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Sub-theme 09: [SWG] Organizational Paradox

Change for Good? Organizational Paradoxes and Unintended Consequences of Transforming
Modern Societies

**Exploring the unintended consequences of managerial ‘paradox sharing’
with subordinates and superiors. The case of the Royal Danish Defence**

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Abstract: This paper connects with the ongoing debate on the dark side of paradoxes and with the EGOS paradox subtheme call for papers on unintended paradoxes posing the question of how responses to paradoxical tensions by some actors give rise to unintended or negative consequences with negative repercussions for other actors. We report from case study in the Royal Danish Defence whose leadership philosophy, training and evaluation is based paradoxes. Our analysis shows that unintended consequences are salient, when: 1) paradoxes are perceived as having been delegated too far down the hierarchical line unaccompanied by the necessary resources to pursue a “both-and”-strategy; or 2) when a both-and approach has been communicated from upper level management, yet the experience further down the line is that the approach is in fact one-sided. In addition, a third typical outcome was positive unintended consequences in the form of the unexpected activation of paradox coping strategies by subordinates to counter unintended consequences of paradox coping strategies at higher hierarchical levels. Our ethnographic study points beyond our original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ with subordinates and superiors in “paradox trios” giving rise to suggestions of a “managerial paradox eco-system”-perspective exploring paradoxes relationally, i.e. focusing on the fact that individual actors’ paradox

coping strategies influence and are influenced by other actors' coping space and available coping strategy repertoire. We also suggest that not only inclusion and identification of relevant stakeholders in the managerial paradox eco-system is relevant, but also that the "paradox readiness" of these stakeholders plays a significant role.

Introduction

"As complexity, change and ambiguity intensify in organizations, so does the value of a paradox lens and both/and approaches to theory and practice."

(Schad, Lewis, Raisch & Smith, 2016, p. 5).

Organizational paradox theory (e.g., Smith, Lewis, Jarzabkowski & Langley, 2017; Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Lewis & Smith, 2014.) is a growing and increasingly successful research area, not least due to its relevance in a world characterized as VUCA-volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014) and grand societal challenges" such climate change and migration (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi & Tihanyi, 2016). Paradox theory offers a pathway for understanding organization and their actions in such circumstances (Bourton, Lavoie & Vogel, 2018; Lüscher, 2018; Johnson, 2014) as well as a way of making sense of ongoing change and complexity for managers and other organizational actors (Nielsen, Mogensen, Bévort, Henriksen, Hjalager & Lyndgaard, 2019). By depicting the world of contemporary organizing and management in keeping with the way things are rather than how we would wish they were (Johansen, 2018), paradoxical thinking can empower managers. At the same time, warnings of a trap of success for organizational paradox research have begun to surface (Cunha & Putnam, 2017), pointing to the need to proactively explore a diversity of perspectives (Schad, Lewis & Smith, 2019) not least a critical perspective zooming in on the dark sides and the (negative) unintended consequences of paradox navigation as a leadership strategy (van Bommel & Spicer, 2017; Berti & Simpson, 2019).

We report from an ongoing mixed methods case study exploring the interaction between three levels of managers and their experiences of unintended consequences of paradox leadership in the Royal Danish Defence. The Royal Danish Defence is an interesting case, as this organization has been actively and explicitly working with paradox thinking and

theory for the past 10 years, and their leadership philosophy, leadership training and evaluation is based on selected core paradoxes deemed particularly relevant for the Royal Danish Defence. We aim to explore the consequences of “sharing of paradoxes” across managerial levels, and how this is experienced in practice by paradox managers.

The paper is structured as follows: First, we position our exploration of unintended inter-managerial consequences of paradox leadership within paradox theory and the recent focus on power and unintended consequences. Second, we present our research design and methodology including a case presentation of the Royal Danish Defence and its paradox-based leadership philosophy. Third, we present the results of an ethnographic study observation and interaction with managers participating in paradox leadership training conducted by the case organization’s leadership development unit zooming in on the (negative as well as positive) unintended consequences of paradox leadership. The last section concludes on the analysis and emphasizes the importance of exploring interaction effects among different levels of managers and employees to realize the full potential of paradox thinking in practice – in both individual organizations, society and paradox research.

Theoretical framing

This short paper connects with ongoing debate on the darker aspects of paradox leadership and with the paradox subtheme call for papers on unintended consequences paradoxes posing the question of how “the dynamics of responding to paradoxical tensions by some actors give rise to unintended or negative consequences that may actually exacerbate tensions for others” (Hahn, Jarzabkowski & Knight, 2019). As a recent article on disempowerment and paradoxes observe: “*Paradox theory tends to be “rather power-neutral” (van Bommel & Spicer 2017, p. 156), neglecting to acknowledge “what seems paradoxical higher up appears confusing and absurd lower down” (Czarniawska 1997, p. 97)*” (Berti & Simpson, 2019, p. 4). Tensions are experienced differently at different levels (Schad & Bansal, 2018), and the successful coping strategy of one level may exacerbate (or alleviate) tensions at other levels (Clegg, da Cunha & e Cunha, 2002, p. 484): “[T]he two poles of a paradox may operate at different levels in the organization. A given dynamic may be true of individual behavior but the opposite may apply at the organizational level.”

Not only are paradoxical tensions experienced differently by different managers at different hierarchical levels and contexts, they also interact between levels and in this respect the aspect

of power in terms of resource access, mandate and competences becomes important. Interpretation of paradoxical tensions may differ, but the degree to which actors are equipped and able to choose an appropriate course of action also differs. The room to maneuver are unevenly distributed among hierarchical levels, and so lower level managers or non-managers may be confronted by paradox, but have little opportunity to cope. The individual managers' coping strategies also impact their stakeholders such as for instance their subordinates or immediate superiors and they are in turn influenced by these actors' coping strategies. This begs the question of how managers experience and cope with the unintended consequences of their own paradox navigation and that of their subordinates and superiors.

Research Design & Methodology

Our exploration of the unintended consequences of “paradox sharing” between managers and their subordinates takes its point of departure in an ethnographic exploratory study: Participant and participating observation at the management development educational program of the Royal Danish Defence College, where all managers are trained in paradox theory and thinking with a point of departure in the leadership codex. Numerous observations was made by the second author, who teaches the program and also conducts 1:1-talks with follow-up on the participating managers' experiences with working with paradox in practice.

We have explored an insider-outsider research design (Louis & Bartunek, 1992), where the first author, who is unaffiliated with the case organization, has had the role of the detached outsider voice. To be able to open-endedly explore the ethnographic experiences of the second author, the first author has conducted interviews with the second author before, during and after data analysis. Three rounds of data sensemaking iterations has been carried out, where we explored and made sense of the field notes, teaching materials as well as insights from a paradox-focused 180-degree leadership evaluation scheme originally devised by the second author and colleagues from his team at the Royal Defence College (now operated by the HR function of the Royal Danish Defence).

Both authors have held two rounds of meetings with the director of the Institute for Leadership and Organisation at the Royal Defence College. The director is the manager of the department in charge of paradox training and he was lead strategist and project manager of the process leading to the formulation of the current paradox-based leadership philosophy of the Royal Danish Defense – a topic that he also pursued in a PhD study (Holsting, 2017).

In addition, a number of archival sources have been supportive in allowing the first author to navigate the complex workings of the Royal Danish Defence as well as be able to assume a skeptical, yet knowledgeable outsider position of being able to not only listen, but also pose critical, curious questions.

Unintended consequences – COVID19

In the submitted EGOS-short paper, the original idea was to explore the findings of the ethnographic study further by exploring paradox coping in action. This was to (and will be at a later point) be carried out by conducting a qualitative analysis consisting of interviews and focus group interviews with three managers, their individual immediate managers and a group of 5 subordinates per managers (“paradox trios”). In these interviews, the experience of coping with paradox would be analysed with a view exploring the interrelationship between the individual managers’ paradox navigation and coping strategies and how this is experienced by managers, their subordinates and their immediate managers. We planned to combine these data with a quantitative analysis of 360-degree manager performance appraisals based on the paradox-based leadership philosophy of the Royal Danish Defence from trio respondents. Unfortunately, the performance appraisal cycle was put to a halt due to COVID and the quantitative data set we intended to gather cannot be collected until the autumn of 2020. Also, many of the employees and managers that we intended to interview was sent home or directed to other activities that their usual tasks making recruitment of respondents difficult or in many cases impossible leaving us with incomplete “paradox trios”. As a consequence, this paper will report only from the ethnographic study.

This situation in turn has the positive effect that we can report from and leave room for a more detailed discussion of findings from the ethnographic study that pointed beyond our original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ with subordinates and superiors in “paradox trios” giving rise to discussion about a “paradox stakeholder perspective” or “managerial paradox eco-system” as well as deliberations about the importance of the “paradox readiness” of managerial paradox stakeholders. The EGOS paradox track seems a most relevant forum for making further sense of these insights as well as adding other perspectives to these interesting aspects of our ethnographic data.

Presentation of the case study organization: Paradox-based leadership philosophy in practice

The Danish Defence consists of approximately 20.000 employees, 15.000 in uniform. In 2008, the Danish Defence implemented a new Leadership Codex with the purpose of creating a shared understanding of modern leadership for all employees. It builds on three levels: 1) Philosophy (underlying assumptions), 2) Ethics (values for good leadership), and 3) Norms (actual leadership behavior). Prior to the implementation of The Leadership Codex in the Danish Defence, there were a set of 14 principles (value statements) for good leadership that had existed for almost 30 years. The Leadership principles was considered to be inadequate to guide the leaders of the Danish Defence in the challenges that they were facing due to several major changes in and around the organization; e.g., going from the territorial defence of Denmark to an expeditionary force to be used in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions abroad. The military found it selves in an increasing complexity both in the operating and administrative environment and at the same time were under severe pressure to optimize its financial management and implementation of New Public Management.

To cope with the increasing complexity and often opposing demands, it was decided to implement the Leadership Codex, which builds theoretical on paradox theory in general and hugely inspired by Cameron and Quinn's work on competing values framework (Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 2003). The main paradoxes arising from the tensions between focusing on the relations (employees) and results (performance) and from focusing on creating organizational stability or change. The goal was to strike a proper balance between the tensions, in effect a "both-and"-solution instead of an "either-or"-solution. This decision was aligned with the implementation in 2006 of the Danish Defence employee annual performance review concept based on the Leadership Codex. This was operationalized as a set of competencies that all employees were evaluated by based on actual behavior and called the Norm-level of the Leadership Codex. The same concept was used to asses and plan each employee's education and career progression.

The Value-level in the Leadership Codex was developed through a combination of strategic policy making and an involvement of the organization through 20 representative focus group interviews, 176 participants in all. The interviews aimed at identifying a collective understanding of the leadership roles and values that constituted good leadership behavior in the Danish Defence. This resulted in nine leadership values that all leaders in the

Danish Defence are obliged to follow. In addition, it resulted in the description of a set of conditions that should be created to increase the likelihood of adherence/compliance. So in a sense, this outline placed demands on the leaders, while at the same time outlining the conditions the leader could demand from the organization in order to be able to implement these values. All leadership education programs in the Danish Defence was aligned to support the Leadership Codex implementation in general and at some courses the leaders were in detail trained to analyze and act accordingly to leadership challenges viewed as paradoxical in nature. This meant to view the leadership task at hand as center of gravity and balancing their leadership affords around this task and thereby navigating the paradox instead of trying to solve it. In 2017, a quantitative concept for leadership evaluation founded on the Leadership Codex was implemented. This means that all leaders in the Danish Military are evaluated by their superior, themselves and their subordinates according to the philosophy, ethics and norms in the Leadership Codex.

Analysis: Unintended Consequences

The general feedback from internal Danish Defence surveys is that the managers of the Danish Defence see a lot of appreciation of the paradox-based Leadership Codex at all levels in the organization. They do, however, also observe some unintended consequences. These consequences are particularly voiced in the leadership courses where students bring and work on their own cases. Table 1 below summarizes the central themes arising from the participating observation and field notes of the second author exemplified as three types of typical unintended consequences:

Insert Table 1 about here

As shown in Table 1, the two of the most frequently experiences unintended consequences are when leadership paradoxes are pushed too far down the organization (exemplified by Manager 1) or when paradox leadership seems to be viewed as a sort of a promise to solve a problem that subsequently are not solved (exemplified by Manager 2).

When a paradox is pushed too far down the organization the person or group designated to handle the paradox find themselves in a position where they do not have the capacity/competencies nor the mandate/power to actually do anything about the challenges at hand. This often leads to frustration or even stress among the implicated participants. This could be in cases where the task is to step up production and at the same time reduce costs, e.g. train the soldiers to do more challenging task in a wider spectrum of combat scenarios but with less time to train them and you do not have the capacity to manage this paradox. Another example is when the task is to coordinate with other branches of the defence and get them to contribute with resources but with no authority make them do so.

The other unintended consequence observed is when paradox leadership is used as a promise to solve a problem that is the result of competing demands. This could be during a period of organizational change where the leaders promise to focus on both the changes at hand but also the stability of the routines in the organization. This so the organization simultaneously can prepare for the tasks of tomorrow and keep the level of the present operations. Often the employees find themselves in situations where they do not have enough resources or the right competencies to make the proper changes nor continue the level of operations expected of them. Then they feel that their leaders have not fulfilled their promise of handling both criteria for success/demands. This often leads to a diminishing level of trust between superior and subordinates and in severe cases employees leaving the organization.

Also apparent from Table 1, however, is that unintended consequences are not exclusively negative in nature (e.g., Manager 3). This suggests that although we tend to associate unintended consequences with negative synergies, we need to stay open to possible unintended upsides of sharing of paradoxes across managerial levels and with employees.

Paradox sharing: From “paradox trios” to “paradox eco-systems”

Our findings suggest that it is timely to explore paradoxes relationally, capturing the ways in which individual actors’ paradox coping strategies influence and are influence by other actors’ coping space and available coping strategy repertoire. Widening the scope beyond the individual managers enable us to see, how unintended consequences take place when different coping strategies interact. As mentioned in the methodology section of the paper, our study took an unexpected turn due to COVID 19, but also because some of the themes that surfaced in ethnographic study pointed to the fact that our initial idea of “paradox

trios” of a paradox system consisting of an “anchor manager” (being the focal point of the trio), the manager’s superiors as well as a group of subordinates were too limited. A larger group of stakeholders both inside and outside the case organization emerged as relevant stakeholders from the point of view of the individual manager’s room for maneuvering and coping with paradox in practice. Indeed, a larger group of stakeholders were identified as significant collaborators with whom paradoxes are shared and collectively coped with (or not coped with) – for instance external actors in the supply chain or international military partners or peers in horizontal arrangements internally in the organization (e.g.; matrix organizing and projects).

Particularly, data from feedback sessions between paradox trainers and paradox managers pointed to the fact that the challenges – as well as the upsides of working with paradox in practice – are likely to be experienced in the in-between landscapes of individual paradox leadership and relevant stakeholders in the hierarchical line, laterally or crossing organizational boundaries, what we seek to label a “managerial paradox eco-system”. Thus, our data directs our attention away from individual managers (and employees to a lesser extent) and suggest a move towards what has been termed third stage paradox research exploring paradox relationally (Smith, 2019). In much the same way as Sheep, Fairhurst and Khazanchi (2017) has called for research that focus on the interrelationships of tensions and paradoxes that function as triggers, mitigators, or amplifiers of other paradoxes, we suggest that managerial eco-system paradox coping also involves interaction effects where different stakeholders’ actions may trigger, mitigate, amplify or negate the experience and room for maneuvering of other stakeholders. Our previous analysis have uncovered that actors may affect each other negatively as well as positively.

Studying paradox in an eco-system also addresses the call for situated studies of paradox within organizations and their wider context, so that scholars examine paradoxes as emerging from organizing rather than surfacing as isolated problems to be tackled (Cunha & Putnam, 2019, p.102). Enhancing our knowledge about paradox stakeholders and eco-systems can reshape and redraw the paradoxical landscape potentially leading to a new, a presumably much messier and complicated map of organizational paradox than the one advanced by the now classical Smith & Lewis (2011). It is our assertion that a more complex understanding of organizational paradox is needed to bring the field closer to the organizational practice that paradox theory departs from.

“Paradox readiness” – threshold competency level for exploring paradox eco-systems?

Not only the identification and inclusion of a larger group of stakeholders emerged from our analysis of the ethnographic data; the “paradox readiness” of the actors in the managerial eco-system also surfaced as important for the paradox coping opportunity and resources available to what we term the “managerial paradox ecosystem”. The readiness of the managerial paradox eco-system not only depends on the paradox capabilities of individual managers. Our ethnographic study also suggest that the system surrounding the manager and the actors that deal with different dimensions of the paradox are significant players with regard to obtaining synergies, externalities or inertia. Particularly participants’ prior knowledge and experience with paradoxical leadership as well as an organizational dedication to focusing on and confronting paradox seems relevant. With regards to such paradox readiness or maturity, the data from the Royal Danish Defence is a special or even radical case in the sense that the organization has worked proactively and explicitly with paradox on the individual and organizational level for more than a decade.

Absorption and transfer rates of paradoxical thinking may vary considerably in a large organization such as the case organization, and as our analysis has pointed out that unintended consequences occur even in a matured system. Still, the organizational paradox capability building is at an advanced level in the case organization; paradoxical thinking and acting is a common framework for action and offers a shared vocabulary for collectively articulating and discussing paradoxical leadership: Managers, superiors and even subordinates - in the cases where subordinates are officers - have been trained in paradoxical thinking and leadership in general and the leadership philosophy of the Royal Danish Defence in particular. Also, the official leadership philosophy is espoused from top management supported by a broad range of internal communication such as training materials, missions statements and not least an elaborate performance management system measuring managerial performance using ability to live the leadership philosophy and the organizational paradoxes chosen by the Royal Danish Defence as a yardstick.

The eloquence and competency level of organizational actors has made the experience of exploring paradox in the Royal Danish Defence special in comparison to other organizations, where organizational support and individual managerial competency development for paradoxical thinking is not as advanced. Managers may often detect and experience paradox as sensation of uncertainty and confusion, experiencing what Lüscher &

Lewis (2008) has termed “messiness”. Indeed, one of the difficulties of paradox theory identified in the paradox literature is that managers rarely speak of their problems as paradoxes (Gaim, 2018). This means that interventions and data collection must start from “Adam and Eve” – even the ability to be able to identify and understand paradox thinking as well as acquisition of the vocabulary (e.g., distinguishing paradoxes from “difficult problems” or challenges in general) is a difficult and for some managers insurmountable task (Sleesman, 2019; Nielsen, Mogensen, Bevort, Henriksen, Hjalager & Lyndgaard, 2019).

As an illustration, it was found in a recent research project involving 55 Danish managers from private SMEs in a series of eight action learning-interventions focused on the development of paradox coping competence that just getting participants past the initial barrier of understanding paradoxical thinking on an overall level, identifying and naming a paradox relevant for their individual managerial practice took extensive effort on the part of both facilitators and participants (Mogensen, Nielsen, Henriksen, Bevort & Vikkelsø, 2018). Only at the end of the six months intervention, a larger number of participants had familiarized themselves with the vocabulary and thinking involved in paradox theory. It is our assertion that the competency level found in this action learning-study is much more typical setting for paradox research than the development levels found in the Royal Danish Defence.

The challenges of engaging with organizational practice and actors in paradox studies have caused concern among paradox scholars that paradox be reduced and tamed beyond recognition so as to accommodate practitioner difficulties with paradox research in order to be able to engage practitioners for interventions and/or data collection (Cunha & Putnam, 2019). One way of passing the difficult first paradox identification and paradox naming-threshold of managers as well as the “the paradox reduction trap” is to investigate organizations and managers that are already experienced with paradox leadership. This creates opportunities for researchers to avoid “taming” or even “laming” paradoxes, when paradoxes are studied in their wild, natural habitat.

Although it may be relevant to explore paradox eco-systems in a variety of contexts regardless of actors’ and organization’s degree of paradox maturity/readiness, it is our assertion that inquiries into eco-system paradox coping may necessitate access to systems of more matured paradox navigators – or a research design with lengthy ethnographic studies, participant observation and or action learning/action research design such as has been suggested by Fairhurst (2019).

At the same time, the case of the Royal Danish Defence also points to the fact that paradox scholars may not find virgin territory to be educated and absorbed by the academic discourse as more organizations adapt and implement paradoxical leadership as a governance and/or leadership philosophy. In more matured organizations such as the Royal Danish Defence, ability to acquire the paradox language of the organizations in order to capture what may be a more or equally advanced level of knowledge of paradox is important. Data collecting that does not only avoid reducing or “deparadoxifying” paradox, but also ascertain that informants and researchers are discussing the same issue is important to capture paradox in the wild as well as learning from paradox practitioners in organizations working strategically and explicitly with organizational paradox. Although paradox scholars lament the current situation of high entry barriers for organizational practitioners to our field complicating communication and dialogue, we may soon find fewer white spots on the map.

Conclusion

Increasing our understanding of the consequences of paradox leadership for different levels of managers as well as non-managerial staff is important for the advancement of paradox theory as well as practice. In a contemporary organization and organizing, where self-leadership, co-leadership and other leadership philosophies foreseeing delegating of responsibility and risk to lower level managers and employees is in the rise, mitigating negative unintended consequences as well as reaping the benefits of positive unintended consequences come to the fore.

This paper has reported from an ethnographic case study on the interaction between managers and their experiences of unintended consequences with paradox leadership in the Royal Danish Defence. We have analyzed ethnographic, observational data and field notes on managerial experiences of unintended consequences of paradox leadership when interacting with subordinates and immediate superiors. We have shown that typical unintended consequences are salient, when: 1) paradoxes are perceived as having been delegated too far down the hierarchical line unaccompanied by the necessary resources or mandate to adequately cope in accordance with a “both-and”-strategy; or 2) when a both-and approach has been communicated from upper level management, yet the experience further down the line is that the approach is in fact one-sided. In addition, a third typical outcome was positive unintended consequences in the form of the unexpected activation of paradox coping

strategies by subordinates to counter unintended consequences of paradox coping strategies at higher hierarchical levels.

Based on themes surfacing from our data, we also discuss the need for paradox studies to include a wider range of stakeholders in the exploration of both intended as well as unintended negative and positive consequences of managerial coping with paradox. Our ethnographic study points beyond our original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ with subordinates and superiors in “paradox trios” giving rise to our suggestions of a “paradox stakeholder perspective” or “managerial paradox eco-system”-perspective exploring paradoxes relationally, i.e. focusing on the fact that individual actors’ paradox coping strategies influence and are influence by other actors’ coping space and available coping strategy repertoire. We also suggest that not only inclusion and identification of relevant stakeholders in the managerial paradox eco-system is relevant, but also that the “paradox readiness” of these stakeholders plays an important role for managerial experience of and coping with paradox in practice.

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Table 1: Summary and examples of unintended consequences of paradox leadership

	Manager 1	Manager 2	Manager 3
Unintended consequence	The leadership is well aware of the paradox at hand but chooses to ‘push’ the paradox down into the organization leaving the Manger at the lower level with no means to cope with the paradox.	Some officers feel that their profession is under pressure because of the shift from a more craft-oriented and experience based education to a more academic based education. Only the first part of the coping strategy, accreditation of the officers courses are implemented leaving some officers with the impression that paradox coping strategy was a promise that did not deliver resulting in mistrust.	Facing a major organizational change and new tasks, but with fewer resources, a Colonel in the Airforce are surprised to learn that the implementation of the Leadership Codex has made his organization more resilient to the change process thereby meeting less resistance.
Core paradox	The (Manager) Army Lieutenant Colonel main responsibility is to train and prepare a unit for their next mission but do not have enough personnel to do so. This could be viewed as a Performing/Organizing tension according to Smith and Lewis (2011).	Some of the Danish Officers education has been accredited according to equivalent demands for higher education programs in Denmark while at the same time undergoing huge budget cost thereby reducing the more experienced based and craft-oriented teaching. This could be viewed as a Learning/Belonging tension according to Smith and Lewis (2011).	During a major organizational change happening over only a few months and with budget cuts at the same time the need for new Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) should be developed. This could be viewed as a Learning/Organizing tension according to Smith and Lewis (2011).
Paradox coping strategy of manager	The Manager tries to cope with the tension by pressuring his soldiers to work (a lot of) extra hours and in some cases reduce level of preparing, e.g., cancelling training exercises.	The Manager tries to navigate the tension by removing some of the more craft-oriented teaching from accredited academic courses with the intent to open up new courses that can pick up the teaching that are removed.	The Airforce Colonel tried to implement more lean procedures to meet the budget cuts and expected a high degree of resistance in the organization.

Manager’s view of Subordinates’ (non-managers) reactions to paradox navigation strategy:	<p>The dissatisfaction among the soldiers rises. The ability to keep the experienced soldiers from leaving and filling the vacant positions becomes increasingly difficult.</p>	<p>The Manager is met with hesitation, resistance or even obstruction from teachers but eventually gets the changes implemented and the courses accredited.</p>	<p>The high degree of expected resistance to change did not happen. Instead, he found that the shared understanding among his officers of the challenges as paradoxes made them more resilient and able to navigate conflicting demands facing them with “both-and”-solutions rather than “either-or”-solutions.</p>
Manager’s view of immediate superior’s reactions to paradox navigation strategy	<p>The Army Colonel is proud of the unit’s work and the high professional standards they manage to reach during training and preparation, despite the difficult situation with lack of personnel. He sees no immediate solution to the challenge.</p>	<p>The leader of the Manager is very satisfied with the result and do not share the teachers’ concern of the profession being under pressure.</p>	<p>The Colonel’s superior was very happy and a little bit surprised with the fast results and almost no “noise” from the organization.</p>