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Larsen, Christian Albrekt

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National identity across two dimensions

Christian Albrekt Larsen,

This chapter discusses how national identity, one of the main concepts/variables throughout this book, should be measured and interpreted (the chapter is a shortened version of Larsen 2017). Based on my previous work, the chapter suggests that we respectively think about the *content* of the national identity and the *intensity* of the national identity. As for the content dimension, I follow a long tradition, which distinguishes between civic and ethnic nationalism (I use national identity and nationalism interchangeably). As for the intensity dimension of national identity, I simply distinguish between low and high intensity. These basic distinctions leave us with four ideal-types. A *low-intensity civic nationalism*, a *high-intensity civic nationalism*, a *low-intensity ethnic nationalism* and a *high-intensity ethnic nationalism*. See Figure x.1 The chapter explains how I have derived at this classification and how the residents of various countries can be positioned. Thus, the main contribution is to better understand the character of national identity across countries. The link between the character of the national identity and measures of social cohesion is *not* analyzed in the chapter. However, in the last section, I propose ideal-typical cohesion-building-strategies attached to the four ideal-types.

The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section introduces the civic-ethnic distinction. The second discusses four pitfalls related to this distinction. The third introduces and discusses how national identity has been measured in empirical data, in particular the civic and ethnic distinction, The fourth section introduces multi-classification-analysis (MCA) as a methodological tool to describe national identity. The fifth section interprets the results from MCA applied to the largest available dataset on national identity; the national identity module in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The sixth section describes the average position of residents of 44 different nation-states. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief summary and prepositions about links between the character of national identity and strategies related to social cohesion.

Figure x.1. National identity across two dimensions. Four ideal-typical positions and empirical positions based on the latest available ISSP national identity data (n=44)



The civic-ethnic distinction

The distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” perceptions of nationhood has been pivotal for scholarly work on nationalism (Kohn 1961[1944]). Arnason e.g. argues that *“In the whole literature on nation and nationalism, it would be hard to find a more seminal work than Hans Kohn’s ‘Idea of Nationalism’* (Arnason 2006: 46). At the same time, scholars of nationalism have also heavily criticized the dominance of this distinction. It has been argued that the distinction is conceptually unclear, too simple to capture the complex nature of perceptions of nationhood and of little relevance for contemporary attitudes to migration. My suggestion is to revitalize the classic distinction by means of a new method to interpret the existing data (see below). Kohn’s distinction had its roots in Meineke’s (1970[1907]) distinction between “staatsnation” (state nation) and “kulturnation” (culture nation). Kohn’s basic argument was that in Western Europe (his examples were France, the UK, The Netherlands and Switzerland), the borders of the state were settled prior to the rise of nationalism, which created a strong focus on the new democratic procedures that could legitimize the existing state. Nationalism therefore contained a narrative about turning oppressed inhabitants into citizens. In a less positive interpretation, Tilly calls it a “state-led nationalism” where *“rulers who spoke in a nation’s name successfully demanded that citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state”* (Tilly 1994:133). In contrast, the borders in Eastern Europe were settled after the rise of nationalism, which created a strong focus on the ethnic/cultural dimension of nationhood. Tilly calls it “state-seeking nationalism” where “*representative of some population that currently did not have collective control of a state claimed an autonomous political status, or even a separate state, on the ground that the population had a distinct, coherent cultural identity”* (Tilly 1994:133). Kohn used the terms “Western” and “Eastern” both to denote the geographic locations of the various ideas of the nation (Kohn drew the line between the area west of the Rhine and the areas east of the Rhine) and to denote two different ideal types of perceptions of nationhood.

The seminal historical work of Kohn has been followed by an important literature about the conceptual and empirical soundness of this distinction and its application on contemporary nation-states (Nielsen 1996, Hjerm 2003, Janmaat 2006, Jones, Smith 2001a, Jones, Smith 2001b, Kaufmann 1999, Kuzio 2002a, Reeskens, Hooghe 2010, Shulman 2002, Kymlicka 2000b, e.g. Ceobanu, Escandell 2008). Conceptually one of the key questions has been whether the distinction should be used as a dichotomy, a continuum or a two-dimensional space. Empirically one of the key questions has been, which variables actually measure “ethnic” and “civic”.

The pitfalls of the ethnic civic distinction

Kohn’s distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” is at the surface simple and convincing but still contains a number of pitfalls. Firstly, it is widely agreed that the use of the term ethnic is problematic. The problem is that ethnic is not easily defined and Kymlicka (2000b) rightly argues that perceptions of nationhood are typically formed around broader cultural markers, i.e. often it is shared norms, values and customs and not common ancestors that is believed to be crucial. And if common ancestors are believed to be crucial, it is typically because it is seen as the best guarantee for maintaining common values and norms. Thus, conceptually it is difficult to keep cultural and ethnic markers apart, which makes Meincke’s old term “kulturnation” more precise. Kohn’s himself actually seems to be well aware of the social construction of ethnic; *“Modern nationalities, however, are mixtures of different, and sometimes even very distant, races. ... Few is any nationalities can at present claim anything approaching common descent“* (Kohn 1944:14). The term “civic” is also somewhat problematic. If positively defined as state power legitimized through public participation in democratic procedures, the term gets normative connotations. Thus, Kohn has been accused of distinguishing between a “bad” and “good” kind of nationalism, which could be influenced by his own life story. Kohn was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1891), prisoner of war in Russia after the First World War and ended his life as a college teacher in the free US. Again Meincke’s term “staatsnation” seems more precise and neutral. “Political community” is another possibility.

Secondly, most contemporary scholars find it useful to replace Kohn’s dichotomy with either 1) a continuum from “civic/Western/political” at the one end to “ethnic/Eastern/cultural” at the other or 2) a two-dimensional solution. Those in favor of a continuum often cite Anthony Smith for the argument in his seminal 1991 book that “*… every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized”* (Smith 1991:13). However, most empirical studies, this one included, find a two-dimensional structure in perceptions of nationhood. This has led to the argument that empirically the “civic/Western/political” and “ethnic/Eastern/cultural” parts of perceptions of nationhood do not seem to be mutual exclusive phenomenon (Jones, Smith 2001a, Reeskens, Hooghe 2010, Jones, Smith 2001b, Janmaat 2006, Kunovich 2009). However, the previous studies are troubled by a weak conceptualization of what it means to be high/high or low/low on the two dimensions (though see Bonikowski, DiMaggio 2016 on the American case, and Larsen 2016 on the Danish case). The chapter suggests an alternative interpretation where “civic” is at the one end (in the top of Figure x.1) and “ethnic” at the other (in the bottom of Figure x.1), i.e. a one-dimensional continuum but with an additional second dimension measuring intensity (see below).

Thirdly, it can naturally be questioned whether inhabitants of a given nation-state share a common perception of nationhood or rather have a number of competing stories of nationhood. Especially scholars working on the American case have documented that a number of competing narratives about nationhood are present within the American public (Smith 2003, Bonikowski, DiMaggio 2016). The obvious answer is that Kohn refers to the dominant perception of nationhood. Kohn argues that *“The character of no people is fixed once and forever. Every people participates in the entire spiritual world of humanity and its richness; no human trait is missing in any people. But in different peoples different characteristics, abilities and tendencies receive a different emphasis. It is not the possession of definite traits which defines a people, but the tendency to accentuate them”* (1944:30). Kohn did have some substantive arguments for expecting some perceptions of nationhood to dominate. He. e.g. argued that *“the growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form”* (1944:4). Tilly is a bit more specific; *“states did commonly adopt programs of normative indoctrination designed to homogenize there subject populations and to activate there national commitments”* (Tilly 1994:138). The national school system that promotes a standardized language and a common understanding of the history of the nation-state is the clearest example. This “program of normative indoctrination” sometimes even include nationwide religious schooling. Other important programs of “normative indoctrination” are military service, ministries of culture and state-financed public mass media institutions. However, even with such institutions in place, one can find important within-country variation in perceptions of nationhood. Furthermore, perceptions of nationhood are often formed in opposition to each other, i.e. one narrative only makes sense with a counter-narrative present. In Kohn’s own work “civic” helps to define “ethnic” and the other way around. In the two-dimensional framework suggested by this chapter, each of the four quadrants also helps to define each other.

Fourthly, and most profoundly, Kohn provided a historical account connected to the geopolitical realities of the 18th and 19th century that might not be valid in the 20th or 21th century. The nature of the “birth” of a given nation-state might create better opportunities for some perceptions of nationhood than for others. However, history seems to have falsified any idea of a deterministic link between dominant perceptions of nationhood around the formation of a given nation-state and contemporary perceptions of nationhood. Germany is a point in case. The archetypical “kulturnation” seems in most aspects to have become a “statenation” (see below). Kohn’s other archetypical Eastern nation-states also undergo profound changes after the break down of the Soviet Union (e.g. Ceobanu, Escandell 2008, Shulman 2002, Kuzio 2002b). Using the ISSP data material from 1995, including 15 countries, Shulman (2002) concluded that the covered Eastern European countries were much more “civic” than expected. Schulman did not have longitudinal data and did warn about making firm conclusions based on a single cross-cut. But the available empirical evidence led to the argument that the Eastern countries might have overcome their “ethnic” nationalism of the past. In this chapter, there is evidence of a “backlash” to high-intensity ethnic nationalism in some of these countries (see below).

How to measure dimensions in perceptions of nationhood?

The majority of cross-national empirical studies of the “ethnic-civic” distinction have used the ISSP-module on national identity (www.issp.org). This is for good reasons as it is the most comprehensive dataset on perceptions of nationhood. The module was fielded in 23 nation-states in 1995, 33 in 2003 and 33 in 2013. In each nation-state, a representative sample of adult (18 years old and above) have been asked a common set of standard survey items. Most studies use the seven ISSP-items where respondents are asked what it means to be truly American, Russian, Dutch etc. The argument is that the criteria used to construct the (imagined) boundary between those inside and outside the nation are pivotal for the underlying perceptions of nationhood. This approach follows what has been labeled the boom in boundary studies within sociology (Wimmer 2008). The specific ISSP-question had the following introduction “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…”. The respondent was then asked about:

1) to have been born in [country].

2) to have [country] citizenship.

3) to have lived in [country] for most of one's life.

4) to be able to speak [country language].

5) to be a [dominant religion].

6) to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws.

7) to feel [country nationality].

Part of the inconclusiveness of the previous studies is caused by confusion about which of these items respectively measure "civic/Western/political" and "ethnic/Eastern/cultural". One solution is to choose indicators deductively. Schulman (2002) e.g. choose "born" (1), "citizenship" (2), "lived" (3), "laws" (6) and "feel" (7) to reflect "civic" and "language" (4) and "religion" (5) to reflect "ethnic". Another approach is to inductively look for dimensions in the responses of citizens. Here previous studies of the 1995 data derive at a two-dimensional solution, where "born" (1), citizenship" (2), "lived"(3) and "religion" (5) form the first dimension and "laws" (6), "feel" (7) and "language" (4) form the second dimension (Jones, Smith 2001a, Jones, Smith 2001b). Previous studies of the 2003 data derive at a similar solution for the second dimension and a close to a similar solution for the first dimension (though "citizenship" is left out of the first dimension and an additional item added in 2003 about ancestry was included) (Reeskens, Hooghe 2010: 589). The interpretation of these dimensions differs. Reeskens and Hooghe use the label "ethnic" (dimension 1) and "civic" (dimension 2), whereas Jones & Smith argue that the dimensions cut across the "civic-ethnic" divide (they especially find it problematic to include "language" (4) in "civic" and "citizenship" (2) in "ethnic". Thus, in a review, Janmart argues that *"a number of items… could have been interpreted differently by the respondents, which makes it difficult to assign meaning to underlying dimensions in the data"* (Janmaat 2006:58). Furthermore, the interpretation is (perceived to be) troubled by the fact that it has proved difficult to find a relationship between what these studies labeled the "ethnic-dimension" and negative attitudes to migration/migrants and between what these studies labeled the "civic-dimension" and positive attitudes to migration/migrants (Janmaat 2006). It has also proved difficult to link proudness measures (also measured in the ISSP-survey), the boundary measures and xenophobic attitudes more broadly (e.g. Hjerm 2003). All in all, this leaves an uncertainty about the interpretation, which e.g. leads Ceobanu & Escandell (2008) to replace the ethnic-civic distinction with four alternative dimensions, Jannmaat (2006) to supplement the ISSP data with Eurobarometer data, Bail to apply fuzzy-set techniques (2008) and Wrigth to test alternative rank-order measures to distinguish "ethnic" and "civic" elements in perceptions of nationhood among Americans (2011). The solution suggested by this chapter is to apply MCA (see next section), which comes with a number of advantages when dimensions are to be interpreted. Figure x.1 is derived from MCA.

Multi-classification analysis

The chapter makes use of the full ISSP dataset on national identity (see Larsen 2017 for details). The chapter contributes with a better interpretation of the two-dimensional structure that has been found in the previous studies of the ISSP-data. It does so by means of MCA, which is part of the broader methodology labeled geometric data analyses (Clausen 1998, Le Roux, Rouanet 2004, Husson, Lê & Pagès 2017). It is a method developed to describe relationships among categorical variables in large tables.

In the first step of MCA, the relevant variables are chosen. The chapter follows the previous literature and use the seven items introduced above. These so-called active variables are used to establish the relevant "space". The respondents could answer the questions using the following categories "very important", "fairly important", "not very important", "not important at all" and "can't choose". The answers are recoded into "very/fairly important" (marked by a "+" in online appendix Figure x.1) and "not very/not all important" (marked by "– " in Appendix Figure x.1). In the second step of MCA, the relevant number of dimensions is chosen. The eigenvalue of the first dimension is 0.34 (x-axis), explaining 33 percent of the inertia within the data, and the eigenvalue of the second is 0.15 (y-axis), explaining 15 percent of the inertia. Appendix Figure x.1 shows the derived two-dimensional space (or cloud of modalities). Categories located close to each other indicate that these answers tend to go together.

The MCA-analysis largely replicates what is found with other techniques in previous studies (close to identical to the solution with six multidimensional indicators provided by Kunovich 2009:580) but as discussed above the substantial interpretation of these dimensions have troubled previous studies. MCA comes with the advantage that so-called supplementary variables can easily be added. These variables do not actively shape the constructed space but the position of the categories of the supplementary variables ease the interpretation of the dimensions and the clustering. The added additional variables are importance of family background (item added in 2003), feeling of national belonging, feeling of proudness about the nation, attitudes to the size of migration, attitudes to whether migrants should assimilate and preference for given priority to national programs and films in TV. Thus, the chapter advances the field by using these supplementary categories in the substantive interpretation of dimensions and clustering.

The interpretation of the two dimensions of perceptions of nationhood

The substantive interpretation of the dimensions and the clustering is crucial but complex. The first dimension is suggested to distinguish between those who in general find these criteria important, located to the right in Appendix Figure x.1, and those who in general find these criteria less important, located to the left. Though the importance assigned to be born in the country and have lived most of the life in the country (see above) contributed the most to this dimension, it is not simply an “ethnic” dimension. Our interpretation is that it is a matter of higher or lower intensity of nationalism, in any form. It is not so puzzling that those who find it important to have lived most of the life in the country also tend to find it important to have citizenship in order to a truly e.g. American. This is what is indicated by the low distance between these two categories in the right side of Appendix Figure x.1. And the other way around. Among those with low-intensity national identity, it is not so puzzling that those who do not find it important to have lived most of one’s life in the country neither find citizenship very important in order to be e.g. truly French. The second dimension is, as already mentioned, suggested to distinguish “civic” and “ethnic”; or in more neutral terms between the relative weight respectively given to the political or cultural (imagined) community. The “civic” minded, scoring high on the vertical axis, find it unimportant to have been born in the country, to have lived in the country most of the life and belong to the dominant religion but find it highly important to respect the laws. The “ethnic” minded, scoring low on the vertical axis, find it unimportant to respect the law, speak the language and feel national but find it important to belong to the dominant religion and be born in the country. Turning to the supplementary variables and the four established quadrants, one can further elaborate on this interpretation.

Those in the lower right quadrant distinguish themselves by finding it important to belong to the dominant religion in the country, to have been born in the country and to have lived most of one's life in the country in order to be "really" French, American, Turkish, etc. Those answering "very proud" of their national identity tend to be located in the lower right quadrant. Those in the lower right quadrant also tend to answer that migration should be "decreased a lot" and agree in the statement that national television should give preference to national films and programs. This supports the interpretation that the lower right quadrant is a high-intensive ethnic nationalism.

Those located in the upper left quadrant distinguish themselves by taking more or less the opposite position as those in the lower right quadrant. The supplementary variable show that those in the upper left quadrant tend to answer that they only fell "somewhat" proud of the nation (not "very proud" as those in the lower right quadrant) and feel "close" to the nation (not "very close" as those in the upper right quadrant). They tend to disagree with the statement that national TV stations should give priority to national programs and they find the family background to be unimportant for being a real member. Finally, they answer, on average, that immigration should "remain the same" or "increase a little". This supports the interpretation of low-intensity civic nationalism.

Those located in the upper-right quadrant distinguish themselves by finding it important that members respect the law, speak the language, and feel national. Those in the upper right quadrant tend to answer that they feel "very close" to the country and that migration should "decrease a little". They also distinguish themselves by answering that "it is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society". This supports the interpretation of high-intensity civic nationalism.

Finally, the segment in the lower left quadrant generally finds the criteria unimportant but is at the same time dominated by ethnic nation perceptions. It is the most challenging quadrant to interpret. Those located in the lower-left quadrant distinguish themselves by especially finding it unimportant to be able to speak the language, feel national and respect the law. The supplementary variables added provides some further insight. Those located here distinguish themselves by being "not proud at all" or "not very proud" of their nationality. Many also answer that they do not feel "close at all" or "not very close" to the nation. Respondents in this segments seem to have a somewhat troublesome relationship to nationalism but beneath the low-intensity one finds ethnic markers of nationality.

The cross-country-variation in perceptions of nationhood

The ISSP data clearly indicate across-country-variation (see Larsen 2017 for further details). Figure x.1 shows the (average) position of the country in the latest available sample. In the upper left low intensive civic quadrant, one largely finds the Northern European countries. As expected from Kohn's historical account, France is found in this quadrant. The two countries with the most clear-cut low-intensity civic nationalism are Sweden (2013) and the Netherlands (2003). In accordance with Kohn's historical division, one also finds Denmark (2013), Switzerland (2013) and Belgium (2013) in the upper left quadrant. In conflict with Kohn's division, Germany (2013), Estonia (2013) and Slovenia (2013) and Taiwan (2013) are found in this quadrant. Norway (2013), Finland (2013) and Iceland (2013) are "Western" countries but their borders were settled late in history. Thus, one could also perceive these cases as deviant if Kohn's historical distinction is applied in a deterministic manner.

In accordance with Kohn's historical division, one finds most of the none-Western countries in the high-intensity ethnic quadrant. East European countries such as Poland (2003), Slovakia (2013), Bulgaria (2003), Hungary (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Lithuania (2013) together with neighboring Russia (2013) and Georgia (2013) are located here. So is Austria (2003) and Italy (1995). In accordance with Kohn, one also finds countries with late settled state borders such as the Philippines (2013), Venezuela (2003), India (2013), Turkey (2013), Mexico (2013), Uruguay (2003), Chile (2003), South Korea (2013) and South Africa (2003) in the lower right high-intensity ethnic quadrant. The latter, South Africa, is positioned as the country with the most clear-cut high-intensity ethnic nationalism (2003). The only country in the quadrant in conflict with Kohn's historical division is New Zealand (2003) but she is positioned close to the center, which indicates a fairly equal distribution of citizens across the two-dimensional space.

Finally, one finds the positions of countries that cannot easily be handled by Kohn's dichotomy. In the upper right high-intensity civic quadrant, one finds the settler societies such as Australia (2003), the US (2013) and Canada (2003) together with Portugal (2013) and Latvia (2013). UK (2013) is located at the border of this quadrant. Again, the location near the center indicates that most of these countries have large groups of citizens located in the other segments. Nevertheless, it fits the historical account that intensive civic nationalism is particularly widespread in settler societies. Especially, the position of Canada is remarkable. In 1995, Canada had on overrepresentation of citizens with low-intensity civic nationalism, which positioned the country together with the Netherlands and Sweden; the three countries that have experimented the most with so-called "multicultural policies" (Koopmans 2005). In 1995, only 52 per cent of Canadians found it important to have been born in the country, only 55 per cent found it important to have lived most of one's life in Canada and only 26 found it important to be Christian (see Larsen 2017). In 2003, the shares had increased to 82 per cent, 83 per cent and 54 per cent. This Canadian move to high-intensive civic nationalism is also described in national studies. Wong & Guo e.g. describe how the Canadian multicultural "civic" policies of the 1990s were replaced with more "integrative" policies of the 2000s (2015:4). The lower left quadrant can neither be handled by Kohn's dichotomy. In Ireland (2013), Israel (2013), Croatia (2013), Spain (2013) and Japan (2013) there is an overrepresentation of citizens that find the criteria unimportant but still are dominated by ethnic nationhood perceptions. Our interpretation is that it primarily has to do with collective memories of violence attached to high-intensity ethnic nationalism in the context of fixed nation-boundaries (see the last section). However, if a marker for national identity is to be found, they are still dominated by ethnic perceptions.

Conclusion and additional prepositions

The chapter has revitalized one of the most enduring distinctions within studies of nationalism. Despite all the pitfalls of Kohn's distinction between "ethnic" and "civic" nationalism, the article argues that it points to some very basic insights, which continue to be of relevance for contemporary analyses of perceptions of nationhood. When narratives about nationhood are constructed, the rulers and the ruled continue to rely on identities that can be connected to the political community around the governing of the state and/or identities that can be connected to cultural communities around shared language, religion, food, arts, etc. Nationalism always seems to have elements of both but they do stand in an antagonistic relationship with each other. This was the y-axis in Figure x.1. The content of national identity. The main contribution of the chapter was to add an intensity dimension, the x-axis in Figure x.1, to this classic civic/ethnic distinction. Thereby one derives at four ideal-types low-intensity civic nationalism, high-intensity civic nationalism, low-intensity ethnic nationalism and high-intensity ethnic nationalism, which can be used to describe the national identity of individuals, groups or even countries; by average positions.

The chapter has not covered how the dominance of various public perceptions of national identity is linked to social cohesion. However, with inspiration from Kohn and Tilly, I will end the chapter with some prepositions. Firstly, I suggest that ideal-typically, low-intensity civic nationalism dominates in countries that both have well-established state and nation boundaries. In this context, both the state and the nation are taken for granted. Therefore issues about social cohesion are focused on non-assimilated new-comers, i.e. immigrants. Thus, in an ideal-typical case, I would suggest that the dominant social cohesion building strategy is to assimilate these non-assimilated minorities. Sweden could be a case close to this ideal-type. The state borders are settled and there is little discussion about how to turn Swedes into Swedes, i.e. the nation (and the reproduction of the nation) is taken for granted. However, there is an intensive discussion about how to integrate immigrants. Secondly, I suggest that ideal-typically, high-intensity civic nationalism dominates in countries with well-established state boundaries but without well-established nation boundaries. In such contexts, issues about social cohesion are not only focused on non-assimilated minorities but on all residents within the state. Therefore, in an ideal-typical case, I would suggest that the dominant social cohesion building strategy is broad assimilation of everybody living in the country. The US could be a case close to this ideal-type. The state borders are clear but the nation borders are fuzzy. Therefore the nation (and the reproduction of the nation) is not taken for granted. It is an ongoing project to which everybody living within the state boundaries are exposed to and expected to take part in (Kymlicka 2000a).

Thirdly, I suggest, ideal-typically, that low-intensity civic nationalism is found in countries with well-established nation boundaries but fuzzy state boundaries. Thus, issues about social cohesion are primarily about where to draw the boundaries of the state. Therefore, in an ideal-typical case, the dominant social cohesion strategy is to adjust the state boundaries so that members of (the taken for granted) nation are inside the state borders and non-members (of the taken for granted) nation is outside these state borders. Ireland could be a case close to this ideal-type. The production and reproduction of being Irish is taken for granted but the state boundary to Northern Ireland is one of the most salient political issues in the public. Finally, I would suggest that ideal-typically, high-intensity ethnic nationalism typically dominates in countries with both fuzzy nation and state boundaries. In this context, the “country” is both nation- and state-seeking. It is in these contexts that one finds the most aggressive and violent social cohesion building strategies; genocide being the worst. A case close to such an ideal-type could be Turkey. The nation boundary is made fuzzy by strong divides between a secular and an Islamic tradition. Thus, what it means to be Turkish cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, the state boundaries of the Turkish state can neither be taken for granted. Large groups of Kurds question the South-Eastern borders. This is ideal conditions for high-intensive ethnic nationalism, which have led to a long history of severe repression of the Kurdish minority and the contemporary rise of Tayvip Erdoğan. All in the name of securing a coherent Turkish nation and state.

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