Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus

Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Axel Legay, Danny Bøgsted Poulsen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceedingArticle in proceedingResearchpeer-review


Tools and techniques for assessing the possibilities and impacts of attacks on IT systems are necessary to ensure the IT systems upon which society depends on continue to operate despite targeted attacks. This reality compels the development of intuitive brainstorming formalisms like attack-defense trees. With an attack-defense tree and a suitable system description, one can validate if a system succumbs to or withstands a described attack. Yet having established a secure system, it is still necessary to understand if and how system security may or may not be compromised or improved when the system requires modifications. Our research describes how we develop and implement a modeling methodology to resolve attacker-oriented refinement between systems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFormal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems : 28th International Conference, FMICS 2023, Proceedings
EditorsAlessandro Cimatti, Laura Titolo
Number of pages17
PublisherSpringer Nature Switzerland AG
Publication date2023
ISBN (Print)978-3-031-43680-2
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-031-43681-9
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Event28th International Conference on Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS 2023 - Antwerp, Belgium
Duration: 20 Sept 202322 Sept 2023


Conference28th International Conference on Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS 2023
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.


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