Dannelsen af en psykologisk og videnskabelig habitus hos psykologistuderende

The formation of a psychological and scientific habitus in psychology students

Casper Feilberg, PhD thesis, Department of Psychology and Educational Studies, Roskilde University, 2014.

Summery in English
This thesis presents an empirical examination of the formation [Bildung] of aspects of a psychological and scientific habitus in psychology students at the Departments of Psychology at Roskilde University and Aalborg University. It contributes to the ongoing debate on the objective of and the quality of a university education.

The examination starts from an analytical distinction between a psychological habitus and a scientific habitus. In this way the double challenge of students of psychology is elucidated, consisting in 1) a need to learn how to understand other people in a qualified way in the light of our own lifeworld (psychological habitus), 2) but that this psychological sense for the case in question must be enriched by the use of scientific theory and method, if the students are to be able to act in a professional way when times come (scientific habitus). This unified whole is called a cultured (formed) psychological and scientific habitus.

The overall aim of the inquiry was to empower students and the psychological profession with autonomy and independence, therefore my research was guided by an emancipatory knowledge-guiding interest (cf Habermas) (p. 159-160).

Abstracts of chapters: Foundational theory (chap. 2). The foundational theory (pre-understanding) of the thesis describes the fundamental ontological, epistemological, ethical, and methodological approach to the research question. The thesis presents an existential phenomenology based on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur by underlining the primacy of the life-world within phenomenology. Hence we are in a position to understand the intertwining of experience, body, and thought in a way that is not limited to the physical body, but shared intersubjectively. It is possible to make a distinction between three levels of the lifeworld; the aestetic (experiential) level, the practical level and the theoretical level of meaning. This distinction must be understood in the sense that we inescapably experience in an immediate sense, and that the theoretical level of meaning is an abstraction of the wholeness of the lifeworld. This existential phenomenological foundational theory acts as the platform on which the contributions from critical theory (Habermas, Negt) and psychoanalysis (Bion) are based.

Qualitative research methodology and research design (chap. 3+5). An existential-phenomenological perspective on qualitative research methodology is put forward, stressing the phenomenon itself as an intersubjectively shared phenomenon. Other hallmarks are the transparency and exemplary meaning, as well as a controlled enquiry and an explication of fore-meanings with regard to the research phenomenon. This is based on the work of the phenomenologists Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Keller, as well as Blaikie with respect to research design. Thus a new phenomenological research methodology is presented, which bridges the traditional dichotomies between 1) induction and deduction, and 2) between a descriptive enquiry and an interpretive enquiry. I suggest that 1) the hermeneutical circle is understood as a dialectic between questions and answers, between fore-meanings and the revision of these in the light of the empirical observations and findings, as a continuous process towards a better understanding of the phenomenon itself (Gadamer), and that 2) phenomenological research is always necessarily descriptive, but at the same time the value of interpretation must be stressed for qualitative research methodology (Heidegger, Ricoeur).

The empirical material is collected at the Departments of Psychology at Roskilde University (RUC) and at Aalborg University (AAU) respectively. The study of psychology at RUC is a combination master’s programme with two subjects, of which psychology can be one of them. The study of psychology at AAU, though, is a full five year Master’s programme in psychology (cand. psych.: i.e. graduate in applied psychology). The empirical material is therefore collected as independent field studies.
The empirical material from RUC consists of an interview and a second interview with one student at the bachelor level and the master’s level respectively, as well as observations of, and group interviews with, their group members (4 interviews and 2 group interviews and 2 observations).
The empirical material from AAU consists of an interview and a second interview with one student at the bachelor level and the master’s level respectively, as well as observations of, and group interviews with, their group members, and observations of seminars (in all 4 interviews, 1 group interview and 2 observations). Furthermore, interviews with three students at the master’s level, and finally group interviews with two groups I supervised myself (in all 3 interviews and 2 group interviews).

Theoretical concept of the case in question (chap. 4). In order to describe central features of a psychological habitus and a scientific habitus, I draw on Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Bion, and Habermas. In a phenomenological interpretation of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, the habit is emphasized as central to understand the habitually incorporated readiness at the aesthetic and practical level of meaning. In my descriptions of features of a psychological habitus and a scientific habitus, I present a new way of viewing the development of professionalism within university psychology, by taking the dilemma of the profession as my starting point: to acquire both a psychological habitus and a scientific habitus and to unite them in a moulded psychological and scientific habitus. These features constitute the background understanding of the thesis as regards the interpretation of the empirical material. So, it consists of a two-legged structure; the sense of the psychological habitus of the phenomena and the perseverance as regards examining and describing them on the one hand, and the objectivity of the scientific habitus on the other, where a methodical examination and a theoretical explanation of it is supposed to develop further the immediate understanding. These two ’legs’ must, however, be combined, so that the immediate understanding informs the scientific concept, this in a way that further develops our understanding of the case itself: the readiness or this attitude I call a moulded psychological and scientific habitus.
In order to understand the processes of formation I draw on the works of Gadamer, Kemp, and Negt, and I emphasize on the one hand the necessary self-abandonment and engagement in the educational activity (existence at stake), and on the other the necessary movement back to oneself by developing one’s own voice. By the processes of formation I understand the incorporation and the acquisition of features of a psychological and scientific habitus, which is made possible through the students’ personalized imitation and inspiration of teachers and fellow students (the creating mimesis). To understand the restrictive and derailing dynamics in the processes of formation, in the scientific work and the group work, I draw on the theory of the psychoanalyst Bion about the feelings interweaving our reflective thinking. According to Bion we must endure and manage frustration and uncertainty in the work of understanding something basically new or complex.

The empirical results (chap. 6+7). The thesis shows that the benefits and the quality of education must be understood to what extent we succeed in influencing the way the student of psychology perceives, acts and thinks in a professional and scientific way. The formation of a psychological and scientific habitus must furthermore be understood from a social and emotional perspective in the intra- and interpersonal processes which are connected with changing one’s person and understanding of the world in a basic way. Through descriptions and interpretations of the education of the students, the phenomenon of existence at stake is pinned down as crucial for the students engagement in ways that put them in exactly the situations (in deep water) where they can grow the most. Especially the organization in groups is exemplary when it comes to supporting and making possible these processes of formation. The thesis presents examples of how strong emotions and processes are put at work (existential drama) in connection with the students’ work with a research question and psychological theory and method. But if existence at stake are to contribute constructively to the formation of the students, well-informed supervision is required. Finally, I argue that an increased knowledge of these promoting and restrictive processes can enhance the students’ formation of a psychological and scientific habitus.