self-consciousness that knows itself only through the negation of everything ‘around it’ (although a spatial metaphor is somewhat unfortunate to characterize this purely negative point of non-identity with anything sensually determinable). Self-consciousness, according to Hegel, is the awareness of oneself as *not-that*. Not the fruit that one is eating, not the road that one is walking, not the body of the other that one is seeing, not even the hand that one is using to open the door. ‘I am not my hand’, one could say, is the inaugural statement of self-consciousness. The problem for self-consciousness, however, immediately becomes precisely this negative status, and it therefore seeks the recognition and understanding of another self-consciousness in order to be confirmed as a real self-consciousness, as something that has a relation to the world, including to other self-consciousnesses. But how to provide this recognition? Anything the other says or does will always be a form of phenomenal activity, i.e. it will be material expressions of an intended ‘spiritual’ form of recognition. Literally saying ‘I recognize you’, for instance, does not count as an expression of pure self-consciousness, because it is itself a material expression—it is a phonetic structuring of air, so to say, and it immediately begs the question of which intention was ‘really’ behind the exclamation. Just like the child screams and demands that his parents really love him, so self-consciousness must disregard all expressions of recognition, because they can never really count as *it*, and enter into a struggle of life and death in order to demonstrate that it really doesn’t care about any of the phenomenal aspects of its existence. In Hegel, this struggle ends up in some sort of power balance, because we realize that the continued negation of the other’s phenomenal existence will only ensure death, and not recognition. (The impossible choice in the scene of recognition is a choice between two alternatives that are both worse. ‘Recognition or your life!’—if you take his life, you don’t get recognition – and you can’t get recognition without negating his life). By ‘working through’ this power structure, however, we come to realize that the other had the same problem as ourselves, and that we can only maintain ourselves as reasonable creatures by also maintaining life, and therefore we must develop an objective (and objectified) spirit in which everyone is recognized.

The problem, in the struggle for recognition, resembles the problem of addressing the ‘homo noumenon’: If I want to address you not in your capacity of being a creature of first or second nature that is able to both walk and talk and engage in agreements and struggles, but in your capacity *merely* as a *Vernunftswesen*, how can I be sure that anything I say (or write) will not be addressing you as a *homo phenomenon* instead, i.e. as someone who has different practical forms of interest in hearing, acknowledging and making use of that which I say? For example: Is teaching philosophy a private or a public use of reason? I am not sure that this is an easy question to settle: On the one hand, you are performing your function as a citizen, working for the state (typically) in order to earn a salary; on the other hand, if teaching philosophy is not about encouraging the public use of reason, then what is it about at all? And is it still a public use of reason to write an article for a peer-reviewed journal, if you do it primarily to fulfill the quota in your department and improve your CV? In other words: How do you ‘put your life at stake’ in writing; how do you show that you are interested in addressing something more than the mere material expression of for instance

someone buying and reading a book? How does a pure self-consciousness speak to another pure self-consciousness? As Hegel's struggle indicates: only via the signifier, only through the detour of the phenomenal world.

Indirect communication

This could be the setting for approaching Kierkegaard's style of writing. Why is it necessary for Kierkegaard to use 'indirect communication'? Well, in the first take already precisely because one pure self-consciousness cannot communicate 'directly' with another pure self-consciousness. To literally do that, some form of telepathy would be required, which would circumvent the material world *in toto*. There is no communication that does not have to abide by the signifier. Therefore, there is also no communication that does not misfire at least a little bit. I thus always potentially see my own communication a little bit from the outside. Even in the most straightforward technical language game, I might always suddenly stop and feel entirely alienated: 'Why am I doing this at all? Who *am* I?!' In the second take, Kierkegaard's indirect communication could precisely be said to be a form of *producing* this alienation. It does not give us piecemeal information on how to live a good, Christian life, which principles to adhere to, or how to be a good son or wife or father, but rather engages us in various ways of staging life that might make us think: 'Could that be me?' or 'Am I myself what I want to be? What Kierkegaard wants to do is therefore to short circuit normal communication in order to open up precisely such questions. Indirect communication, as James Conant has put it, 'is Kierkegaard's name for his method of benevolent deception' (Conant 1996: 284).

Indirect communication, however, is not a means of translation, however flawed it may be, of an original spiritual content, from one pure self-consciousness to another. One could imagine that the benevolent deception was required in order to lure the other into engaging with the text and then step-by-step making him understand what he is reading—seeing it as signs that indicate what the author really wanted him to think. Instead of saying, for example: 'I want you to go to church and pray', the author would write an elaborate story about a father that lost his child and got it back and suddenly felt an immense gratitude, which made him start going to church and pray. The reader would then be able to infer the 'real intention'—namely to make him or her go to church and pray in gratitude of the wonders of the world. Such a conception of the benevolent deception would maintain a fairly simple and straight forward idea of the propositional content that the author wants to convey, and merely sees the problem as one of pedagogy, if you will: how to approach the reader in such a way that he or she will come to think the thought that the author has already formulated?

Kierkegaard is not addressing the reader as someone who can re-translate his writing back into an original intention that could not be expressed directly. The other subject is the famous 'singular individual' ('Hiin Enkelte'), which is not a spiritual container that receives information (directly or indirectly communicated), but more like an ability in the other, a *way of reading*, a way of relating to text in general. Kierkegaard is not *transmitting thoughts* (however indirectly), but *provoking thinking*. He is addressing someone who is anyone and everyone, but not merely in their capacity of being Mr. X or Ms. Y. It is to them, but as singular individuals—and they are only such things by becoming them—for instance by beginning to think in another way about themselves. There is some truth in the idea of 'seeing the text differently' than how it first meets the eye: There *is* something of a duck/rabbit gestalt switch in reading Kierkegaard, but it is not a secret access to a code that will make you see the rabbit. The rabbit is not Kierkegaard's thoughts before the text; it is seeing the text in the light of your own life.

The *enkelte* is the addressee, and a keystone to the authorship. 'Without this category,' says Kierkegaard in an addition to his *Point of View of My Work as An Author*, 'and without the use that has been made of it, the reduplication of the entire work as an author would be missing' (SKS 16: 99). The reduplication of the entire work depends on the category of the 'singular individual', i.e. it is reduplicated by being received by the *enkelte*, by being read as something that does not only

contain straight forward messages and communication, but concerns another way of seeing the whole thing. The work still contains the same sentences and the same stories, but now also addresses the reader as someone who can relate to them in another way than the one in which one relates to information.

Kierkegaard is not writing to convey propositional content to his readers, to put it in the language of contemporary analytical philosophy. He is writing to address the reader as such, to address the 'other subject' than the one who is receiving and processing information. To quote James Conant again, he is not providing us with information and correcting false beliefs, but seeking a way to approach the reader as someone who is caught in an illusion:

A false belief can be confronted directly. One does this by arguing for the truth of the negation of the false belief. Kierkegaard suggests that this method of direct confrontation is not available to him because there is a sense in which there is no matter of fact or doctrine about which he wants to enter into a dispute with his reader. It is not that his reader has a point of view which he wants to disagree with (in the sense of wishing to argue for the negation of that point of view). The problem, rather, is that his reader suffers from an illusion. (Conant: 273).

An illusion, unlike false beliefs, can never be destroyed directly, as Kierkegaard himself says: '[...] one must approach from behind the person who is under an illusion'. The illusion, which the reader is expected to be under, is the illusion of being unproblematically the one, he or she is (Mr. X or Ms. Y), and this illusion cannot be confronted directly because a direct attack would either be dismissed or (worse) assimilated within the frame of the reader's understanding of him- or herself. (If Kierkegaard's work was a series of self-help books, it would indeed be an effort at conveying concrete information, in the form, e.g. of 'You should maybe be less ironic, when faced with the idea of choice. Someone has to do their duty and build strong families.' Self-help books, according to Wikipedia, 'are books written with the stated intention to instruct any readers on a number of personal problems'. Such a form of writing obviously directly mirrors what in psychoanalysis is called suggestion, i.e. a way of communicating that molds the ego of the addressee in the image of the ego of the sender). Confronting an illusion is in a way both more and less ambitious than challenging false beliefs. Less, because it does not try to convince the receiver of any particular propositional content; more, because it involves a much more radical perspective of challenging the very way in which we relate to ourselves.

The illusion of being unproblematically the one, one is, is a common and popular illusion. This, in fact, is how we are mostly conceiving ourselves in as far as we have any coherent perception of ourselves at all. It is the illusion of our ego to speak in psychoanalytic terms. Egos communicate content among each other quite swiftly. They have a good and rather straightforward relation, as long as it does not occur to them to wonder, whether that is really all there is to it. You can bring an ego to a dinner party and expect it to perform well, just as you can be 'current as the king's coin' as Anti-Climacus says in *The Sickness Unto Death*, without having any clear sense of what it means to be a self (SKS 11: 151). The illusion is to believe, whether actively (consciously) or not, that your ego has a firm grounding in the reality, it is situated in, and that going with the flow of the world, as it presents itself to you, amounts to anything like a grasp of the implications of the things you are doing or saying. Speaking with great solemnity about the importance of the moment of choice might indeed be a way of keeping the choice at arm's length. In Jim Conant's reading, the central problematic in this respect is the confusion about the meaning of religious concepts pertaining, in Kierkegaard's work, particularly to the implications of what it means to be a Christian, and Kierkegaard's ambition accordingly should be to assist his reader in getting rid of the illusion that he knows what it means to be a Christian.

True as this may be, Conant's reading tends to tip the balance towards a linguistic therapy that does not exhaust (although it may not contradict) the issues at stake in the relation between author and

reader in Kierkegaard's work. Conant reads Kierkegaard in a comparison with Ludwig Wittgenstein (who also wanted to free his readers from illusions—those of philosophy), but instead of following Conant further down this road, I want to pursue a little bit further the implications of not knowing what it means to have or be a self, which I mentioned.

The self

In *The Sickness Unto Death*, Anti-Climacus defines the human being as spirit and spirit as the self.

Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. (SKS 11: 129)

The self is thus not the soul (the soul is rather one of two moments in the relation that relates to itself, the other being the body), but the 'relation's relating itself to itself.' The human being, which does not relate itself to itself without a self or is not aware that it is a self. It has two dimensions, it is still a relation of two (body and soul), but it does not relate to this relation. In other words: A human being that does not relate itself to itself can function in all the ways a creature with first and second nature qualities functions: it can run, hop, dance, sing and talk endlessly about books, it has read. But as long as it does not relate to its own self as a relation, it remains selfless. It is a 'negative unity', as Anti-Climacus calls it, whereas the relation that relates itself to itself is the same relation, but as a 'positive' unity of the two moments of the relation (129). Freeing the addressee from the illusion of the ego and the truisms of the symbolic order of which it is part therefore means addressing the self: bypassing the ego and encouraging, provoking the self to question the patterns and understanding, which the ego immediately recognizes. The indirect communication is thus directed at the self, because the self is the capacity to reflect on and relate to content, rather than merely receiving it:

There is no direct communication, and no direct reception: There is a choice. Things do not work as they do with direct communication, by luring and threatening and exhorting – and then, then, quite unremarkably the transition takes place, little by little, the transition into sort of accepting it, being convinced, holding the opinion that, etc. (SKS 12: 143)

There is no piecemeal convincing going on in Kierkegaard's work, and there is also no piecemeal dissolution of confused language going on. Or not only this, at least. There is a concerted effort at addressing the reader in his or her capacity as a self, and communicating to the self cannot take place in the shape of a transfer of propositional content. It rather consists in evoking the self, making it appear—encouraging the way of reading that enables the receiver to imagine a choice, where he didn't imagine one before. The benevolent deception thus concerns a kind of estrangement, which opens the door to a recognition of the universal deception of being an ego that thinks it knows what it is doing. This estrangement itself is the very name of the self.

Furthermore, in relating itself to itself, the self not only considers different choices that it didn't really consider before. The self is not merely the capacity of choosing, as if becoming aware that one must choose between various lines of education, jobs, relationships, etc. would be all it means to be aware of oneself as a self. The self is not merely something that occurs, when you become aware of your capacity to choose, and lead your own life, but is 'derived', as it is stated a few paragraphs below the already quoted famous passages, and therefore relating to itself for the self implies a capacity for relating to something more than the conscious choices between A or B or C – namely an Other; 'et Andet' in the Danish original. ('The Choice' in the quote from 'Indøvelse i Christendom' above is not a matter of choosing between Pepsi or Coke, but about confronting or avoiding the full implication of being a self). The self has not posited itself, and can therefore only

genuinely relate itself to itself by relating to the other in itself. In a first step, one could say that the self is the other of the ego. It is that which is not the ego, or it is the ego's otherness. But that does not make it a substance separate from the ego. The self is not the 'true kernel of one's being', if by that one understands a spiritual core or a pure self-consciousness, which rests in its own dimension over and above the *homo phenomenon*. As the otherness of the ego, it rather consists in the awareness that the ego *has no firm grounding in itself* (in its self) and is therefore exposed to something other than itself (than its self). The self is the lack of self-grounding. In Hegelese, the other of the self, or the other in the self, or the other that the self relates to when relating to itself, could maybe be considered as the other self – as quite literally the dimension of the other that one is confronting (in the struggle for recognition), which reflects the dimension of oneself that is one's self. In *Anti-Climacus*, the other of the self or in the self, from which the self is derived, is explicitly God. The self has not posited itself, but is posited by God, and therefore relating to oneself means (also) relating to that which has posited oneself, namely God. In a gender studies reading, the other of the self could be considered as the other sex—as the fact that there is an other to the way I am constituted as a sexed being, or in order for me to at all be a sexed being. But I think it is fair, or maybe even most precise, to maintain the dimension of the other as simply that of the otherness that one must relate to, when relating to oneself. In that sense, the self that is the addressee of Kierkegaard's writing is simply the self as a way of relating to the other of oneself. And therefore, any confirmation or direct attack or straight forward identification of the ego with the content of a text will be a way of failing to address the one to whom it is of concern.


Finally, the author himself is not in charge of his own self anymore than is the receiver. This is another potential problem in Conant's account, since he seems to attribute to Kierkegaard, the author, a clear vision of his task as the one to 'benevolently deceive' his reader into seeing the world right, to put it in Wittgensteinian terms. This probably makes too much of a hero out of the author, and tends to reduce him to a conscious ego with an elaborate intension of helping his fellow human beings out of their illusions. I would much rather opt for the interpretation that the author and the receiver are 'in the shit together'. They both have the problem of how to relate to themselves. And they both in fact, I would claim, have the problem of how to relate to the written text. Kierkegaard sometimes makes it quite explicit that he sees himself only as a reader of his own text, and even that in order to write, what he must write, he has to almost surrender to that in him, which he relates to in writing: It is sometimes, when he writes, as if there is a voice that instructs him, as he says in the *Point of View of My Work as An Author*, not to be so vain and stupid and instead simply do his duty, keep the pen right, and write: 'And then I can do it, then I dare not do otherwise, then I write every word, every line, as good as ignorant about the next word and the next line' (SKS 16: 53).

As a writer, Kierkegaard is keenly aware that he, the biographical person, is not proposing propositional content that he is expecting the reader to accept, or even be lured into accepting. Much rather, he is, in writing, attempting to convey that which occurs to him, when writing. This is not so much the thoughts that he has already thought out but needs to give some acceptable, material form, but rather the thoughts that pertain to a writer as someone that tries to give way to thinking as such. The self that Kierkegaard is evoking could therefore maybe even be read as his own self. His relation to his own work as that of a reader is precisely the relation of someone who is a product of the text, rather than its producer. There is no clear, preconceived plan for writing each page, but an effect of writing that brings forward the dimension of the reader in the author himself.

In the second appendix to *The Point of View of My Work As An Author*, about the 'Enkelte', which is written in Kierkegaard's own name, the author states that he does not claim to be 'the singular individual'—'although I have struggled' (98). The appendix is entitled 'Den Enkelte' ('the singular individual'), and its first paragraph is dedicated to 'hiin Enkelte'. So, the author himself (Søren Kierkegaard) is dedicating himself to 'hiin Enkelte', trying himself to become 'hiin Enkelte', but professing not yet to have become 'hiin Enkelte', although, as he says, if he should demand an inscription on his gravestone, he would demand no other than 'hiin Enkelte' (98). This singular

individual is thus certainly not just each and every odd person in his or her own right, but rather that which he or she may become, may take on themselves or may choose to be, by fully realizing their own relation to the other in themselves.

The *reduplication* of Kierkegaard's authorship (made possible by the category of the 'Enkelte') could then finally be illustrated by a paraphrase of Lacan's Schema L, which symbolizes a relation between the subject (S) and the Other (A) that is intersected by a relation between the ego (a) and the other's ego (a'). The ego (moi) and the other's ego are those phenomenal beings that have to be bypassed, if a genuinely philosophical address has to succeed. As long as their relation remains uninterrupted, no philosophical reflection has taken place, and no relating oneself to oneself. They perform their duties, interests, and role-playing, like any other petty bourgeois egos, current as the King's coin.



If we allow the subject and the Other to whom the subject's speech is addressed to be the two extremes of Kierkegaard's authorship—the writer in as far as he is not in charge of his own writing (but only 'legally responsible' for it, as Kierkegaard says), and the reader in as far as he is 'the singular individual', then the problem in communicating between them seems to resemble the one described between two pure self-consciousnesses in the Hegelian sense: Their communication is intersected by the wall of language stretched out between the a (ego) of the writer and the a' of the recipient. However, and more in accordance with Lacan's own use of the schema, the relation between the Subject and the Other could also be seen as the relation between the subject (S) as the not-me of the ego, and the Other (A) as the agency that pervades this not-me. (The unconscious is the discourse of the other, as Lacan says). In other words, the writer and the reader could then be seen as the two dimensions of that which constitutes the self: the not-me of the ego and the Other to which it relates when relating to itself. In this way, maybe one could say that the letter has already arrived at its destination, when it is written.

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