Preliminary Security Analysis, Formalisation, and Verification of OpenTitan Secure Boot Code

Bjarke Hilmer Møller, Jacob Gosch Søndergaard, Kristoffer Skagbæk Jensen, Magnus Winkel Pedersen, Tobias Worm Bøgedal, Anton Christensen*, Danny Bøgsted Poulsen, Kim Guldstrand Larsen, René Rydhof Hansen, Thomas Rosted Jensen, Heino Juvoll Madsen, Henrik Uhrenfeldt

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceedingArticle in proceedingResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We perform a preliminary security analysis of the initial boot stage for the OpenTitan silicon root of trust, including formalisation and verification of relevant security goals using both bounded model checking and (unbounded) model checking. We further report on a potential vulnerability in the platform and show how it can be reproduced using formal modelling and argue that co-verification would be able to detect such vulnerabilities for high assurance projects.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSecure IT Systems : 26th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2021, Virtual Event, November 29–30, 2021, Proceedings
EditorsNicola Tuveri, Antonis Michalas, Billy Bob Brumley
Number of pages20
PublisherSpringer
Publication date10 Dec 2021
Pages192-211
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-91624-4
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-91625-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Dec 2021
Event26th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, NordSec 2021 - Virtual, Online
Duration: 29 Nov 202130 Nov 2021

Conference

Conference26th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, NordSec 2021
CityVirtual, Online
Period29/11/202130/11/2021
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
VolumeLNCS 13115
ISSN0302-9743

Keywords

  • Co-verification
  • Formal methods
  • Hardware modelling
  • Security

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