Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus

Kim Guldstrand Larsen; Axel Legay; Danny Bøgsted Poulsen

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6

Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus

Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Axel Legay, Danny Bøgsted Poulsen^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceeding › Article in proceeding › Research › peer-review

Abstract

Tools and techniques for assessing the possibilities and impacts of attacks on IT systems are necessary to ensure the IT systems upon which society depends on continue to operate despite targeted attacks. This reality compels the development of intuitive brainstorming formalisms like attack-defense trees. With an attack-defense tree and a suitable system description, one can validate if a system succumbs to or withstands a described attack. Yet having established a secure system, it is still necessary to understand if and how system security may or may not be compromised or improved when the system requires modifications. Our research describes how we develop and implement a modeling methodology to resolve attacker-oriented refinement between systems.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems : 28th International Conference, FMICS 2023, Proceedings
Editors	Alessandro Cimatti, Laura Titolo
Number of pages	17
Publisher	Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Publication date	2023
Pages	96-112
ISBN (Print)	978-3-031-43680-2
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-031-43681-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6
Publication status	Published - 2023
Event	28th International Conference on Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS 2023 - Antwerp, Belgium Duration: 20 Sept 2023 → 22 Sept 2023

Conference

Conference	28th International Conference on Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS 2023
Country/Territory	Belgium
City	Antwerp
Period	20/09/2023 → 22/09/2023

Series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Number	14290
ISSN	0302-9743

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

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10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6

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Cite this

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title = "Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus",

abstract = "Tools and techniques for assessing the possibilities and impacts of attacks on IT systems are necessary to ensure the IT systems upon which society depends on continue to operate despite targeted attacks. This reality compels the development of intuitive brainstorming formalisms like attack-defense trees. With an attack-defense tree and a suitable system description, one can validate if a system succumbs to or withstands a described attack. Yet having established a secure system, it is still necessary to understand if and how system security may or may not be compromised or improved when the system requires modifications. Our research describes how we develop and implement a modeling methodology to resolve attacker-oriented refinement between systems.",

author = "Larsen, {Kim Guldstrand} and Axel Legay and Poulsen, {Danny B{\o}gsted}",

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Larsen, KG, Legay, A & Poulsen, DB 2023, Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus. in A Cimatti & L Titolo (eds), Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems: 28th International Conference, FMICS 2023, Proceedings. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, no. 14290, pp. 96-112, 28th International Conference on Formal Methods in Industrial Critical Systems, FMICS 2023, Antwerp, Belgium, 20/09/2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6

Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus. / Larsen, Kim Guldstrand; Legay, Axel; Poulsen, Danny Bøgsted.
Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems: 28th International Conference, FMICS 2023, Proceedings. ed. / Alessandro Cimatti; Laura Titolo. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2023. p. 96-112 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; No. 14290).

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceeding › Article in proceeding › Research › peer-review

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