Determinants of government underfunded public pension liabilities in the OECD

Underfunded government liabilities for public pensions constitutes a major expenditure in the management of social programmes in many countries, but to date has not attracted much attention from accountants as it does not easily fit within an accrual-based accounting system. This paper discusses major measurement problems associated with this liability and then examines determinants of variations in projected flow-based funding patterns among OECD governments. Alternative 'behavioural persistence' and 'regression to the mean' hypotheses about the determinants of underfunding practices are formulated and tested using an OECD data set describing the financial and socioeconomic characteristics of government-sponsored public pension systems in these countries. Consistent with the behavioural persistence hypothesis, cross-sectional variations are found to be associated with the funding ratio and the rate of taxation required to keep government debt constant. Variations in underfunding practices across the sample are also sensitive to cultural differences in attitude towards public pension accountability between continental European and Anglo-American countries.