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Aid Against Terroism

Bjørn Møller
The rationales and objectives for development aid (ODA: official development assistance) have evolved over time—from a rather simplistic goal of economic growth, via an explicit focus on poverty reduction to also encompassing, e.g., environmental sustainability and good governance (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen 1999, pp. 28-47). More recently security considerations have appeared as new (or at least supplementary) goal of ODA and as a possible criterion for right-sizing and allocating ODA. It is in this connection that the post-September 11 discussion should be seen about whether to also make counter-terrorism a criterion.

1 ODA AND SECURITY

Even before the debate about linking aid to security took off a debate had taken place about the very meaning of the concept of security (Buzan 1991; Buzan & al. 1998; Møller 2001). This is not the place for an elaboration on this debate. Suffice it to say that it has been suggested to add other “referent objects” of security (i.e. entities whose security may be at stake) to that of the state, either societal groups such as nations or ethnic groups or even individuals. Depending on the referent object, different values may be threatened and therefore in need of protection, as set out in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Whose security?</th>
<th>Values at risk</th>
<th>Potential threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>The State</td>
<td>Sovereignty, Territorial integrity</td>
<td>Other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Security</td>
<td>Nations, Societal groups</td>
<td>National cohesion, Identity</td>
<td>Migrants, Alien cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Individuals, Humankind</td>
<td>Survival, Quality of life</td>
<td>Own state, Globalisation, Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such expansion has obvious implications for the possible linkage between aid and security, where the focus has been on security in an expanded sense. An even more general question is, however, whose national, societal or human security might be enhanced through the allocation of aid—that of the donors (i.e. “ours”) or that of the recipients, i.e. “theirs”?

1.1 ODA and our security

Whether aid might contribute to solving our security problems by making threats disappear depends, of course, on an assessment of the kind of security threats countries like Denmark may be facing from potential aid recipients, i.e. the Third World.
Even though some have talked about military threats to Europe, including Denmark, from Third World countries, e.g. in the form of ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction (Nolan 1991), such alleged threats may safely be dismissed as largely fictitious. Europe’s and NATO’s military superiority is simply so overwhelming (see Fig. 1) that it takes more than simple paranoia to take military threats from “South” against “North” seriously.

 Fig 1: Global Military Expenditures 2001  
(SIPRI Yearbook 2002, pp. 266-267)

The situation may be somewhat different with regard to non-military threats to our national identity, i.e. our “societal security” (Wæver & al. 1993). In principle this might be endangered by massive flows of immigrants and/or refugees from the Third World, as alleged by certain rights-wing groups in European countries, including Denmark. ODA might be instrumentalised to contribute to solving this alleged security problem, as has been suggested in the recent debate about using ODA resources to assist refugees in their immediate neighbourhoods in order to guard against them coming to our part of the world (Møller 2002). Before accepting this argument at face value one should, however, realise that by far the majority of the world’s refugees already remain in neighbouring countries, i.e. in the Third World—and realise how easily this argument may be combined with xenophobia and racism.

As we shall see below, terrorism originating in the Third World may, of course, threaten the human (i.e. individual) security of Danes and other people of the North (Commission on Human Security 2003; Thomas & Wilkin, eds. 1999) as might, in principle, crime and/or contagious diseases stemming from the developing countries. On the other hand, the real risk which these problems may constitute (e.g. measured in fatalities) is very low compared to other risks which we willingly take. Nevertheless, it might make some sense to use ODA to help solving these problems, e.g. through public health programmes and crime prevention schemes in the Third World with a view to preventing these problems from reaching our part of the world.
Regardless of the questionable reality and severity of these potential security problems there is something to be said both for and against including them as criteria for the allocation of ODA. In favour of so doing might speak the hope that cutbacks of ODA might be averted if a convincing case could be made that giving aid is in our own best interest, i.e. that it could enhance our security. Whoever is (as the present author) in favour of an expansion of development aid might therefore be tempted to refer to selfish security interests as an argument, regardless of the logical and empirical case for doing so.

Against doing so speaks the risk of a backlash. If security considerations are allowed to play a decisive role in the “rightsizing” of ODA, the latter becomes vulnerable to any reevaluation of the threats. Should the fear of security threats (rightly) be assessed as minor and/or declining it would seem obvious to reduce the volume of ODA, just as it would be logical to reduce it if other and more serious threats should appear on the horizon, for the countering of which ODA would be obviously useless.

One might further fear a schewing of ODA distribution towards our own immediate neighbourhood if security considerations become decisive. Presumably countries in our neighbourhood will (ceteris paribus) be regarded as the most likely sources of threat and hence be eligible for the lion’s share of ODA, regardless of the actual needs of these recipients in comparison with others. Or one might decide to make countries that would otherwise not qualify as ODA recipients eligible for it as a contribution to their democratisation, hence presumably as a contribution to our security—as recently suggested by the Danish government (Udenrigsministeriet 2003, s. 8). Countries such as Mozambique thus risk receiving a declining share, as it strains the imagination to envision threats against Danish security emanating from Southern Africa. Finally, the ethics in allowing selfish security interests to determine aid is questionable. If this form of aid is actually granted primarily as a contribution to Danish security, the means for it should rightly be taken from the defence rather than from the aid budget.

All considered the arguments against allowing our own security concerns to play a decisive role in determining the size and distribution of aid seem to outweigh those in favour—which does not, however, mean that it does not make good sense to include them as supplementary criteria. The case is rather different if we take the security needs of potential recipients of aid as our analytical point of departure.

1.2 ODA and their security

If we uphold the principle that aid is granted with a view to helping peoples of the Third World, it makes perfect sense to also include the security requirements of these populations in our considerations as to who should receive how much aid and in what form.

There is an intrinsic link between development and security, even though it is more complex
that one might assume. If we commence with the national (i.e. state) security of Third World countries, a few authors have argued that the military expenditures required for this security may play a positive role in furthering economic development (Benoit 1973). However, today there is near unanimity that military expenditures come at the expense of economic and social development (Ball 1988; Brauer & Dunne, red. 2003).

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that many countries in the developing world have quite genuine security problems, e.g. in the form of unpleasant neighbours, which may make military expenditures indispensable, their negative impact on development notwithstanding. In the best of cases an adequate defensive capability may contribute to maintaining a regional balance of power, thereby preventing wars with all their negative implications for economic and social development. Even in the worst case, defence expenditures may help prevent such defeat and subsequent occupation as may also cost dearly. Even though one might thus justify actual military assistance as development aid, the opposite logic seems to hold sway, i.e. that otherwise ODA-eligible countries may forfeit their “right” to ODA if their military expenditures are judged to be excessive. Hence, recipient countries may be forced to “pay” for their development with a deterioration of their national security.

As far as societal security is concerned, national identities in many Third World countries are very much threatened by refugee flows of entirely different proportion than what Europe has experienced. In the year 2001 Sudan was, for instance, “host” to no less than 324,000 refugees from Eritrea, while Ethiopia had to host 67,000 refugees from Somalia and 90,000 from Sudan (UNHCR 2001, pp. 82-94), which may well any “delicate balances” between ethnic groups in the host countries and exacerbate inter-ethnic resentments, hatreds and rivalries. Even though some of the refugee flows are surely due to either poverty pure and simple or to natural disasters, many also flee from wars and civil wars—which means that the societal security of Sudan and Ethiopia might be enhanced by preventing or mitigating armed conflicts in their respective neighbouring countries.

Even more serious than national and societal security, however, is the state of human security in the Third World, i.e. the threats to the survival and quality of life of its populations. Not only is human security threatened indirectly by refugee flows which may deprive the already under-nurished local population of food, or by wars which may lead to hostile occupation. It is also threatened directly by the lack of development. In the terminology of the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung the peoples of the Third Worlds are victims of “structural violence” which may be defined as “relative deprivation”, i.e. as having at one’s disposal less that would be possible (Galtung 1975). Hence human security may be almost synonymous with an absence of structural violence, i.e. with economic and social development (Møller 2001). Besides this structural violence, moreover, life in the Third World tends also to be replete with direct violence, e.g. in the form of armed conflicts or violent crime. Besides constituting a major problem in its own right, such violence also tends to affect economic development negatively, e.g. as crops are destroyed by passing warlords or as those peasant and farmworkers who should secure the harvests are forced to flee the struggle.
It therefore makes perfect sense to combine development aid with efforts to prevent, manage or resolve such conflicts, as Danida did in 2000 (Udenrigsministeriet 2000). Conflict prevention and/or resolution is simply a logical companion of poverty relief and good governance, as violent conflicts have a clear propensity to exacerbate poverty and make bad governance even worse. The reverse logic also applies, as poverty relief and the furthering of good governance, democracy and human rights are quite effective means of conflict prevention. It thus makes sense to devote some ODA resources to, for instance, local, national or regional training programmes in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as has happened in Southern Africa and elsewhere. As soon as we move from “soft” (i.e. non-military) security to “hard” security, including the use of military instruments, however, some “taboos” have to be broken and donor countries may find themselves facing some uncomfortable dilemmas.

- Should we, e.g., support the creation of a military capacity for peacekeeping operations (as Denmark has done in Africa), thus running the risk that this capacity may be abused for less peaceful purposes?
- Should we seek to prevent a re-ignition of a conflict just resolved (as in Angola) by granting support to the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants (Kingma, red. 2000), thus priviliging them over the “real civilians” who have usually been the innocent victims of the conflict?
- Should ODA funds be made available for the purchase of weapons for destruction—which may well be the best way to solve the problem of an excessive proliferation of small arms in the aftermath of an armed conflict (Boutwell & al., eds., 1995; Dhanapala & al., eds. 1999)—if this entails the risk that weapons may be smuggled in from neighbouring countries with a view to being sold?
- Should we perhaps even use ODA funds to support the military defence of recipient countries, e.g. with a view to such strengthened border defences as might help prevent conflicts from spreading—but with the risk that the weapons supplied may also be used for attack or for the repression of the population by the incumbent regime?

There is thus a significant risk that donor countries may not be able to unhold their policy of “clean hands”, but that they may end up with “blood on their hands”, even when guided by the best of intentions. On the other hand, quite a strong case can be made to the effect that not doing anything may be the worst of all alternative courses of action.

2 TERRORISM AND DEVELOPMENTS AID

It should come as no surprise that the questions raised by terrorism resemble those related to security
and conflict prevention, as terror is simply one among several ways in which a conflict can be fought out (Prins 2002, pp. 63-94). Hence, terror prevention and counter-terrorism are merely subcategories of conflict prevention and management. Seen in this light it appears logical to incorporate considerations about terrorism in the goals and strategies for development aid, as it happened with Danida’s 2002 revision of its development policy (Udenrigsministeriet 2002). There are, however, many pitfalls in this approach and a serious risk of schewing ODA in an undesirable direction.

As with regard to security and conflict it makes sense to distinguish here between “terror against us” and “terror against them”, even though this comparison inevitably makes the former pale considerably. There is simply a vast gap between the around three thousand victims of the 11 September attacks and the estimated around three million victims of the civil war in the DR Congo since 1998 (IRC 2003), which may also deserve the label “terror”. Whether to call it so depends, of course, on the definition of terrorism.

Unfortunately, no authoritative definition of the term exists, but most suggested definitions concur in referring to massive and organised violence against civilians as a common feature (Heyman 1998, pp. 3-7), to which might be added that terror by definition (or, to be more precise, according to most definitions) is perpetrated by non-state actors. Not because states are innocent, but simply because the (usually much more massive) violence which they perpetrate, also against civilians, is normally called something else. I shall therefore proceed from the tentative definition of terrorism as “massive, organised violence perpetrated against civilians by non-state actors”.

### 2.1 ODA and the terrorist threat to them

According to the above definition, terror is quite widespread in the Third World, where most violent conflicts feature elements of terror. Indeed many of those conflicts which have been labeled “new wars” (Kaldor 1999), “uncivil wars” (Snow 1996) or “wars of the third kind” (Holsti 1996) are primarily waged against civilians. This sets them apart from “old” or “regular wars” which are primarily fought against the formal agents of the respective opponent, i.e. his regular troops, and where civilian casualties are therefore “collateral”, i.e. unintended (See Table 2).

Particularly extreme examples of rebel movements which have thus waged war against civilians include UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) in Angola (Brittain 1998; Maier 1996) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Abdullah & Muana 1998; Richards 1996) – both of which have now been defeated — and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda (Behrend 1998) which is continuing its atrocious struggle. Another example is the Interahamwe militia which played a major role in perpetrating the genocide in Rwanda in the spring of 1994 (Kakwenzire & Kamukaka 2000; Mamdani 2001, pp. 185-233), and the survivors of which have since wreaked havoc in the DR Congo as parties in the civil war (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, pp. 223-225; ICG 2000; ICG 2003a).
Table 2: The Development of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Premodern</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>New/Neo-archaic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who?</td>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>Conscripts</td>
<td>Militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Amateurs”</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Child soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On whose behalf?</td>
<td>Clan or tribe</td>
<td>The State</td>
<td>The Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feudal lords</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic or religious group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Warlords</td>
<td></td>
<td>Warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against whom?</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
<td>Economic: booty</td>
<td>Political: Territory, sovereignty, power</td>
<td>Individual or group interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though groups such as these undoubtedly deserve the label “terrorist”, one should be mindful to the fact that incumbent governments (who do not always differ much from rebels in their choice of methods) often pin the terrorist label on their opponents. So did, for instance, the apartheid regime in South Africa on the ANC—and not just on its armed forces, the Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), which had actually carried out bomb attacks and the like, but on the entire organisation (Whittaker, ed. 2001, pp. 220-236). In the aftermath of the 11 September, moreover, Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe in a blatant, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at courting the United States, did the same with regard to his political opponents in the Movement for Democratic Change, MDC (ICG 2002, pp. 4-5). Similar developments have been seen in the Arab states, as pointed out by the UN Development Programme in the 2003 version of its Arab Human Development Report:

Following the bloody events of September 11 and the loss of innocent lives in violation of all man-made and divine laws, a number of countries have adopted extreme security measures and policies as part of the “war on terrorism”. These measures and policies, however, exceeded their original goals and led to the erosion of civil and political liberties in many countries in the world (…) One of the worst consequences of freedom-constraining measures in developed countries is that they gave authorities in some Arab countries another excuse to enact new laws limiting civil and political freedoms. (UNDP 2003, pp. 1-2).

Even though it would thus be problematic to always accept at face value the incumbent government’s presentation of the problem, there may be good reasons to allocate aid resources to preventing and combating terrorism and terrorists such as those mentioned above. Almost the same considerations apply to terrorism as to security.

Certain forms of terrorism may threaten national (i.e. state) security, i.e. by being directed against the state or government as the “real” target, even though the immediate victims are civilians—as when a rebel movement seeks to spread chaos in order to weaken the state with a view to subsequently taking over state power, as was the case of the NPLF (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) in Liberia in the first half of the nineties (Ellis 1999; Huband 1998). They actually succeeded in bringing to power the former warlord Charles Taylor through a landslide victory in (more or less
democratic) elections, which seems to have reflected the fear among the electorate of a new period of state collapse and chaos, should he have lost at the ballot boxes (Alao & al. 1999, pp. 103-107).

For the prevention of this form of terrorism programmes for good governance, strengthening of democracy and the promotion of human rights recommend themselves as does support for (the non-violent and non-terrorist parts of) civil society. For combating terrorism in cases of unsuccessful prevention, however, it may be most relevant to strengthen the state, which should preferably be combined with power-sharing measures, allowing former rebel and terrorist leaders a say in political matters, e.g. by cooptation or even by offering them a seat in government, as happened with the former Renamo movement in Mozambique (Hume 1994; Synge 1997) and as it was attempted in the mid-nineties (and is presently being retried again) with UNITA in Angola (Hare 1998; ICG 2003b).

Other forms of terrorism are directed against societal security, i.e. against the identities of ethnic or other groups. A particularly heinous form of terrorism (e.g. practiced in the former Yugoslavia) has been organised mass rape—not merely intended by the organisers to “please” their own troops, but also to “infect” the victims, not merely as individuals but also as those on whom the reproduction of the nation or ethnic group depends (Kaldor 1999, p. 52). A muslim woman who has been raped, perhaps even impregnated, by a Serbian soldier is no longer capable of transmitting the ethnic identity to her children, at least not according to more fundamentalist versions of Islam.

For the prevention of such forms of terrorism any measure is useful which may serve to erode ethnic or religious barriers, in which connection education is vital. Support for mass media dedicated to furthering mutual understanding among societal groups may likewise be valuable. Just as a hate radio such as the infamous Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines in Rwanda could lay the groundwork for (and subsequently orchestrate and direct) a genocide of catastrophic proportions (Chalk 2000), radio stations such as Studio Jambo in Burundi (sponsored, among others, by the international NGO Search for Common Ground can presumably help preventing such disasters. Even trivial soap operas may promote this objective by depicting members of the opposing societal groups (in casu Hutus og Tutsis just as in Rwanda) as individuals rather than ethnic stereotypes.

Most forms of terrorism in the developing world as well as elsewhere, however, are directed against individuals, i.e. they represent an acute threat to human security in the sense of survival and quality of life, material as well as mental. Such terrorism is often motivated by personal hatreds (albeit often deliberately cultivated by unscrupulous leaders), which tend to affect mainly male youths who have been uprooted and marginalised as a result of economic developments (Richards 1996, pp. 87-114)—or even children who in the role as child soldiers appear in disturbing numbers in many of especially Africa’s armed conflicts, and who are often even more brutalised and terroristically inclined than the adult rebels (Goodwin-Gill & Cohn 1994; Furley 1995).

Prevention of terrorism as a threat against human security is primarily a matter of promoting “soft” values and combating the “gun culture” which unfortunately reigns in many countries, not least in Africa (Cock 1997). This may happen through improved education as well as via support for civil
society. It will also be tremendously important to ensure that the young people (who statistically form a much larger share of the total population than in the developed world) have reasonable prospects for the future. Defeating this form of terrorism in the case of failed prevention will largely be a matter of strengthening and improving the police forces, not merely technically but also with regard to their ability to collaborate with civil society—and it thus makes perfect sense that Danida supports several such programmes in Africa.

In conclusion, there are thus good reasons for allocating ODA funds for terror prevention and counter-terrorism in developing countries, provided only that the overall objective of aid remains to help the recipients rather than the donors. Unfortunately, however, most of the current debate about terrorism and aid is devoted to the latter objective.

### 2.2 ODA and the terrorist threat against us

It is perfectly understandable that the threat of “Islamic terror” attracted much attention in the wake of the 11 September attacks. Nevertheless, this cannot justify sacrificing all sense of proportions.

A sober analysis shows terrorism to be, at most, a minor problem in the developed world, where the risk of dying from terrorism is much lower than that of dying from, e.g., traffic accidents, smoking, unhealthy food or other “welfare phenomena”. In the United States the risk of violent death from ordinary crime or shootings has thus always been much higher than that of dying from terrorist attacks. Even in the *annus horribilis* of 2001, the number of homicides in the USA was (according to FBI statistics) 13,752 (of which 8,719 with handguns), which should be compared to what was at that time the official estimate of 2,823 World Trade Centre fatalities (FBI 2001, pp. 23 and 302).

One cannot even demonstrate that neither international terrorism or terrorism pure and simple are generally on the rise. On the contrary, the emerging picture from the last decades is one of ups and downs which do not really form a trend (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the changes from year to year have almost invariably been due to very specific causes such as breakthroughs or setbacks in the
Middle Eastern peace process or improvements or deteriorations in relations between India and Pakistan.

Moreover, terrorism has typically not hit the global “North” and not at all blindly (see Table 3). On the contrary, it has been concentrated in other continents and usually been accurately targeted, simply because it has mostly been motivated by concrete political goals. Targets have included Israel (because of the Palestine conflict), the UK (because of Northern Ireland), Spain (due to the Basque conflict), India (related to the Kashmir conflict), Russia (because of Chechnya), etc.. Most other countries, including Denmark have hardly experienced any terrorist attacks at all, even though some of their citizens may have been hit inadvertently, simply because they happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

What may be new and a reason for concern is the size of terrorist attacks (see Table 3) as well as the motivation for some of the largest ones, even though it is too early to tell whether there are isolated incidents or harbingers of an emergent trend.

### Table 3: International Terrorism (US State Department 2003, pp. 162-163)

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<td>21</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>178</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>68.0</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>804</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>172</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>241</td>
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<td>395</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>325.7</td>
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<td>5,379</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,856</td>
<td>976.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>750.8</td>
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<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>615</td>
<td>765</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>914</td>
<td>6,694</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>5,431</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>17,928</td>
<td>2,988.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Victims per attack (average) | 3.0 | 24.4 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 15.3 | 13.8 | 9.2 | - |

Whereas most previous terrorist attacks had relatively well defined and limited political goals, groups such as the Japanese sect Aum Shinriko, responsible for the poison gas attack in the Tokyo metro in 1995 (Kaplan 2000; Juergensmeyer 2000, pp. 102-116) and the al-Qaeda network (Williams 2002) have apparently no real political goals. As shown by Mark Juergensmeyer (2000, pp. 119-243; cf. Laqueur 1999, pp. 127-155) they rather see themselves as engaged in a “cosmic war” between nothing less than Good and Evil. This may justify absolute ends and objectives and the resort to unlimited means to achieve them, perhaps even weapons of mass destruction (Tucker, ed. 2000; Laqueur 1999; Gurr & Cole 2000) such as nuclear weapons or biological weapons designed to cause infectious and
deadly diseases. In view of prospects such as these it stands to reason that international terrorism can only be trivialised at one’s own peril. Acknowledging it as a serious problem, however, raises two questions, i.e. how to prevent or defeat it and whether development aid may be instrumentalised for this purpose.

As a minimum, donor countries such as Denmark may obviously demand from prospective recipients of ODA, be they countries or organisations, that they refrain from engaging in or supporting terror directed against ourselves or our allies. Nobody is neither legally nor morally obliged to provide weapons or other support to one’s direct enemies. Applying this minimum criterion is rather unproblematic for a country such as Denmark, as by far the largest part of our ODA is anyhow granted to countries where international terrorism represents no problem. Problems may, however, arise with regard to reconstruction assistance to organisations in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq where it may be difficult to ensure that these recipients do not clandestinely support international terrorism (or begin to do so at a later stage)—a complication which may also arise with regard to aid to the Palestinian authorities.

Regardless of how reasonable such minimum demands may be, there is no reason to expect their application to have any major effect in terms of preventing or combatting international terrorism, thereby improving our (national, societal or human) security. Indeed, it may even have the opposite effect. If we were to choose to support the most fanatical and extreme terrorist organisations, we might actually achieve such an improvement in the sense of moving down several places on their list of future targets. Needless to say, however, thus paying terrorists “protection money” in the form of ODA would be totally unjustifiable, both politically and morally.

As correctly formulated in the Danish government’s strategy plan for ODA in the coming five-year period, *A World of Difference*, the main contribution of development aid to the fight against terrorism is of a more general nature, i.e. to “fight the underdevelopment and the hopelessness that create an ideal breeding ground for religious fundamentalism and political radicalisation.” It therefore also appears sensible that “the Government will significantly enhance efforts to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and to stabilise and consolidate peace, both bilaterally and multilaterally”. (MFA 2003, pp. 2 and 8). Unfortunately, however, this is much easier said than done, as the connections are quite complex and may differ from country to country.

The first dilemma to address is how to weigh considerations of terror prevention and counter-terrorism against those of poverty alleviation and other traditional ODA objectives. There does not seem to be any clear link between poverty and terrorism (Midlarsky 1999, pp. 231-247), neither in the sense that terrorists are usually poor nor that they tend to come from poor countries. On the contrary, the typical terrorist comes from the urban middle class, but has often been (and almost always feels) marginalised (Bell 1998, s. 74-102; Laqueur s. 90-97; Sullivan 2001). If he (almost all terrorists are men) were to be made eligible for aid, this would almost inevitably be at the expense of the poor, the rural population and women who have traditionally (and rightly so) been the preferred recipients.
Furthermore, the typical recruiting countries for terrorists do not belong to the world’s poorest. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia was the country of origin of most of the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks—but to grant development assistance to a country with an annual per capita income of more than 10,000 US dollars (UNDP s. 165) would be obviously absurd. The poorest countries of the world are, on the other hand, not the typical breeding grounds for terrorism, even though certain very poor countries may serve as convenient bases of operation for terrorist organisations or networks. Even in such cases, however, this is not so much because of poverty as such, but a result of these countries having weak or even collapsed state structures, as was obviously the case in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995; Kaplan 2001; Mishra 2002a; 2002b) and as may in the future be the case of e.g. Somalia (Kansteiner 2002). To prevent this from happening probably requires a reconstruction of the collapsed states almost from scratch, both economically, politically, administratively and politically—for which purposes the granting of ODA funds would seem obvious.

Perhaps equally important is the psychological factor. Both the typical terrorists and their supporters and “constituencies” (as well as a very large part of the general population, perhaps even the majority) feel that they are being treated unfairly and perceive their identity as being threatened by the “MacWorld” of globalisation which may explain their resort to “Jihad”, as aptly formulated in Samuel Barber’s bestseller (2001. See also Robertson 1992). Furthermore, according to some analysts (Mousseau 2002) the population in many developing countries feels that their “clientilistic” culture, resting on lasting personal bonds, is being pushed aside by the market culture featuring less solid and short-term contractual relations. This is not perceived as a clash of cultures or civilisations in the sense of Samuel Huntington (1996), but rather as a struggle for the survival of their culture in an uneven struggle against our lack of culture. In such a situation even terrorism may appear as legitimate—but development aid granted without hidden selfish motives or demeaning and humiliating conditionalities may help prevent the spread of such attitudes.

3 Conclusion

There thus seems to be some sense in allowing terror prevention and counter-terrorism as well as more general security political consideration to play a certain role alongside other rationales for granting ODA. Primarily it makes sense to strengthen the security of the recipients of aid, also against terrorism, as this is a precondition for meeting the other objectives of development aid. Secondarily, certain forms of development aid may also contribute modestly to our security, partly as means of terror prevention. However, it would be unwise to expect swift or dramatic results of this, and as argued above it will be of the utmost importance to avoid a patronising posture in the allocation of aid to countries and projects, as this risks exacerbating the problem by reinforcing the impression of an uneven struggle between culture and power.
4 LITERATURE


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