Title: Introduction: Theorizing the Civic Turn in European Integration Policies

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Introduction: Theorizing the Civic Turn in European Integration Policies

Abstract
Many authors have written about the ‘civic turn’ in European migrant integration politics and policy that began in the late 1990s, but few have focused on the conceptual or normative dimensions of this turn. The purpose of this special issue is to help correct this situation. In this substantive introductory article, we begin with a discussion of the ‘convergence or national models’ debate that dominated early work on the subject. The next section presents the argument that civic integration is best understood as an ideological turn. It expands ‘good citizenship’ into personal conduct and values, shifts the responsibility for integration from the state to individuals, and institutionalises incentivising and disciplining integration processes, which are often really just a means of migration control. This is accompanied, we argue, by a civic nationalist conception of membership that appeals to shared political values, but defines those values through the culture of the state’s national majority. We then move on to the mechanisms and effects of civic integration, followed by a discussion of its normative analysis, before finally summarising the articles included in this special issue and how they address the concerns that we have raised.

Keywords
Civic integration; civic turn; national models; conceptualization; theory

Introduction
Long-term residence in Western states increasingly comes at a price. That price – proof that individual newcomers will be valuable members – and the politics surrounding it is the focus of this special issue. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, a broad liberalizing trend towards jus soli, dual citizenship, and less administrative discretion has been qualified by an equally widespread trend towards conditioning access to residence and citizenship. Increasingly, access to legal entry, permanent residence and citizenship requires speaking the language of the host country, knowledge of liberal principles and the country’s history, culture, and institutions, and/or economic self-sufficiency – and states use instruments such as tests, courses, and contracts to promote these goals (Goodman 2014).
The rise of these so-called ‘civic integration’ policies caught migration studies by surprise. It overturned expectations of post-national, human rights driven forms of membership (e.g., Soysal 1994; Tambini 2001), whereby migrants would not need naturalization (as they could enjoy most rights without it), and host societies would find acculturation unnecessary, indefensible, and impractical (critically Hansen 2009; Mouritsen 2012). Yet, for some scholars this policy development signals a different, tougher kind of post-nationalism (Joppke 2010); a liberal convergence towards a European “citizenship lite.” Here, the closure of membership is increasingly tied, not to national identity, but to employment skills and economic selection within a harder outer (European Union) shell, and, at the level of identity and defining values, to simple preference for ‘liberal people’ (Joppke 2007: 15). In this view, economic discourses of employability and mobility crowd out comprehensive narratives of civic duty and patriotism, not least the imprint of nationalism and ‘old’ national models of immigrant integration on policy-making.

This diagnosis, however, may be too narrow. Governments and publics do in fact emphasize civic culture and ‘good citizenship’ – also over and above employment and mere profession of universal values – as modes of integrating culturally plural societies. Moreover, civic integration policies do not look the same in all countries but vary a lot in terms of who they target (scope), what they require (demandingness), and which legal status they guard (sequencing) (Goodman 2014). This diversity appears to reflect different national trajectories and historical path-dependencies (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Jensen, Fernandez, and Brochmann 2017; Mouritsen 2013), but also the ebb and flow of left-right politics and the strength of new right parties (Howard 2009; Goodman 2014). Indeed, Joppke’s prediction of a neo-Roman lightening and de-nationalisation of citizenship ignores how electorates in the age of populism, when they care to exercise their democratic rights, often do so to influence the boundaries of membership (Müller 2016). Moreover, the creation of good workers and citizens often connects to broader agendas of social cohesion, whereby substantial acculturation into and protection of majority heritage creep back in as presumed socialisation context or condition of trust and solidarity.

The controversies highlighted with these introductory remarks are real, but also reflect a lack of agreement about how civic integration and national models of integration should be defined as concepts and understood as phenomena. Indeed, the two concepts have appeared needlessly oppositional as the contributions to this special issue demonstrate. This special issue aims to advance the debate by clarifying these central concepts and show that there really is no need to pit civic integration against nationalism and national models of integration, as they are concepts and
phenomena that to some extent co-exist, intersect, overlap and coalesce (Jensen, this issue; Mouritsen et al., this issue). Importantly, liberalism and nationalism are no strangers to each other, conceptually or empirically, as Gustavsson and Mouritsen et al. clearly show in their contributions to this special issue.

The study of civic integration policies has matured considerably (it has gone beyond single or few country comparisons towards systematic comparative analysis, empirical conceptualisations and indexing thanks to scholars Sarah Wallace Goodman, Marc Howard, Marc Helbling and others). However, the ongoing ‘battle’, which in many ways inspired the development of the field, between proponents of national path dependency models, structural and discursive convergence, and party politics is in no need of a verdict. Nationalism is not vanishing, convergence has taken place, nation-states understand integration differently, and party politics matter. What is needed, however, is reflection on the central concepts and how their empirical referents interact and condition each other’s impact on policy output and outcomes. Not only would one expect these notions and dynamics to differ across nation-states, it might also differ across policy areas within nation-states. As the contribution by Fernández (this issue) shows, citizenship policy in Sweden is very much a sheltered island in a sea where notions of civic integration, nationalism and post-nationalism otherwise make the waves.

The contributions to this special issue, as well as this substantive introduction, suggest a somewhat broader understanding of civic integration. First, it emphasises public and state civic integrationist discourse as ideology (Mouritsen et al., this issue; next two sections), and in doing so the effects of host society boundary drawing (Triadafilopoulos, this issue). Second, because it is an ideological phenomenon it cannot be reduced to a subset of integration policies. Hence, the study of civic integration must move beyond policies regarding residence and citizenship and include, for example, regulation of religion, labour market and social policies that target immigrants and the teaching of history, civics and religion in schools. Thirdly, it suggests going beyond the important study of effects of civic integration as public policy (Goodman and Wright 2015) towards a broader political-sociological theorisation of societal civic integration, which may turn our attention towards welfare state regimes, class-formation, links between socioeconomic and civic integration, and the impact of majority attitudes and new populism on civic inclusion. In particular, it reopens the discussion about the relationship between civic integration discourse, nationalism, national models (Fernández, this issue; Jensen, this issue), and national identities (Gustavsson, this issue).
After the next section, which revisits the debate on convergence and national models, the following section discusses the ‘civic’ in civic integration as an expansive, state-driven ideological turn, which overlays existing national traditions. The next section proceeds to discuss in which way such ideologies, which may or may not be nationally specific, are also evidence of nationalism. A further section reviews the small literature on whether civic integration policy ‘works’ and suggests directions for a broader political sociological theorisation of immigrant civic integration as societal process and effect. The following section discusses the strange paucity of normative political theorizing of civic integration, before a section outlining contributions to the special issue.

**Does civic integration equate convergence of ‘national models’?**

Mainly four observations on national immigrant integration policies and discourse underpin the argument that Western states converge on civic integration as a new, shared model, whereby the notion of more distinct ‘national models’ increasingly loses analytical relevance. *First*, Western states increasingly condition access to residence and citizenship on a range of integration requirements (Goodman 2014). *Second*, public debates increasingly focus on labour market integration and the costs of its failure to the welfare state. This reflects a neo-liberal re-alignment, in the face of global competition and fiscally entrenched welfare states, away from decommodifying protection towards supply-side creation of self-supportive, contributing, and flexible employees (Joppke 2007; Soysal 2012; Suvarierol 2015). *Third*, even though debates routinely stress national belonging and culture, the national ‘stuff’ that immigrants are asked to share is most often defined in terms of universal liberal values such as freedom and equality (Jensen and Mouritsen 2017; Joppke 2008). Attempts to foster reflective autonomy, non-authoritarian life-styles, gender equality and sexual tolerance reflect broader cultural liberation trends, particularly in North Western Europe. This liberal perfectionism – some call it “illiberal” (Orgad 2010) or “repressive” (Joppke 2007) – which legitimizes intrusion in the private lives, school choice, and even the minds of immigrants, also feeds cultural stereotypes. *Fourth*, the widespread criticism of multiculturalism as a policy idea, which (even as it may continue or even be spreading under the radar, with different names) is part and parcel of concern with national ‘common’ cultures (Joppke 2014; Ossewaarde 2014). This paradoxically accompanies the *de facto* dilution of majority cultural heritage and general acceptance of a right to practice minority culture and religion.

However, the significance of such evidence of convergence is disputed. No one denies that substantial variation remains regarding which (sets of) integration requirements states implement,
how demanding they are (e.g., different levels of language proficiency) and which legal statuses they guard (temporary or permanent residence and/or citizenship). Those who argue that integration policy still reflect institutionally entrenched differences (i.e., national models) emphasize this variation.

These critics of the convergence thesis argue that how states can employ similar policy instruments is still constrained by historically embedded perceptions – functional and normative – of the nation, the role of the state, and the nature of integration and social cohesion (see e.g., Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Meer and Modood 2009; Mouritsen 2013). Civic integration policies, rather than a policy shift, arguably constitutes an additional layer of policies on top of existing institutional arrangements and policies, which remain in place (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Indeed, even though nationhood is articulated in a liberal register, how publics and decision-makers understand certain values and what supports them varies with different conceptions of nation and state. National publics prioritize different liberal values, understand them differently, and emphasize different historical origins and institutional preconditions (Jensen and Mouritsen 2017). To these scholars, what is happening is not a shift away from old national ways of thinking about integration, but an ideological re-orientation that retains the ‘old’ national differences.

This debate is in a deadlock. Those who stress similarities above differences see convergence. Those who stress differences above similarities see path-dependency. How is headway in this discussion possible? Maybe by asking the question differently. Could there not be both convergence and path-dependency simultaneously? First, if we distinguish between different policy levels (as Hernes 2018 does), it could be that different ideas of what constitutes integration and which issues are problematized (philosophy) may inform or legitimate similar instruments (thus creating convergence at this policy level), but with different scope, demandingness and sequencing (setting). Thus national philosophies might persist, while civic integration policies proliferate. Second, civic integration is perhaps more correctly understood as a purely ideational/discursive phenomenon (see next section) that re-orients national models of integration (convergence) without nation-states losing continuity or national distinctiveness in terms of how they approach immigrant integration (path-dependency). Thus, popular civic integration notions are refracted through historically embedded national philosophies of integration.

Indeed, it appears arbitrary to define civic integration at both the level of public philosophy and policy instrument (as does Goodman 2014 and Joppke 2017: 1156). That is, as both a philosophy focused on employment and liberal values and a set of policies that condition access to
residence and citizenship on the requirements already noted. First, it appears arbitrary to say that such a philosophy only affects a subset of integration policies. Immigrant-targeted measures also appear in areas such as labour market, social, housing, and school policy. Second, abstract ideals may translate to quite different policy solutions as they pass through national structures, institutions, agendas, and parliamentary power dynamics. Third, the same policy instruments may reflect quite different rationales. Language, for example, is a vehicle for all types of integration – political, social, cultural and economic – and, requirements therefore finds support in very different integration ideas. Variations of scope, demandingness and sequencing may reflect such different intentions.

For the reasons stated above, we think it is both empirically and analytically more accurate to understand civic integration as an ideological phenomenon, the central characteristics of which the next section describes.

Civic integration as an ideological turn

The operationalization of civic integration as a set of policies of varying content, harshness, and sequences, while useful for purposes of comparison, still leaves open a more sociological engagement with the phenomenon itself. To appreciate its contemporary significance, let alone theorize its effects, its features needs unpacking.

For starters, the very concept presents a puzzle. What does the prefix ‘civic’ add to ‘integration’ simpliciter – which remains the popular terms? While clearly a contested term politically and academically (Penninx & Garcés-Mascarenas 2016: 13), with diverse national meanings (e.g. Favell 1998a), the two, at first glance, do not seem so different in terms of their goals. Hence, integration minimally means finding a place in a new society by interacting with its main institutions and the host population within important societal spheres. These structural (or functional) aspects abound in the EU Commission’s and Council’s common principles as well as standard academic treatments (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). They include socio-economic elements (such as employment and education) and political elements (such as voting and participation).

While 1980s and 90s literatures emphasized such functional aspects and contrasted them to Chicago school automatic and all out cultural assimilation, neither cultural-identity nor cognitive elements were absent. Functioning in various spheres requires some language familiarity and knowledge of the host society. Enziger and Biezeveld’s report to the European Commission notes
that “in the past it was generally assumed that integration and acculturation go hand in hand, that these are two sides of the same coin”, and that (in Grannovetter’s classical terms) incidence and intensity of interactions interrelates with normative identification (Enziger and Biezeveld 2003: 8-9, 22-25). Moreover, countries with radically different integration models – American ‘melting-pot’ incorporation, French republicanism, and British, Canadian or Swedish versions of multiculturalism – all expected immigrants to develop some attachment and loyalty and respect basic liberal-democratic values.

Is what academics have begun to term civic integration then the same as integration in the eighties? No, it is not, and several features distinguish the two:

- **Expansion**: Civic integration expands the realms of desirable ‘good citizenship’ and the skills needed to undertake it beyond labour market participation, voting and civil society volunteering into personal conduct and values, the practice of religious life, and increasingly even family life as well as the proper interaction with the (welfare) state.

- **Individualization**: Civic integration shifts the onus from structural facilitation and equal opportunities in terms of participation rights and resources – let alone concern with discrimination and prejudice – towards individual capacity and obligation to participate and acculturate. Also, by contrast to earlier ideas of mutual societal adaptation, civic integration, given the incontestable nature of these obligations, is one-sided and pertains to the individual’s willingness to ‘integrate’.

- **State involvement**: Civic integration, rather than occurring automatically, involves the deliberate, targeted, and comprehensive state enhancement of integration processes that encourage desired mind sets and practices through incentives, or through more moralistic, disciplinary interpellation of individuals.

- **Civic screening**: Civic integration policy fuses integration attempts with immigration control (Joppke 2017) such that the optimizing of national civic resources is linked to the screening of ‘desirables’ by conditioning access to legal entry, residence and citizenship.

These four features of civic integration, we submit, constitute a significant re-orientation of policy-making, but not a wholesale departure from national models of integration. States may steer a different course on each dimension, and the prominence of each may vary. Their significance for policy-making depends on different national configurations of citizenship. They do so, not only in terms of Brubaker’s (1992) and his predecessors’ classical civic-ethnic distinction on the membership dimension (which needs reconstruction in more processual terms, see Jensen 2014), or
the deductive, theory driven insertion of an ‘acceptance of public pluralism’ variable (Koopmans et al. 2005), but also along other dimensions of citizenship. Among them are citizenship’s political-participatory vs passive/private aspects (Turner 1990), the role of welfare state regimes and conceptions of social citizenship (Breidahl 2017), traditions of democracy and volunteering (Takle 2015), and state multiculturalism as (non)interference with civil society and minority groups or active equal treatment (Mouritsen 2013).

In some countries with particularly restrictive civic integration policies – such as Denmark, Austria, or the Netherlands – the appeal to national culture casts doubt on the liberal universalist credentials of ‘civic’ acculturation, which even at its most disciplining should leave private cultural and religious practices alone. Critics have noted this in relation to difficult language requirements and historical knowledge tests with items on Christianity and ancient heroes. Even as the latter only require cognitive familiarity, not positive affirmation, they reflect a homogenizing intention, whereby civic integration is framed against the hazards of ‘too much’ diversity. First, as a tendency to culturalise liberal-democratic values and practices. As inherently bounded, rooted, and shared by majorities (Favell 1998b), as Western (or connected to Christian traditions) by historical default, or as national in their particularly valuable evolution – and in all instances as diametrically opposed to ‘non-Western’ traditionalism. Secondly, in line with sociological notions of cultural similarity as such facilitating social cohesion (Putnam 2007), and enabling democratic deliberation and welfare state solidarity (Mouritsen et al, this issue).

In this logic, significant general acculturation or cultural ‘flexibility’ of lifestyle may also become a sign of good citizenship. Such intentional homogenization, instrumentalized for civic purposes, e.g. in school curricula, is likely to have limited effects. The most significant assimilation prospect may be a side effect of civic integration measures, which overstep the private-public boundary, touching on family life, gender relations, even censuring or containing certain expressions of religion. In as far as the everyday life of Muslim immigrants and descendants is deeply structured by life styles and social relations, which connects to orthodox religiosity, civic integration – if it were to work – entails significant crowding out of minority practices. Civininess, when defined very comprehensively, does conflict with traditional Islam, leaving in place only (religious) culture as heritage, identity, and emotional-aesthetic attachment. Such laundering of religious immigrant culture is in clear evidence across Western Europe.

Civic integration and nationalism
Scholars debate whether such comprehensive civic acculturation, discussed above, takes civic integration policies into the orbit of nationalism. Authors who emphasise a Kohnian distinction (Wright 2011; Joppke 2008a) between ascriptive and achievable membership criteria are right that demanding integration requirements remain voluntarist in a legal sense. Nevertheless, accompanying political discourses often ‘ethnisize’ purportedly inherent civic (in)capacities of groups, and national meanings of measures of achievable criteria (‘feeling like a German’) diverge (Wright 2011: 839; Simonsen 2016).

However, the civic-ethnic distinction trades on an ambiguity (Yack 1999), not of the ‘ethnos’ element, but in appeal to culture or ‘values’. Civic nationalism is often seen as a strictly political identification with universalistic values embodied in state institutions and constitutions as distinct from culture as something substantial and particular. The former, while still associated with territorial political communities, are in a sense ‘non-’ or ‘post-national’, as when Joppke (2008b; 2010) associates civic integration with a ‘liberal identity’ or Rawlsian ‘political liberalism’. This movement – towards what Müller (2008), applying Habermas’ and Sternberger’s term to immigrant incorporation, calls constitutional patriotism – constitutes ‘retreat of nationalism’, except in ‘repressive’ forms where states go beyond scrutinising migrants’ behaviour and focus on their beliefs (Joppke 2010: 141-42). Similarly, to Goodman (2014) civic integration policies reflect a new ‘state identity’ that ‘promotes a minimally transformative process, advocating common values and skills for autonomy without sacrificing home culture’ (32).

The problem with such analyses is that civic national identity of entirely non-particularistic values is an unrealistic sociological description of national solidarity and identification. Empirical variation certainly exists in the understanding of (liberal) values and principles that immigrants are required to affirm. However, most civic integration policies are also aimed at integration and maintenance of social cohesion (see the analysis in Mouritsen et al., this issue). This is where the already quite unrealistic depiction of within-state liberal value consensus begins to thicken, suggesting a flaw in arguments on the rise of purely political, liberal, state-centred, or post-national identities (but note the Swedish case, Fernandez, this volume).

In Joppke’s interesting and influential work, this failure is associated with the conflation of ‘civic nationalism’ – bearing the properties outlined above – with what normative political theorists term ‘liberal nationalism.’ Civic nationalists, Joppke claims, citing Kymlicka and Miller, have correctly pointed out that shared values are an inadequate basis for social cohesion (2010: 117). However, Kymlicka and Miller are both liberal nationalists, and explicitly distinguish their
positions from civic nationalism’s universalistic conception of social cohesion (Kymlicka 2001; Miller 1995; also Gustavsson, this issue). The key difference is that civic nationalism is concerned with the normatively constitutive character of the nation, while liberal nationalism focuses on the role that nationality plays in facilitating liberal-democratic politics. Civic nationalists see the nation as the product of liberal practice, whereas liberal nationalists see it as the context (Larin, forthcoming). The argument of the latter is that liberal states require nationalism, even as it undergoes de-traditionalization, but also that the cultural thickening associated with this – including privileging and protecting national language and heritage – is not necessarily a bad thing, depending on its consequences for the treatment of minorities, including immigrants.

Joppke then excludes ‘liberal identity’ from nationalist politics so long as it focuses on behaviour rather than belief. He seems to think that only ‘repressive liberal identity’ qualifies as nationalist because it ‘forces people to be free’ by adopting liberal-democratic values, whereas ‘political liberal identity’ merely regulates their interactions. Both versions, though, are consistent with understandings of civic nationalism—just different types. Liah Greenfeld (1992) makes a distinction between ‘individualistic–libertarian’ and ‘collectivist–authoritarian’ conceptions of the nation, and argues that while ethnic nationalism always portrays a collectivist nation, civic nationalism can go either way (the former in the United States, the latter in France). Larin’s (forthcoming) reference to ‘liberal civic nationalism’ and ‘republican civic nationalism’ is a useful way to distinguish between Joppke’s two types of liberal identity. While emphasis and implications are different – and, contra Joppke, the republican version is surely becoming dominant – both nevertheless portray shared political values as the basis of social cohesion.

However, in the context of integration policy, we would argue, the sincerity of civic nationalists-and-integrationists’ commitment to ‘universally shared values’ is questionable. As Mouritsen has pointed out, these values are often ‘presented as accomplishments of distinct national histories and circumstance’s in civic integrationist discourse (Mouritsen 2008: 23; also Mouritsen 2006). This kind of political manoeuvring is part of what Halikiopoulou et al. call the ‘civic zeitgeist’ (2013). Europe’s radical right-wing parties often pursue their still ethnic exclusivist agenda by identifying liberal-democratic values ‘as the unique patrimony of the nation.’ In this way, ‘our’ nation is one of tolerance, liberalism and diversity and that tradition is threatened by an influx of intolerant, reactionary and narrow-minded ‘others’ (109).

Such misdirection is often framed as emancipatory. One example is so-called ‘integration from abroad’, which require prospective (family) migrants to pass tests before they even set foot in
the country. This policy, often presented as a way to protect women against illiberal practices such as forced marriage, simply makes it more difficult to enter the country (Kofman et al. 2015). Farris calls it ‘femonationalism’: the ‘mobilization of feminist ideas by nationalist parties and neoliberal governments under the banner of the war against the perceived patriarchy of Islam’ (2012: 185). Mepschen demonstrates that a discourse of homosexual emancipation has been used in a similar way (Mepschen et al. 2010) consistent with what Puar calls ‘homonationalism’ (2013).

Even when civic integrationists’ commitment to civic nationalism is sincere, however, shared values may provide an inadequate mechanism for social integration. The ‘ideology of shared values’, as Wayne Norman calls it, ‘gets the connection between shared identity (in so far as it takes account of this) and shared values backward. It is not typically common values that lead to a common identity, but vice versa’ (1995: 147). Norman, Kymlicka (2001; 2002: 252-268), and Yack (1999) all provide examples of states that share political principles—Norway and Sweden, Canada and the United States—without thereby wishing to unite and clearly without sharing a national identity. Principles of freedom and equality tell us little about the communities that share them, including something as basic as where to draw their boundaries. Moreover, the idea that membership in purportedly civic nations is based on shared political principles is obviously false: for native-born Americans, for example, ‘their citizenship has nothing to do with their political beliefs. They automatically acquire citizenship by descent, and cannot be stripped of it if they turn out to be fundamentalists or fascists’ (Kymlicka 2001: 244). In a similar way, in Europe’s civic integrationist states, migrants, bizarrely, are the only people whose membership depends on the performance of the receiving majority’s self-representation (Larin, forthcoming).

What actually constitutes the (minimal) ‘stuff’ of national identity is an open, empirical question, with normative implications (Gustavsson, this issue) to which writers such as Kymlicka and Miller give each their answers. None of them, however, focuses on shared political values. Indeed, the enforcement upon immigrants of either such ostensibly ‘shared’ values or a duty to cherish a politically curated, thicker nationhood easily backfires (Mouritsen et al., this issue). The pursuit of national integration through ostensibly civic acculturation in important ways nevertheless continues a tradition of Western nationalism, rather than departing from it (Mouritsen et al., this issue). As argued by Podoksik (2017), the defining feature of historical nationalisms was not in fact appeal to kinship or ‘natural’ folk tradition. Rather, it was the deliberate inculcation of an ‘artificial’ high culture, which, in its many different forms – including religious and backward-looking, illiberal ones – would better the nation’s standing and prosperity by civilising its subjects, in the
process inculcating a national pride in the project. Emphasising this feature of nationalism – the protection of civilizational high culture and associated identity building and boundary demarcation – over an admittedly waning culturally distinctive substance, noted by Joppke and Kymlicka alike, places the contemporary politics of civic integration at its very centre, even as the means, such as hectoring on *Leitkultur*, remain flawed. What, then, could further civic integration?

**Theorizing the effects and mechanisms of civic integration**

Research on civic integration involves a deeper theoretical questioning of assumptions about individual motivations, societal functionalities and causes – over and above an intentional set of policy instruments – that policymakers take for granted. The few studies that try to answer whether civic integration mechanisms have a positive effect on different integration outcomes – political participation, employment, national identity and social integration (trust, perceived discrimination) – either report null-findings (Goodman and Wright 2015; Simonsen 2017) or only small effects (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). However, as some studies of naturalisation find positive effect on socio-economic and political integration (e.g., Hainmueller et al. 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2017), civic conditioning which impedes access to citizenship is likely to impact negatively too. No studies so far have looked on the effect of immigrants’ perceptions of civic conditioning (fairness, intention) on integration propensity.

Existing studies not only do not allow us to say anything with confidence regarding effects of civic conditioning; they also limit themselves to test common-sense assumptions in public debate. Future research may profit from more sustained engagement with the sociology of integration and citizenship, including a reappraisal of some very classical perspectives, in writers such as Durkheim and T.H. Marshall.

First of all, the *societal* or holistic nature of immigrant integration – visible in the Durkheimian organic/mechanic distinction – needs rescue from its current individualistic and state-centrist use. Durkheim posited a movement from traditional integration, based on cultural/religious homogeneity within clear status hierarchies, towards modern integration, based on functionally interdependent role taking of diverse but equal individuals. Some civic acculturation policy indicates an anachronistic return to pre-modern homogeneity (and hierarchy) models of solidarity. Nevertheless, Durkheim also expected a distinctively modern, rights- and merit based normativity (a ‘cult of the individual’) accompanying functional differentiation and conditioning solidarity.
between strangers (Marske 1987). The direction of such norm-based solidarity is uncertain though, and may conceivably play out differently in the contexts of diverse immigrant and majority groups.

On the one hand, increasingly urban and culturally differentiated societies may produce new interdependencies and forms of contribution, based on increasingly abstract norms of reciprocity and civility. On the other hand, this differentiation in flexible labour markets and impersonal cityscapes also comes with deep welfare state penetration of, and dependence on families and civil society. This may foster increasingly comprehensive moral economies (see Berman et al., 2016) of recognition or ‘social esteem’, e.g. pertaining to proper child rearing (Honneth 2014), that conflict with the life worlds of some groups.

Either way, cultural (‘mechanic’) integration, for what it is worth, is also dynamic – and, for better or worse, two-sided. Hence, prospects of civic acculturation are likely to depend in part on cultural and discursive host society contexts, where electoral politics and welfare state logics meet local inter-culturalism, but also class-based identity struggles among majorities, including native majorities-becoming-minorities in European metropolitan areas (Crull 2016). Civic integration in terms of values, identification, and trust may well depend on functional aspects, such as spatial interaction and economic competition, but also on experience of fairness (Kumlin and Rothstein 2010) and majority cultural aspects, such as changing appreciation of pluralism among majorities. Young, urban liberals are more likely to have solidarity across cultural divides (Breidahl et al 2018), déclassé blue-collar workers less so. Newcomers, on the other hand, may be less likely to emphasize their differences, more embracing of civic acculturation efforts (e.g. in schools) – or at least more likely to belong (Simonsen 2016) in the absence of hostile discourse, exclusive conceptions of nationhood, and social discrimination.

Another classical perspective, which adds a material dimension to, and bridges the Durkheimian distinction, is the sociology of welfare state integration emerging from T.H. Marshall (1997). Marshall was notoriously oblivious of immigrants. Yet his notion of social integration as class abatement reminds us of early migration studies’ onus on equal treatment as a condition of immigrants’ social status and political empowerment. Marshall’s guiding idea concerned cultural modernization – including societal participation and political efficacy of the previously excluded – through social rights and class mobility. An important literature connects lack of socio-economic integration, conspicuous immigrant unemployment and underclass formation, to declining solidarity and electoral realignment of working class voters (Larsen 2013). While this literature’s focus on the civic outlooks (trust, tolerance) of majorities tackles the two-way nature of integration, the
significance of socioeconomic factors, such as precaritization, relative deprivation, residential segregation, experienced policy (un)fairness, and ethnic employment competition – or of avoiding these ills – for immigrant civic integration outcomes remains understudied.

However, Marshall’s vision was not merely economic. Participation in a common civilization of opportunities and absence of conspicuous poverty would produce a new dignity and independence. This nexus between social status and cultural transformation, missed by many readers, generates important hypotheses - also because he may not have been right. Marshall optimistically assumed the working class might emancipate itself within a shared national culture, imbued with the aesthetic and moral habitus of the English upper class. He foresaw – citing the economist Alfred Marshall – a linear class journey, whereby ‘every man [sic] could become a gentleman’ (Marshall 1997: 4-5). However, Bourdieuian attention to cultural class-formation and moral boundary maintenance towards the underclass casts doubt on this promise, particularly when ethno-religious diversity and urban subgroup formation is inserted into the equation (Bennett et al 2008).

We do not know much about how second and third generations’ self-identification, counter-cultural outlooks (towards majorities and parent generations), and experiences of cultural class boundaries condition transmission from social to civic participation. While educational and employment success may prevent full-scale alienation, merely belonging ‘in’, not ‘with’ a national society, surely impedes the smooth civic role taking, its unbiased Parsonian linearity dubious to begin with, which increasingly requires adaptation to straight and narrow middle class expectations. Minority pursuit and re-negotiation of citizenship likely clashes with a new populism, which feeds on majority-group working class resentment of diversity and own identitarian devaluation by cosmopolitan elites (Rothstein and Kumle 2018) at the cost of cross-ethnic solidarity with poor immigrants.

Each of these theoretical perspectives suggest empirical attention to mechanisms of the moral economy of boundary maintenance, within which civic integration is implicated in ways that highlight its holistic nature. The push in state policies and discourse, supported by large segments of Western electorates, towards civic closure and concomitant ambitions to evaluate, discipline, or exclude the ostensibly un-civic from the nation reflects constitutive aspects of what citizenship is, and possibly the parameters of what it could be, at least within the framework of Western welfare states. They all bear on a sociological – rather than legal or normative conception – of citizenship as a bounded solidarity concept. Citizenship, thus understood, structures the distribution of scarce
resources and rights within bounded spaces, as well as cultural but contested ideals of obligation and civic contribution (Turner 1992). Membership and access to rights and resources increasingly depend – for newcomers particularly – on perceived ability or willingness to meet such expectations. It concerns recognition, not of the individual’s cultural identity (Taylor 1992), but her status as virtuous, contributing citizen. Whether this moral boundary maintenance, which almost inevitably is culturally biased, motivates or rather stigmatizes and causes withdrawal is an empirical question. However, the dialectic between civic recognition and membership is a constitutive one, which has resurfaced with contemporary mass immigration.

**Normative approaches to civic integration**

There are not many normative analyses that focus specifically on civic integration policies (though Joppke’s sociology often shifts to prescription). Those that do tend to be written by legal scholars and focus on how these policies violate liberal-democratic norms (e.g. Guild et al. 2009; Kostakopoulou 2010; and Orgad 2015 for a more favourable perspective). The literature on multiculturalism and liberal nationalism that emerged in the 1990s is directly relevant, however, since authors such as Will Kymlicka (2001) and David Miller (1995) explicitly argued against the civic nationalist conception of social integration—and, indeed, Kymlicka is a frequent target of civic integration’s proponents.

There has been, of course, a broader kind of ‘civic turn’ in other areas of political philosophy with burgeoning interest in classical and civic republicanism, deliberative democracy, liberal virtues, liberal national or patriotic identities and cultures, the reciprocity of social democratic work obligations, and even civic multiculturalism (for an overview, see Mouritsen 2008). In all their conflicting diversity, these perspectives presume that citizenship involves functionally necessary contributory and civic cultural aspects, that this gives rise to certain obligations or legitimate normative expectations, and that the exercise or experience of citizenship is associated with integration of the political community.

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1 Miller’s latest book (2016) may seem to side with the civic integrationists at first glance, especially since he includes ‘civic integration’ as one of the most important types of integration in the chapter that deals with this issue. His argument does not build on the broader civic integrationist literature, though, and is still based on liberal, not civic nationalism.
However, normative political theory needs more sustained discussion of whether, when, and how liberal states may justifiably pursue civic acculturation of immigrants. Concretely, to what extent is requiring or promoting specific political, cultural or historical knowledge, participatory engagement (including employment), family and gender related practices, or affirmation of ‘values’, let alone loyalty legitimate (see e.g. Hampshire 2011; Seglow 2009)? Existing normative discussions of citizenship acquisition have focused on the illiberal content of civic integration (Bauböck and Joppke 2010). However, the crucial discussion from a liberal justice standpoint may not concern relatively inconsequential and symbolic framings of test questions, or even futile loyalty screenings, but rather the restrictiveness or even impossibility of certain requirements, which bears much more on questions of inequality and discrimination.

In particular, theorizing of legitimate and illegitimate forms of membership conditionality are needed – arguably also at the last gate of citizenship. It might begin from a distinction between approaches, which imply a liberal contract – in terms of relevant reciprocity, positive incentives, realistic prospects, and reasonable exemptions – and others, which construe conditionality as selectivity and screening. The reason that few political theorists have entered such discussions – a thorny road for liberals – may well be that their very framing eventually touches upon an even more difficult one. This is the question about universalism versus partialism, and the protection of internally just, but bounded societies (Miller 1995). Under which conditions is the relevant moral viewpoint a concern with the existing polity and its members, and under which conditions the rights of newcomers?

Contribution of this special issue
As stated in the introduction, the big takeaway from this special issue is, first, that civic integration is an ideological phenomenon that empirically coalesce with nationalism and national models of integration. Second, that it is a phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to a subset of integration policies and that in order to conceptualize and theorize it we must move beyond studying residence and citizenship policies (both as output to be explained and as predictor of outcomes) towards a broader political sociological theorisation of societal civic integration.

The five articles in this special issue contribute in different ways in this endeavour. Jensen sketches a more developed ideational theory of national models of integration hereby providing better answers to how such models might co-exist, intersect and merge with notions of civic integration and what constitutes good evidence that states are re-orienting or leaving behind
particular ‘old’ national understandings of integration. Mouritsen et al. and Fernández both emphasize the ideological nature of civic integrationist discourse and its relation to nationalism. Mouritsen et al. do so in relation to debates on national Leitkultur, which, while decidedly ‘civic’, in Denmark, the Netherlands and to some extent Germany, are also culturalised – linked to national traditions, even Christianity – and tied to assumptions of manifest and latent integration functions of nations, seeking to ‘civilize’ newcomers. Fernández analyses the interestingly deviant case of Sweden, where a widely praised open and liberal citizenship regime seems to be partly contingent on a shallow and ambiguous conception of membership. Triadafilopoulos focuses on the relationship between civic integration and debates over religious accommodation, and argues that such debates are best understood as instances of competitive group boundary construction and maintenance. Religious believers’ interest in honouring their group’s customs is not only based on individual devotion but also reflects their interest in maintaining a sense of coherent religious group identity, while liberal-democratic societies simultaneously strive to create liberal-democratic subjects through various means, including integration measures. Finally, Gustavsson argues that debates over the relationship between liberalism and nationality require a new analytic framework that differentiates between liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism, and constitutional patriotism by applying David Miller’s five dimensions of liberal nationality.

These contributions help push the theoretical debate on civic integration, nationalism and national models in a constructive direction, deepening our understanding of the ideological shifts and developments that has taken place during the last two decades of integration politics in the West.

References


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