TY - JOUR
T1 - FlopCoin
T2 - A Cryptocurrency for Computation Offloading
AU - Chatzopoulos, Dimitris
AU - Ahmadi, Mahdieh
AU - Kosta, Sokol
AU - Hui, Pan
PY - 2018/5/1
Y1 - 2018/5/1
N2 - During the last years, researchers have proposed solutions to help smartphones improve execution time and reduce energy consumption by offloading heavy tasks to remote entities. Lately, inspired by the promising results of message forwarding in opportunistic networks, many researchers have proposed strategies for task offloading towards nearby mobile devices, giving birth to the Device-to-Device offloading paradigm. None of these strategies, though, offers any mechanism that considers selfish users and, most importantly, that motivates and defrays the participating devices who spend their resources. In this paper, we address these problems and propose the design of a framework that integrates an incentive scheme and a reputation mechanism. Our proposal follows the principles of the Hidden Market Design approach, which allows users to specify the amount of resources they are willing to sacrifice when participating in the offloading system. The underlying algorithm, that users are not aware of, is based on a truthful auction strategy and a peer-to-peer reputation exchange scheme. Extensive simulations on real traces depict how our designed mechanism achieves higher offloading rate and produces less traffic compared to three benchmark algorithms. Finally, we show how collaborating devices get rewarded for their contribution, while selfish ones get sidelined by others.
AB - During the last years, researchers have proposed solutions to help smartphones improve execution time and reduce energy consumption by offloading heavy tasks to remote entities. Lately, inspired by the promising results of message forwarding in opportunistic networks, many researchers have proposed strategies for task offloading towards nearby mobile devices, giving birth to the Device-to-Device offloading paradigm. None of these strategies, though, offers any mechanism that considers selfish users and, most importantly, that motivates and defrays the participating devices who spend their resources. In this paper, we address these problems and propose the design of a framework that integrates an incentive scheme and a reputation mechanism. Our proposal follows the principles of the Hidden Market Design approach, which allows users to specify the amount of resources they are willing to sacrifice when participating in the offloading system. The underlying algorithm, that users are not aware of, is based on a truthful auction strategy and a peer-to-peer reputation exchange scheme. Extensive simulations on real traces depict how our designed mechanism achieves higher offloading rate and produces less traffic compared to three benchmark algorithms. Finally, we show how collaborating devices get rewarded for their contribution, while selfish ones get sidelined by others.
KW - Ad-hoc Networks
KW - Cloud computing
KW - Computation Offloading
KW - Cryptocurrency
KW - Device-to-device communication
KW - Mobile communication
KW - Mobile computing
KW - Mobile handsets
KW - Proposals
KW - Servers
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029180130&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TMC.2017.2748133
DO - 10.1109/TMC.2017.2748133
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85029180130
SN - 1536-1233
VL - 17
SP - 1062
EP - 1075
JO - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IS - 5
ER -